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This special issue has a dual intent. First and foremost, it engages with a core theoretical question:
how can the comparative, cross-cultural study of hagiographical sources be carried out in a way that is
meaningful and productive? In so doing, it offers a scientific discussion of questions about taxonomy,
and multi- and cross-disciplinary approaches. Its intent is to develop a critical comparative approach
to most effectively engage with emic discourses on and about individuals recognized as perfected by a
given community or tradition—however this perfection may be understood in its original cultural and
social context.
Secondly, it also cultivates a methodological goal, exploring strategies to conduct dynamic
scholarly collaboration in Religious Studies. If we are to produce thoroughly comparative studies of
religious phenomena in general, and of hagiographical practices and productions in particular, it is
advisable that we involve people who bring diverse specializations to the conversation. This includes
a diversity of disciplinary training (e.g., history, sociology, philosophy), focus area (e.g., historical,
geographical, cultural), religious traditions studied (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity, Islam), competencies
(e.g., cognitive, linguistic, philosophical), identity (e.g., gender, race, geographic origin), and status
(e.g., tenured, untenured, graduate student). This raises at least two further questions: how to foster
and enact collaboration when doing research; and how to share the ensuing findings in a way that
foregrounds the collaborative effort.1
In the past thirty years, critiques of Europe-centric, Christian-rooted, colonial taxonomies have
frequently challenged the use of hagiography as a valid and valuable category for the apprehension of
historiographical sources (e.g., Lifshitz 1994; Heffernan 1988). This scholarly attitude reflects a general
rejection of comparative cross-cultural and religious endeavors, especially as exemplified in the work
of Jonathan Z. Smith.
In recent years, though, the comparative study of religious phenomena, on a variety of scales
and with greater reflexivity, has seen a resurgence. This has been the case within essentialist,
phenomenological, and theological projects (Rose 2016; Voss Roberts 2016; Clooney and von Stosch
2017), which historically were at the center of most post-modern critique. In the past two decades,
though, there has also been a growing effort to maintain the primacy of comparison, especially
when empirically grounded, as an invaluable means to apprehend “the other” (most recently:
Schmidt-Leukel and Nehring 2016; van de Veer 2016; Freiberger 2018; Freiberger 2019). Parallel to
1 The contributors to this special issue volunteered to work on these essays from a much larger group of keen collaborators
that gathered, rather organically, over the course of three years at different scholarly venues. We are mindful that our group
could be more heterogeneous, as could also the pool of representatives who were able to commit to work on the articles
published here. As organizer of most of these collaborative events, I feel that more intentional and targeted recruiting could
have yielded broader representation and a greater variety of perspectives. I nevertheless felt that, as a way to challenge
established practices of doing scholarship in Religious Studies towards the cultivation of a collaborative framework it was
preferable, at least at this early stage, to rely primarily on individual inclinations and willingness to step outside one’s
academic comfort zone. It is my hope that our readers will be inspired by our experiment to join us in a second, more
heterogeneous phase of collaborative development.
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this shift in methodological approach, scholars of religion and cultural historians began to display a
renewed interest in the critical study of hagiography, broadly defined, in comparative and cross-cultural
perspectives (e.g., Monge et al. 2016; Ownby et al. 2016; Rondolino 2017).
In light of this new shift towards comparison, the post-modernist critiques of comparison, and
the complex history of the category hagiography, we find ourselves at a most apt moment to re-envision
comparative hagiology as a worthwhile collaborative exercise in the academic study of religions.
The expression comparative hagiology, meaning the scholarly, scientific cross-cultural comparative
study of hagiographic sources, first appeared in anglophone academia in 1908 (MacCulloch 1908).
More recently, the term hagiology, referring to the scientific study of sanctity and the writings about it,
features in the title of an ambitious francophone academic series, published by Brepols, on the study of
Western Christian saints and their cult: “Hagiologia: Études sur la Sainteté et l’Hagiographie.”2 Here,
we adopt the expression “comparative hagiology” in the sense of a scientific study of phenomena,
discourses and processes on, about, and for the production, distribution, and consumption of hagiography
in global perspectives. This necessarily requires us to first (re)define what is meant by hagiography, and
how we might use the category.
The essays in this special issue represent a first attempt at formalizing, in a publicly accessible
written format, some of the outcomes from a series of conversations that took place over the past
three years about theorizing hagiography and hagiology cross-culturally.3 Of these, two pre-conference
workshops at the 2017 and 2018 conferences of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) provided
the core questions and themes that the contributors to this special issue develop. Participants to these
workshops explored the notion of comparative hagiology in loosely oriented, free-form, small and large
scale group discussions. Everyone was asked to draw extensively on their own scholarly expertise,
research, and experience, but also to bring an open mind and willingness to bridge disciplinary and
cultural divides, as they engaged with a diverse group of scholars of religions. As we engaged with
questions of theory, method, and taxonomy, underscored by ethical concerns that echo post-colonial,
post-modern, and feminist critiques of academia, we eventually came to a practical question. How do
we balance our desire for innovative and collaborative approaches to humanistic scholarship with the
professional realities of the contemporary academic work environment (particularly in North America)?
For example, how can we reach beyond our individual areas of expertise while also accounting for the
institutional structures and metrics for promotion and tenure that tend to be based almost exclusively
on single authorial ownership and recognition? The present special issue is our experiment with
one such alternative mode of collaborative thinking and writing that also acknowledges the need to
guarantee, especially for junior academics, an explicit and exclusive authorial recognition.
Consequently, we decided to structure the 2018 AAR pre-conference workshop around the
discussion of five core individual reflections on “Comparative Hagiology,” written by the contributors
to the 2017 AAR panel “Recentering Sacred Biography”—Todd French (Rollins College), David
DiValerio (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), Jon Keune (Michigan State University), Sara Ritchey
(University of Tennessee, Knoxville), and myself, Massimo Rondolino (Carroll University).4 Their task
2 See: http://www.brepols.net/Pages/BrowseBySeries.aspx?TreeSeries=HAG. For an analogous use of the term, see also
(Grégoire 1996). For a critical reflection on the term in the context of its historical development within the Bollandist project,
see (Philippart 2012).
3 Unless explicitly stated, I was the event organizer. 2016 International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo MI: paper
panel “Comparative Perspectives in Hagiology.” 2017 conference of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in Boston
MA: pre-conference workshop “Comparative Hagiology;” paper panel “Recentering Sacred Biography: Hagiography as
a Category of Analysis for Comparative Sanctities” (organized by Sara Ritchey). 2018 AAR conference in Denver, CO:
pre-conference workshop “Comparative Hagiology: Issues in Theory and Method;” paper panel “Saints and Their Miracles:
Comparing Miracle Stories in Christian and Hindu Hagiography” (organized by Patton Burchett); paper panel “The Ethics
of the Saints: Re-Reading and Re-Writing Hagiographical Texts” (organized by Brian Siebeking); paper panel “Hagiography
and Patronage.”
4 DiValerio’s contribution is in lieu of Gloria I-Ling Chien’s (Gonzaga University), who was one of the panelists of “Recentering
Sacred Biography” but was unable to contribute to the 2018 workshop and the current special issue.
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was to draft a concise self-reflection on whether and how to do comparative, cross-cultural studies
on hagiographical sources, drawing from their respective disciplinary training, areas of expertise,
competencies, and past research. Each one was also asked to do so concisely, and with a focus on theory
and method, with the ultimate goal of fostering a dynamic discussion on second-order hagiological
analysis. In light of the conversations at the workshop, we then reworked our contributions into the
five concise and highly focused essays that begin this special issue, which we then shared virtually
among all contributors for further comments, feedback and exchange.5 All other participants in the
2018 workshop were also invited to respond to any number of the five core papers they wished to
engage with, to whichever extent (depth and breadth) most closely resonated with their sensitivities
as well as personal and professional experiences (as scholars, as area specialists, as comparativists,
as hagiologists, as teachers, etc.), further explicitly addressing our group’s collaborative model in
its entirety. Six participants have contributed responses to this special issue: Kevin Guilfoy (Carroll
University), Scott Harrower (Ridley College), Nikolas Hoel (Northeastern Illinois University), Aaron
Hollander (Graymoor Ecumenical and Interreligious Institute), Brian Siebeking (Gonzaga University),
and Barbara Zimbalist (University of Texas, El Paso).
I anticipate that this combination of structured reflection and free-form discussion will puzzle
some readers. I am also confident, though, that the dynamism that this format engendered among
the contributors (in person and virtually) generated insights into aspects none of us would have
otherwise identified—and certainly not in the manner in which they appear in this special issue.
The plurality of views and opinions presented here necessarily reflects our individual sensitivities,
scholarly trainings, and research agendas, and these may resonate more with some readers and less
with others. The overarching concern that all essays share is the need to identify common tools for
an interdisciplinary, comparative, and intentional study of religious and hagiographical phenomena,
tools that should prove of interest to all scholars of religions, regardless of disciplinary training and
focus area. It is our hope that, in reading the product of our collaborative efforts, more will join our
ongoing conversation, with the understanding that agreement is less important than commitment to
engage constructively in mutual self-reflection.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: Not all participants to our panels and workshops were able to contribute to this special
issue. Nevertheless, the essays we present here owe much to the exchanges we collectively engaged in during
the 2017 and 2018 AAR pre-conference workshops. Here, I would like to recognize all the workshop members
who do not feature in this special issue, and who, sharing with all of us their knowledge, views, and expertise,
have nevertheless made it possible: Travis Ables, Dean Accardi, Wendy Love Anderson, Joel Bordeaux, Daniel
Burton-Rose, Gloria I-Ling Chien, Jennifer Eichman, Pascale Engelmajer, Tyler Feezell, Seokyung Han, Hans
Harmakaputra, Ayesha Irani, Chloe Martinez, Richard McGregor, Verena Meyer, Margaret Anne Moore, Joshua
Mugler, Aaron Reich, Roberta Sabbath, Tim Sanders, Charles Talar, Anna Taylor, Michael VanZandt Collins, and
Stefan Wheelock. A particular thanks to Charles Talar for his English translation of Guy Philippart’s 1994 essay
“Hagiographes et Hagiographie, Hagiologes et Hagiologie: Des Mots et des Concepts”, which was circulated
among the participants in both workshops.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Abstract: Since its now notorious mid-1800s historiographical positivist critiques, the term hagiography
was often contested as a valid and valuable category for the comparative study of religious phenomena.
This essay argues for the perpetuation and careful use of the term hagiography and its cognates in
comparative contexts. Drawing from my work on the narrative traditions of the medieval Christian
Saint Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) and the Tibetan Buddhist Milarepa (c. 1052–1135), I offer a
revised definition of hagiography that reflects the nexus of behaviors, practice, beliefs, and productions
through which a community constructs the memory of a human being it considers to have embodied
religious perfection. I then suggest that the category, so redefined, allows us to more readily and
accurately characterize these kinds of narratives. Consequently, we can easily apprehend them as
emic historiographical creations that situate a given community between past and future in light of a
given theory of truth, embodied in the literary saintly figure. This, eventually, orients individuals and
communities, doctrines, and practices within a historical timeframe.
Keywords: comparative religions; definition; disciplinary innovation; hagiography; hagiology;
religious studies; sacred biography; sainthood; theory and method in religious studies; taxonomy
Textual, visual, performative, and archeological sources, as well as practices and behaviors, about
saints are instrumental for the academic study of the cultural history of religious communities.1 In the
second half of the 1900s, scholars of early and medieval Christendom exquisitely demonstrated this
by examining the manners and modes in which devotees and practitioners crafted, communicated,
and lived their notion and memory of individuals who were seen as exemplars of Christian virtue
(see, most notably, Graus 1965; Brown 1981; Vauchez 1981; Bynum 1987; Heffernan 1988; Head 1990).
Crucially, these studies are also all necessarily comparative; they examine a plurality of phenomena
(illuminating one specific instance in light of others or contrasting some phenomena against others) as
a way to discern, among other factors, how these were generated, by which people, against which
others, or to whose benefit.2 Eventually, with an understanding of sainthood as a constructed notion,
reflective of discrete historical, geographic, social, and cultural factors (Delooz 1962, 1969), within a
scholarly historiographical discourse, the question is no longer about who the person-saint might have
actually been. Instead, it is about the functions that might be fulfilled in making that individual a saint
and how these relate to an individual’s or a group’s worldview and activity.
In the context of the study of the Franciscan question, for example, the comparative examination
of sources on the life of Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) allowed scholars to move beyond determining
1 Mindful of its historical and theological Christian connotations, the term saint and its cognates are here adopted more
broadly as a heuristic device to readily and intuitively refer to individuals that a particular tradition, group, or individual
recognizes as perfected in light of a given theory of truth and an eventual related soteriology (see, for example, Hawley 1987;
Kieckhefer and Bond 1988; Ray 1993).
2 On the modes of comparative analysis, see (Freidenreich 2004; Freiberger 2018, 2019).
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which was the most historically accurate and, in a positivist sense, “true” (Sabatier 1894). Eventually,
this shift led to an appreciation of the competing ideological interpretations and agendas (theological
and political) of each author and their social realities (Frugoni 1993; Dalarun 1996; Manselli 2002;
Pellegrini 2004; Vauchez 2009).3 This crucial focal shift in the scholarly study of narratives on saints is
not unique to works about the history of the Christian world (whether in late antiquity, the greater
middle ages, or early modernity). In Buddhist studies at large, for example, scholars showed that
similar compositional dynamics also take place in the context of the construction of the narratives
of fully enlightened beings, whether monks in the Theravāda tradition (Schober 1997), one among
Tibet’s most renowned Buddhist tertön (Tibetan gter ston, a visionary discoverer of esoterically hidden
teachings) (Gyatso 1998),4 the first patriarch of the Chan lineage of Chinese Buddhism (Jorgensen 2005),
or the most famous Tibetan Buddhist lay ascetic (Quintman 2014).
It is already possible to discern a correspondence of the ways in which individuals and communities
codified the lives of beings seen as perfected across cultures, religious traditions, historical periods,
and geographical areas. This similarity in the phenomena and their dynamics is further complemented
by a similarity in the way in which they were studied from the second half of the 1900s onward. It
is at this time, in the history of western academia, in fact, that, even if only in relation to a distinct
historic–cultural context, scholars compared sources in light of the ideological, doctrinal, social, and
political contexts in which they were produced and received. Notably, this shift necessarily also forces
us to compare, contrast, cross-examine, and differentiate all relevant hagiographical data in light of the
respective discourses that inform the construction of the notion of their portrayed subject as saint.
Here, I wish to contribute to this ongoing conversation toward establishing a shared vocabulary
for the comparative study of hagiographical sources, whether inter- or cross-culturally. In particular, I
argue that we should adopt the concept of hagiography as an analytical category for the taxonomy of
sources that contribute to construct and promote the recognition of a given individual as a perfected
being in the context of a particular religious theory of truth—note that I here consistently italicize the
term as a way to readily problematize the very nature of the category. As such, then, comparative
hagiology designates an academic, scientific approach to the study of particular religious phenomena,
which is understood as a discursive inquiry into historiographical sources (whether textual, visual,
performative, or archeological).5 Crucially, the data apprehended are here not to be taken to do
historiography in the sense that they “write/develop history” in a (manifestly prejudiced) positivist
sense. Rather, they are historiographical because they contribute to the construction of their own makers’
sense of historical identity. In this respect, such sources enact a past that informs and provides meaning
to their authors’ present, often also prefiguring a possible future ((Lifshitz 1994; Turner Camp 2015;
Rondolino 2017); on historical narratives and the construction of identity, see also (Cassinari 2011)).6
3 On the “Franciscan question”, see, most notably, (Minocchi 1902; Manselli 1974, 1980).
4 Gyatso’s work also raises stimulating questions about the relationship between author and subject when the person who is
being narrated as perfected is also the one who is narrating, a dynamic that Claudio Leonardi, reflecting on Augustine’s
Confessions, aptly categorized “auto hagiography” (Leonardi [2000] 2011). On the relationship between author and subject in
the context of religious autobiographical writings, see also (Martinez 2018).
5 On the academic study of “religions”, particularly as a secular project, see, among others, (McCutcheon 1999; Geertz
2000; McCutcheon 2003, 2014; Ramey 2015). See also the activity of the North American Association for the Study
of Religion (https://naasr.com/) and its publications: Brill’s Method & Theory in the Study of Religion (https://brill.com/
view/journals/mtsr/mtsr-overview.xml) and Equinox Publishing’s series “Concepts in the Study of Religion” (https:
//www.equinoxpub.com/home/concepts-in-the-study-of-religion/).
6 Drawing from Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the historiographical fallacy (Nietzsche 2010, 2014), Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
claim that all seeing is always a seeing as (Wittgenstein 1977) and Willard Van Orman Quine’s argument that truth is
fundamentally relative to theory (van Orman Quine 1969, 1992), I contend that this is what scientific historiography also
does and so do we, scholars of religions, when studying and writing about our subjects. If, ultimately, we are bound
by our mental formations and categorical lenses for the apprehension of phenomena, then our reflections and writings
necessarily communicate more about our historically, culturally, and socially contingent theoretical frameworks (but also,
anxieties, aspirations, fears, and hopes), than the objective “truth” of the objects we are studying. In this perspective, I
see the social–scientific self-awareness advocated, among others, by Jonathan Z. Smith and Oliver Freiberger (Smith 2000;
Freiberger 2019) as a critical method to empower us toward engaging, with increasing sophistication, with the one object of
6
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Thus, hagiographical sources engage with and contribute to the development of their social group’s
historiographical discourse. Studying their works and activities, therefore, also forces us to reconsider
and challenge established scholarly categories, for the enactment of critical taxonomical and theoretical
revisions and redefinitions (Keune 2019).7
I contend that the notion of hagiography, at its core, is a heuristic device that serves a taxonomical
function for the following:8 (1) the identification of a given datum; (2) its classification within a group
of similar and already known phenomena; and (3) its study and interpretation in light of the web
of relationships and characteristics proper to that group. As noted, the scholarly enterprise is also a
discourse, much like the hagiographical cultural contexts it studies. Adopting the category hagiography,
therefore, should also entail a critical assessment of the rhetorical processes and discourses out of
which it grew and within which it was used. Thus, engaging in this kind of assessment would also
further our cultivation of a self-reflective, scientific approach to doing religious studies.9 If hagiography
is the comparative categorical lens through which we can identify, apprehend, and study phenomena,
discourses, and processes on, about, and for the construction and promotion of embodied perfected
ideals of religious truth, then it also needs to be fluid and revisable. This, as Jon Keune argues, further
necessarily requires us to engage with the (re)definition of the category religion and its applicability
(Keune 2019). In light of these considerations, then, a fourth step needs to be added to the three already
outlined above: (4) re-assess and rectify the analytical category in light of the data examined.
Before I suggest my working re-definition of hagiography, based on my own experience with the
cross-cultural identification, classification, and study of materials on and about saintly figures, some
further considerations on the category under discussion are warranted. Firstly, in the context of a
scholarly social–scientific study of religious phenomena, the term hagiography does not refer to any
essence or substance possessed by the object studied and arguably shared by all the other objects thus
apprehended. In other words, considering the etymology of the term, it does not posit a hagios, “holy”
or “sacred”, in the sources that we apprehend as hagiography. Similarly, hagiography does not translate
any emic term into our etic scholarly, formal vocabulary. For example, as I show in my work on the
narrative traditions about the medieval Christian St. Francis of Assisi and the Tibetan Buddhist yogin
Milarepa (c. 1052–1135), we may refer to their respective vitae and legendae, or namthar (Tibetan rnam
thar) as hagiography. Yet, the original classifiers fulfil stylistic and taxonomical functions proper to the
cultural world and doctrinal traditions that produced, used, and preserved them. These, in turn, may
or may not map completely (if at all) onto our scholarly use of hagiography, which is and remains a
formal category adopted within a scientific academic discourse.
Incidentally, both vita and namthar loosely do, as the two terms imply the telling of a life-story
framed within the doctrinal confines of a particular soteriology. The Latin vita, meaning “life” and
employed in the title of writings about St. Francis of Assisi, as in the Vita Beati Francisci by Thomas of
Celano (1185–1260), explicitly refers to the telling of the life and deeds of the titular person. Notably, in
Celano’s text, Francis is manifestly identified as perfected by the Latin term beatus (literally “blessed”),
whose discursive meaning is dependent on a particular theology and a very specific doctrinal reading
of its soteriology. Similarly, namthar is conventionally used in Tibetan Buddhist titles to identify
inquiry over which we ought to have the greatest degree of control: our own, often implicit, formal models and theoretical
biases. On this, see also Sara Ritchey’s essay in this special issue.
7 The categorical tension between “history” and “fiction” was famously addressed in (Lifshitz 1994) (see also, more recently,
Monge et al. 2016). Recently, as part of a critical analysis of Buddhist literature as philosophy and Buddhist philosophy as
literature, led by Rafal Stepien (Stepien 2020), I offer a critical discussion of the cross-cultural validity and applicability of
antithetical categorizations, such as “philosophy vs. literature vs. hagiography” (Rondolino 2020). On hagiography as a
fluid category, see also Todd French’s notion of “hagiography’s polyphonic structure” (French 2016) and Guy Philippart’s
discussion of “historia vs. fabula” and of hagiography as “transgenre” (Philippart 2020).
8 For a broad discussion of hagiography in the context of its European Christian development, see (Aigrain 1953; Dubois and
Lemaitre 1993; Grégoire 1996). For a concise, yet exhaustive, genealogy of the term, see (Philippart 1994). For a further
problematization of the term and a proposal for its redefinition, see also (Philippart 2006).
9 See, for example, (Smith 2000; Freiberger 2019).
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writings about the life, deeds, and teachings of an enlightened teacher. The term is an abridgement of
the expression nampartharpa (Tibetan rnam par thar pa), which translates the Sanskrit vimoks.a, which, in
turn, literally refers to the Buddhist complete liberation from the cycle of existence (Sanskrit sam. sāra).
By extension, then, in the context of its use as a literary title, the Tibetan namthar defines “a narrative
of the complete liberation of an individual”. As such, much like Thomas of Celano’s work on St.
Francis in relation to Christian theological interpretations, Milarepa’s namthar is necessarily dependent
upon the interpretations of a Buddhist theory of truth and of its practice. Regardless, the eventual
taxonomical overlap between the emic vita and namthar and the scholarly etic hagiography remains
heuristic and, therefore, it does not reflect an underlying substantive commonality, nor does it betray
any essential cross-cultural or inter-religious trait.
Similarly, hagiography is not a genre—understood here as a datum defined in terms of its formal
qualities. The category does not refer to, nor implies, specific compositional rules, modes of expression,
or formats in style. At one level, in as much as hagiographical sources are often apprehended as literary
genres, this particular issue would eventually lead us to engage in the critical assessment of another
fundamentally European taxonomy, that of literature, which is beyond the scope of this reflection.10 At
another level, however, it also forces us to acknowledge the complexities and sophistication of literary
contexts beyond modern European cultural and intellectual traditions—something that, notably, can
only occur when we contemplate phenomena comparatively, particularly cross-culturally and on a
global scale. For example, vitae of St. Francis of Assisi were written in prose (for example, Thomas of
Celano’s Memoriale Desiderio Animae de Gestis et Verbis Sanctissimi Patris Nostri Francisci, c. 1244–1247;
or Bonaventure of Bagnoregio’s Legenda Maior Sancti Francisci, 1263), in verse (Henry d’Avranches’s
Legenda Sancti Francisci Versificata, c. 1232–1235), and in music (Thomas of Celano’s Legenda ad Usum
Chori, 1230; and Julian of Speyer’s Officium Rhythmicum Sancti Francisci, c. 1232–1239). Similarly, looking
even just at the one example of the best known namthar about the Tibetan Buddhist Milarepa, The Life
of Milarepa (Tibetan Mi la ras pa’i rnam thar, 1488) by Tsangnyön Heruka (Tibetan gTsang smyon Heruka,
1452–1507, literally “the madman of Tsang”), one will find it to be composed of both prose and poetry.
Apprehending any of these works as belonging to a unified notion of “hagiographic genre” would not
only result in a cross-cultural fallacy, but also risk mapping etic formal distinctions in genre onto emic
ones or, conversely, uncritically accepting emic categorizations into the scholarly discourse—or even
exporting differentiations in genre from one given socio-cultural context into another.
Similar considerations necessarily force the scholar-observers to be ever mindful of their own
taxonomy and to negotiate persistently the validity, viability, and applicability of the categories
adopted. It is in this spirit that post-modern scholars often argue against the cross-cultural study of
religious phenomena and cross-cultural taxonomies, and for neologisms in the redefinition of analytical
categories—see, for example, the use of sacred biography to replace the “loaded” term hagiography
(Heffernan 1988). Notably, this approach is also frequently in reaction to the cross-cultural projections
intrinsic of past phenomenological and essentialist comparative projects, with those by Mircea Eliade
now seen as paradigmatic of how not to do comparison in religious studies.11
I argue, then, that the term hagiography always necessarily and exclusively refers to culturally,
historically, and ideologically contingent features. These, in turn, are arbitrarily classified by way of the
same heuristic device (hagiography) as part of a scientific scholarly project. This heuristic taxonomical
process eventually provides us, scholars working on hagiographical sources, to apprehend them
better in a comparative (possibly cross-cultural) perspective, toward a more nuanced understanding
of human behavior and religious phenomena. Indeed, as noted, over the past roughly 150 years,
10 For a concise, yet historically grounded, theoretical assessment of “literature” as an analytical category, see (Williams 1977).
For critical theorizations of the category in global, postcolonial perspectives, see (Bhabha 1994; Gikandi 1996; Damrosch
2003; Spivak 2003).
11 For a critique of similar comparative projects, see, most famously, (Smith 1982a, 1982b, 1990). See also, more recently,
(Hughes 2017).
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hagiography acquired a rather controversial connotation. The concept was famously first criticized by
positivist historians as an example of historical fallacy and as antithetical to biography. More recently,
post-modern critiques of cultural bias further problematized hagiography as fundamentally rooted
in a Christian worldview and as a term that reproduces hegemonic Europe-centric biases.12 I argue,
however, that if we are to engage in a comparative, cross-cultural study of religious phenomena13 and,
in this context, study the narratives of individuals deemed “perfected” by those people who created the
works and practices we now observe, we should retain the use of hagiography as the category for their
apprehension. Furthermore, I advocate this not in spite of the category’s loaded history, but exactly
because of it. On the one hand, electing to discard or replace the term necessarily obscures, rather than
resolves, the complex history of the category and, with it, the possibility of a historical awareness of
the field of comparative hagiology. On the other hand, if, as scholars, we are to cultivate and practice
self-awareness, then we ought to ceaselessly revise and re-envision our theoretical frameworks and,
in so doing, we need to be ever-mindful of their past and present uses and abuses. In my view, in
the context of the study of religious phenomena, at large, and of discourses on and about saints, in
particular, retaining and revising hagiography would allow us to do so most effectively.
Thus, drawing from the history of the category, from the emic perspective of our scholarly tradition
rooted in modern European and Christian history and the related adoption of the concept by scholars
of religions (particularly in the study of Christian traditions), I want to suggest here a new working
re-definition of hagiography.
The complex web of behaviors, practices, beliefs, and productions (literary, visual, acoustic, etc.) in
and by which a given community constructs the memory of individuals who are recognized as the
embodied perfection of the religious ideal promoted by the community’s tradition and socio-cultural
context.
In light of the insights provided by Sofia Boesch Gajano on the construction and promotion of
conceptions of sainthood (Boesch Gajano 1999) and by Flavio Cassinari on historical and mythical
narratives as means to legitimize a given community’s present (Cassinari 2011), I also want to suggest
that such a re-definition of hagiography would allow us to apprehend more effectively the dynamics
of legitimation of religious communities across cultures. If, across fields of inquiry and disciplines,
scholars were to consistently categorize textual, visual, performative, and archeological sources, as
well as practices and behaviors, about saints as hagiography, we may then be able to approach effectively
and collectively the study of hagiographical sources as a means to discern the processes adopted
by religious communities for the (re)construction of their past and the prefiguration of their future.
Thus, because of their central role in their communities’ conscious constructions of historical memory,
hagiographical phenomena represent unique forms of historiographical productions, as their narratives
also simultaneously contain the worldview, the theory of truth that underscores and informs the
historiographical reading of phenomena communicated by the hagiographical production itself.
In my study of the histories of the narrative traditions of St. Francis of Assisi and Milarepa, up
to and including their standard versions by Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (1221–1274) and Tsangnyön
Heruka, respectively, I show how each author offered a portrayal of the saintly figure in light of their
personal doctrinal reading of the religious tradition they identified with and whose origins were
traced to (or through) the narrated figure (Rondolino 2017). Thus, all life narratives of St. Francis and
Milarepa offered a legitimation of the author’s present and his community in light of a reconstruction
of their past, while also simultaneously communicating a project for their future development. In this
respect, hagiographical sources represent conscious constructions of a historical memory that read the
past in light of a given interpretation of the present.
12 On the “use and abuse” of hagiography, see (Monge 2016).
13 Also, I contend that, in our globalized world, ever more gripped by nationalistic polarizing tensions, we ought to.
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It is in light of such evidence that I argue for the possibility of identifying in religious phenomena
pertaining to distinct cultural contexts a web of analogous identity conferring properties which may
ultimately allow us to apprehend the observed data collectively as hagiographical. The use of the
adjectival form, over the noun hagiography, is intentional—as is the consistent adoption of italics in
using the category. Both, in fact, serve the purpose of intuitively highlighting that, as noted above,
the category is part of a scholarly taxonomy and, as such, it serves exclusively a heuristic function.
Similarly, both also act as reminders that the properties identified as analogous across the phenomena
compared (be it two vitae on St. Francis by different authors, or one of his vitae and a namthar on
Milarepa) are seen, as such, by a scholarly observer in light of formal scholarly categories and do not
reflect any essential, universal trait in the objects thus apprehended.
Identifying phenomena, such as the vitae and legendae on St. Francis or the namthar on Milarepa
as hagiographical, then, necessarily brings us to place at the forefront the religious character of any
reflection on the evidence. It further forces us to underscore the defining doctrinal (theological)
framework that shaped the hagiographers’ work—what I elsewhere termed the “hagiographical
process” (Rondolino 2017).14 Doing so eventually also allows us to study any datum so categorized
within its constitutive discursive context: (1) the given communal setting in which it was created, (2) for
which it was intended, and (3) by which it was circulated and received. As works that aspire to inform
and shape individuals’ and communities’ attitudes (devotional acts, writings, performances, offerings,
pilgrimages, etc.) in light of the (re)constructed embodiment of a perfected ideal, hagiographical
productions strive to shape the world around their authors, themselves promoters of a given ideal
of perfection, which is in turn represented as an embodied formal model by the portrayed saint.
Comparing hagiographical processes in this manner, whether inter- or cross-culturally, is also effectively
an act of “discourse comparison”, the critical comparative method advocated by Oliver Freiberger
(Freiberger 2019).
In light of these considerations, as Clifford Geertz aptly noted about religion in general, it is
possible to see how hagiographical productions offer us a “model of” and a “model for” given realities,
as envisaged by their authors (Geertz 1973).15 Yet, categorizing religious phenomena as hagiographical
also necessarily brings us to emphasize their discursive dimension. There can be no saint, no being that
is understood as embodying perfection, without a community that recognizes them as such, in light of
a given interpretation of particular doctrines and theories of truth, which construct and preserve their
memory and promote their cult and way of life.
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Abstract: As a genre defined by its content rather than by its form, the extreme diversity of the
kinds of texts that can be considered “hagiographic” often proves an impediment to the progress of
comparative hagiology. This essay offers some suggestions for the creation of a controlled vocabulary
for the formal description of hagiographic texts, demonstrating how having a more highly developed
shared language at our disposal will facilitate both the systematic analysis and the comparative
discussion of hagiography.
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The other core essays in this volume are dedicated to such important concerns as helping us to
arrive at a more precise definition of hagiography; to be more reflective concerning the nature and the
ethics of comparison; to re-center our understanding of the exemplary figure of the hagiographical
representation; and to think about authorship and reception. The goal of this essay is to offer something
more foundational and basic: to initiate a process of developing a controlled vocabulary that will foster
the systematic description, analysis, and comparative academic discussion of hagiographic texts.
The working definition of hagiography that has been arrived at by this ongoing collaborative
workshop—a text about the life of a figure regarded as holy by some subset of a population—while
reasonable and seemingly innocuously-specific enough, in actuality designates a remarkably wide
range of types of texts. As a genre defined by its content rather than by its form, there are no limits to
what a hagiographic text may look like. (As has been noted elsewhere in this volume, the hagiographic
text need not even be a literary text: Our working definition of hagiography by no means precludes
oral text such as a song or an epic, a dramatic performance, or a non-textual work of art, such as a
painting, statue, or a representation of some other sort entirely. For the purposes of this essay, I shall
be referring specifically to literary texts, although what I herein propose could certainly be adapted
to advance discussions of these other kinds of representations as well.) In the current state of the
fields of Religious Studies, History, Medieval Studies, or what have you, when a scholar refers to the
Life of an individual, his audience has no way of knowing, for example, whether this is a partially
autobiographical text or something composed entirely by someone who lived centuries after the saintly
figure in question; whether the text depicts only the saintly figure’s moment of ascension, or the entire
arc of her life; whether it is an emotive five-page sketch, or a three hundred page chronicle. These are
distinctions that I believe impinge, at times quite profoundly, upon the kinds of issues raised in the
other articles included in this volume.
Presently, the lack of a shared vocabulary for how to describe the formal features of hagiographic
texts hinders us in our ability to study and make scholarly use of those texts: Scholars who are new to
working with hagiography are often uncertain about how a particular text may fit into the broader
landscape of hagiography; for those better-versed in the genre, we lack an efficient way to describe a
particular text to one another, which impedes cross-tradition and comparative-minded conversation.
To further our collaborative project, a practical taxonomy of hagiographic texts, with a well-developed
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vocabulary for describing it, should be developed. Employing such a controlled vocabulary would
allow us to more efficiently specify what kind of thing we are in fact referring to when we mention a
vita, a namtar (Tibetan: rnam thar), a vimoks.a, a Passion, a Life.
The following might serve as the germ for such an endeavor, based on my experience of reading,
translating, researching with, and writing and teaching about hagiographic texts, deriving from a wide
range of historical periods and religious traditions. This quasi-taxonomical controlled vocabulary has
been developed in part through conversations that have taken place during the workshop “Comparative
Hagiology: Issues in Theory and Method,” which met during the 2018 and 2019 meetings of the AAR.
My goal here is to demonstrate the utility of a clear and durable taxonomic vocabulary for describing
the formal features of hagiographic texts, the collaborative development of which—drawing on the
expertise of scholars working on the full gamut of hagiographic texts—may be a possible future
direction for this project.
Sara Ritchey’s piece in this same volume displays an intent comparable to my own (Ritchey 2019).
While I am here limiting myself to addressing formal aspects of hagiographic texts (I make a motion
towards addressing the perhaps more fraught question of the content of these texts toward the end of
this essay), the terms of Sara’s index direct our attention to a series of important themes that cut across
all the different layers in which all hagiographic production is embedded—touching upon formal
qualities of a hagiographic text, but also its contents, its reception, its importance religiously, socially,
and historically.
Part of the inspiration for developing this controlled vocabulary comes from Aviad Kleinberg’s
Prophets in their Own Country (1992). In that book, Kleinberg (1992) develops some very useful labels
for referring to the different kinds of saintliness that have been exemplified by saintly figures over
time, specifically concerning the different patterns of community interaction that historically figured
into an individual’s transformation from mundane being into a Christian saint: “the detached type,”
“the cooperative type,” and so forth. I have found Kleinberg’s taxonomy extremely useful in helping
to progress my own thinking, writing, and teaching about sainthood, and believe that the study
of hagiography (whether comparative or otherwise) could similarly benefit from having a basic
vocabulary and taxonomy for describing and referring to these texts.
After the presentation of this partial and tentative controlled vocabulary—the elements of which
are given in bold—I show some examples of how texts may be described using this vocabulary, then
discuss possible further avenues for this project to explore.
It is crucial to note that many hagiographic texts will be found to not fit neatly into these
categorizations, or to fall into different opposing categorizations simultaneously. Such is the nature
of hagiography, a genre that veers naturally toward palimpsestic productions. Although upon close
examination, texts will often be found not to conform to these categories, the controlled vocabulary
may still provide a useful heuristic. As will be seen, the discussion of how a text does not fit into one
of these categories may be just as illuminating as a discussion of how one does.
A reader may harbor the expectation that a hagiographic text should, with whatever degree
of specificity, tell the story of its subject’s entire life—from birth to rise to holiness to death. But by
no means do all or even most hagiographic texts conform to this, as they in some cases pick up in,
say, early adulthood (as in Leontius’s Life of Symeon the Fool); or address only select moments of the
subject’s life, or even only a key turning point that then stands in for the whole life (as in the Passion of
Perpetua and Felicity) (Tilley 2000). Thus a particular hagiographic narrative might be described as
birth-to-death, episodic, or partial. Buddhism provides us with examples of hagiographies that in
fact span multiple lifetimes.
A foremost consideration for beginning to make sense of or describe a hagiographic text is who
wrote it, and on what authority. On these questions, we see a remarkably wide range of possibilities.
Hagiographies have commonly been written shortly after the lifetime of the saint; sometimes long
after the lifetime of the saint; and only rarely during the life of the saint. Primary authorship can
be by the hand of someone who never knew or encountered the saint, or by an associate of the
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saint, often a devotee or a disciple. In some cases, the saintly figure has been directly involved in
some aspect of the creation of the text, perhaps giving a retelling of her life to a particular witness,
which then provides some of the material for the hagiographic text. Many hagiographic texts
will be found to be partially auto-hagiographical (or pseudo-auto-hagiographical, as the case may
be). Completely auto-hagiographical accounts include Paramahansa Yogananda’s Autobiography of
a Yogi (Yogananda 1998), and the Life of the Tibetan yogin, Shabkar Tsokdruk Rangdrol (1781–1851)
(Ricard 2001). In the majority of cases, the text in question is determined to display a combination of
these possibilities: The text perhaps contains quotations or narrative elements related by the saintly
subject; descriptions or mentions of things observed and/or heard by individuals close to the saint, or
members of her broader contemporary public. These fragments will be woven together by an author
who comes later (or much later). Thus, hagiographic texts are almost always polyvocalic. To describe the
composition of a hagiographic text, we might make use of such terms as: antemortem, posthumous, or
belated; witness-derived, witness-absent; disciple-derived; saintly subject-derived, subject-absent.
We might add a further sub-designation for saintly subject-derived hagiographies: those in which the
saint is quoted (subject-quoted). The French Life of the Iroquois Jesuit saint Catherine Tekakwitha was
written in 1717 by Pierre Cholenec, who had been her confessor, making him a particularly intimate
witness to her story. The text would be witness-derived, but as Cholenec knew of Catherine’s life
based in large part on what she herself told him, the Life may also be considered saintly subject-derived
(Greer 2003). This raises the question, suitable for further study and reflection, of what particular
issues may be raised when a hagiography is written by its subject’s confessor.
Closely related to the above, while in some instances it may be that a hagiographic text can be
determined to have been an entirely original composition, it will much more commonly be found to
be a reworking of earlier materials—whether from narrative fragments or from a complete text, or
multiple complete texts (or a complete text, plus other source material; or multiple complete texts,
plus other source material; and on and on). In some cases it is clearly apparent which prior sources
provided which content in the later hagiography, while in others that material may be reworked
quite drastically, rendering the influence of that earlier source material invisible to anyone who has
not closely researched the materials in question. In some cases it may prove impossible to make a
determination, with the seams between the different potential source materials rendered invisible to
us. It can be observed that in recent decades, much of the scholarship about hagiography has been
focused specifically on what can be made of those seams when they do become visible. All of these
considerations become vastly more complicated when the source material in question is not written
text but oral (or of any non-written medium). To describe the basic substance of a hagiographic text in
relation to prior texts, we might refer to it as an original composition, derived from reworked material,
or drastically reworked. It may be worth adding another designation for when a hagiographic text
draws directly from pre-existing hagiographical sources, but those that are about a different saint
entirely. Here we can cite the example of how, in writing his (first) Life of Francis of Assisi, Thomas
of Celano (c. 1185–c. 1265) characterized Francis in ways that drew directly and quite obviously
from Sulpicius Severus’s (c. 363–c. 420) Life of Martin of Tours (Regis et al. 2004; Hoare 1995). In this
way, any hagiographic text existing within a tradition may influence, directly or indirectly, those that
follow. When this phenomenon is clearly on display, we might refer to a given text as hagiographic
canon-derived. (A complication to this is the fact that hagiographies of Buddhist and Christian saintly
figures almost always bear distinctive markings of the lives—and Lives—of the respective founders of
those traditions. The degree to which they do so, however, varies widely, a consideration that those
widely read within these respective traditions will likely develop a keen sense for.)
A hagiographic text might be composed with the expectation that it will circulate on its own,
independently, as a stand-alone text. Alternatively, a hagiographic text may be composed for and
then circulated as part of a compendium (such as the compendia of Chinese and Korean Buddhist
biographies often referred to as The Lives of Eminent Monks, or the Taoist collections Traditions of
Exemplary Transcendents). In these cases, it may be found that non-negligible elements of the text’s
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meaning are derived from either its mere placement within such a collection, or from the actual
specific contents of the texts amongst which it is placed. Many hagiographic texts that once circulated
independently are at a later point in time placed within a compendium. The repackaging of a
once-independent text can be a significant moment in the making of meaning. The original text may
thus be described as stand-alone, or compendium-dependent. As a variation on this, the earliest,
fragmentary Lives of the Tibetan saint Milarepa (1028/40/52–1111/23) were written to accompany a
body of advanced and highly secret tantric teachings, such that the biographical text circulated as
attached to another body of literature (Quintman 2014). We might describe such a hagiographical text
as having been written and/or circulating in an appendixical manner.
We might also include the simplistic but significant designations of Lives in prose, verse, or
prosimetrum (alternating prose and verse)—a style encountered in hagiographic texts with a surprising
frequency, across languages and religious traditions. Within the latter category, we may encounter
texts that are essentially in verse, with sections of prose, or, more often, texts that are essentially prose,
with sections of verse (most often at the beginnings and/or ends of chapters, or the beginning and/or
end of the text itself). These and other basic formal features (like whether or not the work has sections
or chapters) are worth taking note of in describing a hagiographic text.
As an example of this controlled vocabulary’s being put to use, if I were to give a conference
presentation that focused on the Life of the Tibetan yogin Künga Zangpo, better known as the Madman
of Ü (1458−1532), I might describe it as a birth-to-death chronicle, with chapters, in a prosimetrum
form (DiValerio 2016). From the time of its first printing, it traditionally circulated as a stand-alone
text (despite having been republished as part of a collection of religious biographies in 1972). The Life
is partially antemortem (the longer Part I of the text having been written and block-printed when its
subject was only thirty-six) and partially posthumous (the shorter Part II having been written five
years after its subject’s death). It is witness-derived, disciple-derived, and saintly subject-derived,
and indeed subject-quoted. It is best thought of as an original composition but may also to a limited
extent be understood as a reworked text, as it draws in parts from an earlier account, in the form of
notes taken by the saintly subject’s nephew.
We can compare this text with the account of another “mad” saint: the Life of Symeon the Fool by
Leontius. Written around the middle of the seventh century, between fifty and a hundred years after
its subject’s death, this is a posthumous, partial account, written as a stand-alone text (Krueger 1996).
A consideration of how best to categorize the text in terms of the source material used by Leontius
brings to light some important issues for the genesis of this text: Although portions of the text are
presented as having been related by Symeon, Leontius does not claim to have himself witnessed
Symeon but to have written the Life based on someone else’s written eyewitness account (a claim
that scholars broadly accept as a falsehood, most likely reflecting authorial conventions of Leontius’
day). More likely is that the brief tales of Symeon’s exploits that make up the second part of the text
are gathered from oral traditions (which may make the text in part witness-derived), while the first
half of the text seems to be an original composition by Leontius, while parts are (simultaneously)
ostensibly saintly subject-derived (including many direct quotations). Regardless of whether or not
we ultimately accept this material as having originated from the saint, for comparative purposes, the
fact that the text claims to relate what the saint himself said is significant.
The brief biography of the Taoist “transcendent” (xian) Xiang Mandu, related within a
polemical essay by Ge Hong (283−343 CE) (contained within the collection The Master Who Embraces
Simplicity: Inner Chapters; Baupuzi neipian), is an partial hagiography, telling only of its subject’s
miraculous journey through the heavens, having flown there on a dragon from his mountain retreat
(Campany 2009, pp. 136–137, 251–252). The story having been in circulation for hundreds of years
before Ge Hong’s time, this particular version of the story was written belatedly, derived from reworked
material. The text may be best considered compendium-dependent (having been transmitted in
various different compendia before Ge Hong’s). The majority of the text is presented as Xiang
Mandu’s own first-hand account of his experience, making it (ostensibly) saintly subject-derived,
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subject-quoted, and ostensibly autohagiographical. The fact that this account is provided amidst Ge
Hong’s making an argument about Xiang Mandu’s being a charlatan further complicates the matter.
The account of the saintly Caud. ayya provided in Harihara’s thirteenth-century Kannada-language
Śivaśaran. ara Ragal.egal.u (“Poems in the Ragal.e Meter for Śiva’s Saints”) is an episodic hagiography,
telling only a small part of the story of his life: a handful of specific tales of his enacting an extreme
devotion to Śiva, and Śiva’s eventually welcoming him into his divine abode of Kailāsa. The text is an
original composition and is compendium-dependent. We do not know when Caudayya may have
lived, or what relationship Harihara may have had with him—or indeed, whether or not he existed
at all—leaving considerations of the relationship between the author and its subject indeterminate
(Ben-Herut 2018, pp. 79–81).
As becomes clear from these four examples, hagiographic texts very frequently do not fit easily
into the categories offered by this controlled vocabulary or will be indeterminate. But to discuss how a
text may not fit into a particular category, or why that may be indeterminate, can be highly edifying
about the text, and about the hagiographic process generally.
From the mere fact of writing this piece and thinking about this controlled vocabulary, a number
of questions for future consideration have arisen. What can be made of the notable tendency
toward prosimetrum in hagiographic compositions, across religious traditions and cultural and
linguistic contexts? Does Buddhism strongly favor birth-to-death narratives over partial or episodic
ones, while for other religions, different predilections can be observed? What are the contexts in
which compendium-dependent hagiographical productions seem to be preferred? How might our
understanding of a text like the Legends of the Eighty-Four Mahāsiddhas of tantric Buddhism change in
consideration of the fact of there being such a strong tradition of hagiographical compendia produced
by the Hindu bhakti tradition? As mentioned above: What particular issues may be raised when the
author of a hagiography has served as confessor to its subject? And the thorny and perpetual issue:
How to deal with the multilayered, polyvocalic nature of hagiographic texts that so often represent
many distinct moments of accreted material?
This essay has begun the task of developing a controlled vocabulary for referring to the formal
features of a hagiographic text (pending a broader concerted collaborative effort). We may in the future
expand this project by taking up the task of developing a controlled vocabulary for describing features
pertaining more to the intent and the reception of a hagiographic text, addressing more of the text’s
contents. For example, we may consider what vocabulary may be used to address to what extent
the saintly subject emerges as a distinct individual or adheres to a pre-existing model of saintliness.
Is the subject presented as a perfected being, or as possessing human faults and failings? To what
extent does the text rely on accounts of the miraculous? Is the saintly subject portrayed in a way that
encourages imitation, and/or devotion, or not? Is the text intended for a broad public readership or
a delimited one? Does the text assume a particular prior knowledge among its hearers or readers?
Does it appeal to a specific elite? Does the author signal an intention of creating a definitive historical
record of the saint’s life, or to appeal to the reader on a more emotional level? Having a controlled
vocabulary would foster a systematic consideration of any of these questions.
Hagiographic texts tend strongly toward being complicated, difficult to describe. This is because
of the elasticity of the genre as currently defined, but also because of these texts’ typically polyvocalic
and palimpsestic nature. Having a shared vocabulary will allow us to better locate individual texts
within this diversity, and to more efficiently articulate questions and findings that arise from both inter-
and intra-traditional comparison.
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Abstract: This reflection derives from a discussion that took place at the 2018 “Comparative Hagiology”
pre-conference workshop of the American Academy of Religion. The goal during that meeting was to
articulate points of dialogue for the comparison of exemplary figures in various historic, geographic,
and faith traditions. Here, I offer an open-ended descriptive index as a heuristic device for beginning
a comparative study, whether collaborative or single-authored. After positioning my inquiry from
within my own field of study, medieval European Christianity, I offer a brief “test case” for the
portability of the index by using its terms to think through a text that is widely-regarded within my
subfield as deeply complicated and difficult to interpret, the Life of Christina Mirabilis. I conclude by
re-describing some of the terms of the index and by inviting further re-description.
Keywords: comparative religions; disciplinary innovation hagiography; hagiology; medieval
Christianity; religious studies; theory and method in religious studies
1. Introduction
“Comparative hagiology” offers a method of productively destabilizing the assumptions and
expectations that we, scholars working within specific intellectual, geographic, or confessional traditions,
bring to our sources.1 This destabilization has the potential to make meaning across differences,
and in the process, to generate new insights and understandings in our own areas of specialization.
Undertaken with a genuine sense of humility and a will to listen and revise, the comparative approach
to hagiography as we have outlined it in this collaborative undertaking is an ethical endeavor at heart.
It insists on conversation, learning, and entering into relationships with other scholars, other faith
traditions, and other ways of being in the world. Comparison can enable scholars to develop and
encourage methods that help to take us out of cultural isolation and self-containment; at the same time,
comparison can enhance intra-cultural perspectives, deepening our understanding of authorship and
hagiographical function through recognitions of difference.
As many scholars have noted (Freiberger 2018; Rondolino 2017), the presumption to compare
continues to smack of its colonizing origins, displayed most prominently among the grand comparative
enterprises of mid twentieth-century phenomenologists of religion (Eliade 1958; Heiler 1961).
The comparative approach in Religious Studies (in addition to the disciplinary genesis itself) is
rooted in the efforts of the Euro–American academy to clarify distinctions, and to bring into being
discrete “world” religions as objects of study (Asad 1993; McClymond 2018). Even after J.Z. Smith’s
1 As I explain below in greater detail, I use the term ‘hagiography’ in this essay in a rather expansive manner to include
products other than written texts. I appreciate the term ‘hagiology’ because it shifts attention from writing about sanctity to
its logos. I chose to use the term “hagiography” in this essay, however, because my focus remains fairly fixed on methods of
analyzing culturally-embedded artifacts, as opposed to concerns in the philosophy of religion. While these two endeavors
are by no means exclusive, and both are absolutely necessary for the comparative project, the former term offers greater
precision for the issues I address in this essay.
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1982 “In Comparison a Magic Dwells” and its remarkable quarter-century reassessment in Kimberly
Patton and Benjamin Ray’s A Magic Still Dwells (2000), those who might engage in comparison still feel
the need to offer apologias such as this one.2 Defenses of the comparative enterprise are still necessary
to acknowledge the continuing distortions wrought by colonizing taxonomies and the violence born
of their implicit hierarchies (Mahmood 2016). This distortion bears a legacy that reverberates in
broad cultural perceptions of religious difference. Recent efforts at comparison bear this legacy
in mind, while seeking to negotiate basic terms and methods for comparison (Van de Veer 2016;
Schmidt-Leukel and Nehring 2016).
Hagiography is one of those terms. As I use it, hagiography is an expansive heuristic designation
under which many additional related phenomena fall: relics, images, miracles, sacred biographies or
Lives, pilgrimages, shrines, prayers, liturgies, commemorations, feasts, and more. Unlike scriptural
analysis, which demands a complicated hermeneutic for handling the simultaneity of human writing
and divine revelation, in hagiography even the textual referent itself is indeterminate. Guy Philippart
has noted with respect to writing about saints that the term “hagiographia” (literally ‘the holy
scriptures’) was originally defined in fifth-century Greek Christianity as the final portion of the
Hebrew scriptures (writings such as Psalms, Proverbs, and Lamentations) (Philippart 1994). The term
remained yoked to that connotation until the late nineteenth century when, as Felice Lifshitz has
shown, it began to refer instead to writing about saints as a means of distinguishing historical texts
as “true” and verifiable (Lifshitz 1994). Even if postmodern critique has enabled us to regard all
writing as mediated, there remains an ambiguity in how we use the term “hagiography.” We can
analyze texts, objects, performances, rituals, and bodies as part of a “hagiographical process,” that is, as
vestiges of remembrance of certain holy or otherwise venerable figures, sometimes known as “saints.”3
The hagiographical process refers to “the creation and circulation of saintly narratives as they can be
historically and philologically discerned in distinct religious, cultural, geographical, and historical
contexts.”4 The hagiographical process has enveloped virtuous humans, but also animals, objects,
and individuals that were decidedly unvirtuous, posing further inquiries into what even is a “saint,”
“holy figure,” “eminent one,” or “sage.”5 Are “saint” and “jinn,” for example, interchangeable terms?
Certainly not. So the fundamental first step in comparison is an appreciation of context, of how these
terms signify and function in their native traditions. In other words, there is openness and uncertainty
about the referent of “hagio” in the term “hagiography” (Keune 2019). That the subjects of the
hagiographic process defy neat categorization or identification means that we have more opportunity
to compare and refine our meanings, searching for common patterns.
In an effort to broaden possibilities for the subjects included within the hagiographic process, in
this reflection I will eschew the term “saint” or “holy figure” for exemplar (Brown 1983; Hawley 1987).6
I use this term with the intention of clearing analytical space for multiple participants, so that further
terminological refinements and subjective inclusions can evolve through the comparative process.
For the purposes of the following reflection, “hagiography” refers to texts about exemplars, when texts
include objects, non-verbal images, and ritual actions (procession, votive offering, pilgrimage).
2 (Smith 1982; Patton and Ray 2000).
3 The word “saint” has no meaning in many global faith traditions, so presents some tensions in an effort to establish a
comparative process; however, as the other contributors to this volume note, and as many other scholars have suggested,
it is vital to adopt some comparative terminology. Like “hagiography”, the word “saint” is a heuristic device (albeit one
informed historically and theologically by Christian tradition) that acknowledges a process of perfection within in a faith
tradition. See (Rondolino 2019; Hawley 1987).
4 Rondolino 2017, p. 2.
5 The choice of “hagiographical” as opposed to “hagiographic” when modifying “process” stems from a consideration of
the construction and social negotiation of the process itself. Stylistically speaking, “hagiographic” strikes me as more
fixed. I lean toward “hagiographical” in an effort to grasp at the fluidity of the many agents involved in producing an
exemplary figure.
6 As I discuss later in this essay, ‘exemplar’ is also imperfect since many figures who undergo the hagiographical process were
not regarded as models for imitation. On the phenomenon of urging admiration rather than imitation in late medieval
sanctity, see (Cazelles 1982).
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Hagiographic texts commemorate a member of a community in a way that affirms a set of shared
values (Rondolino 2017). Stories of individual exemplarity suggest various ways in which communities
throughout time have perceived virtue working in their world, how they constructed models of
human behavior deemed particularly virtuous, and how they sought to access holiness in the world.
The hagiographical process elevates the exemplar above the rest of the community, or at least
consolidates their elevation. One node in the hagiographical process that is especially malleable
depending on tradition (as Jon Keune’s article points out with reference to figures like Confucius,
Karl Marx, Shivaji Bhosale, and Mao Zedong—a list that calls into question both the role of the
state and of gender in the hagiographical process) is the role of “religion” itself, or more particularly
of the relationship of the exemplar to notions of divinity. Must the exemplar who undergoes the
hagiographic process be qualitatively different from a hero, idol, founder, or celebrity? In the Latin
Christian tradition, exemplars are distinguished from more quotidian heroes by their proximity to
divinity. Indeed, in that tradition, it is the hagiographical process itself that renders the exemplar into
an intermediary or quasi-transcendent figure, a channel or vessel that comforts or signifies beyond
the ordinary or this-worldly. In this case, exemplars signify the presence of an “other than” in the
world. The graphia or text-production of the hagiographical process concentrates the hagio of the
exemplary figure, making their capacity for grace or holiness or wisdom essential and supra normal.
The hagiographical process, then, transforms exemplary figures into vectors; they are points of contact
that bring individuals into relation with one another, with the ultimate other, and with themselves.
Comparison involves conversation or “dialogue as method” (Eck 2000). Dialogue as method
strives to articulate the other’s context and practice and thereby to come to a mutuality of understanding
and shared imaginative tools. As Jon Keune discusses in this issue, comparison as method enables
self-awareness and new depths of innovation in our scholarship (Keune 2019). By entering into
dialogue, we acknowledge that each interlocutor represents only partial knowledge of the subject
at hand; a piece or an angle on the phenomenon under investigation. As a supplemental pathway
for supporting forms of scholarly dialogue in comparative hagiology, I offer an exercise in selecting
imaginative tools for the comparative methods outlined by Jonathan Z. Smith: description, comparison,
re-description, and rectification.7 Such an exercise might best be undertaken in the collaborative
workshop setting for which I first proposed this descriptive index, at the 2018 American Academy
of Religion Comparative Hagiologies Workshop in Denver, Colorado. During that conversation,
students and scholars of the Abrahamic religions as well as Tibetan Buddhism, the Confucian tradition,
and South Asian bhakti traditions came together with a common commitment to negotiate terminology
that would enable us to share our work, to learn from one another, and to compare. The terms of the
index I offer are informed by that conversation. I pose these terms as part of a fluid toolbox. They are
not intended to be fixed, but rather to initiate their own reformulation and revision in the process of
conversation. As I show at the end of this brief essay, they are subject to re-description even when
employed in a single historic faith tradition; in my case, late medieval European Christianity and its
production of living saints.
2. A Descriptive Index
The index I elaborate here aims to establish a repertoire or lexicon for comparative hagiology.
It serves as a vehicle for comparative reflection. One might use this analytical index in concert
with David DiValerio’s proposed vocabulary for comparing formal aspects of hagiographic texts
(DiValerio 2019). The goal here is to begin a comparative conversation with local, portable components
of the hagiographical process. Each aspect or node in the index offers a frame for describing and
measuring the presence and “work” performed by the hagiographical process. Such an index aims
to provide a common vocabulary for imagining varied worlds inhabited by exemplary figures,
7 (Smith 2004); for an updated version of this five-part process, see Freiberger 2018.
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for articulating the meaning of their presence in the varied traditions. This proposed index is by no
means exhaustive, only indicative. It offers a set of questions as a means into comparison. It is a
heuristic, a method for thinking and imaging comparisons in the hagiographical process. The questions
are the beginning of a conversation, not its conclusion. Their meanings should be in flux, available to
renegotiation and refinement in particular contexts. Not only are the following terms provisional but,
as I show in the final section of this essay, they invite re-description even for a sample hagiographical
text in my own field. That is to say: they cannot possibly exhaust the hagiographical process, but only
suggest inclusive points of dialogue as method.
Are there clear generic distinctions among the array of texts that celebrate the exemplary figure?
Do these modes of representation affirm or undercut one another in any way? Do they reference one
another, offer corrections or purport more complete or accurate versions? How can we consider these
texts as both authorial productions and representations of historical figures and events?
2.1. The Extra-Ordinary
To what degree is the extra-ordinary involved in the hagiographic process of the exemplary figure?
The terrain of the extra-ordinary encompasses miracle, wonder, stupefaction, and amazement. How do
exemplary figures establish their extra-ordinary qualities (or how do their texts establish it)? What are
the degrees of astonishment: when does an astonishing event become a miracle (and when does it
fail to become one)? How do the extra-ordinary stories perpetuated about exemplary figures serve
to affirm social, political, or theological agendas? What is the role of the extra-ordinary story in the
construction of the community who shares that story?
2.2. Mediation
The hagiographical process creates media about exemplars, but exemplars are also mediators or
go-betweens. In what ways are exemplary figures mediated? Many of the terms in the index mediate
the exemplary figure: for example, “vestige,” “performance,” “text.” How does the conglomeration
of mediation establish a landscape for contact with and commemoration of the figure? At the same
time, these mediations not only re-present, they present or make present the exemplary figure. How is
presence and contact established? How does the exemplary figure mediate beyond themselves, making
present the “other than” or divinity? Which mediations have greater authority? Are some mediations
more effective than others at making present the exemplary figure?
2.3. Embodiment and Vestige
What is the place in the hagiographic process of the body of the saint, both in life and after death?
In what material does their body inhere? Is it accessible; if so, how? How is the figure’s material
body marked as distinct, as exemplary? What physical markings make them apparent or signify them
as exemplary? How do they come by those markings—from birth? Or gained through experience?
Are they self-inflicted? How do those markings signify deeper truths about the status of the exemplary
figure? How are they represented long after their bodily death?
What are the materials left behind after the exemplary figure has departed? Do they provide access
to the supernatural or otherworldly? That is, do they serve as a vector of divinity or the supernatural
in the material of the world? How are these vestiges stored and displayed? Who controls access to
them? How are they remembered or revered; that is, what are the stories attached to them?
2.4. Intercession/Transformation
What are the categories of experience articulated in the hagiographic sources from each tradition?
How does the saint’s presence offer an opportunity for transformation? What does the experience
of their reading, performance, and use “do” on the personal and communal level? How does the
exemplary figure interact with their community, either in life or after death? What is the vehicle for
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this interaction? What kinds of goods does contact with the exemplary figure promise to deliver (i.e.,
wisdom, healing, retribution, salvation)? How does a patron or client request intercession?
2.5. Performance
How does the exemplary figure enact their exemplarity? What behaviors belong to the performance
of exemplarity, or how do lived behaviors accrue the status of an exemplary performance? Who is the
audience of the performance?
2.6. Virtue
How does this aspect of the hagiographic process ground virtue? What behaviors are
considered virtuous and why? Are there certain behaviors, violence, for example, that seem puzzling
or problematic?
2.7. Gender
In what ways are the behaviors of exemplary figures constricted by or freed from gender roles?
How does the lens of gender inflect distinctions in access to the holy? Does the disembodied exemplary
figure retain their gendered embodiment after death? How does gender reflect divergent pathways to
exemplarity? Does the figure transgress assigned gender roles, and if so, what is the social significance
of their transgression? How does it relate to the hagiographical process?
2.8. Authorization/Legitimacy
How does the exemplary figure accrue authority? What are the modes of authorization of
exemplarity, both formal and informal? Is there a legitimizing process through which the figure
gradually gains authoritative status? What is the figure’s relationship to institutional authority? Is their
exemplarity locally or communally conferred or contested?
2.9. Economies of Exemplarity
Finally, a few general questions that might pertain to each aspect or the index as a whole. For each
aspect of this index, how much hagiographic weight is this aspect given in the larger economy of
exemplarity? When considering religious boundaries and distinctions, what aspects of the exemplary
figure or their cult speak to a cultural specificity? How is this figure particular to their cultural
tradition? Do they affirm orthodoxy or orthopraxy? Or are they beloved as peculiarities, as aberrant?
In which case, does their aberration or boundary crossing serve to strengthen the tradition’s specificities
(or boundaries)?
3. Re-Description
My own training and research are in late medieval European Christianity; this index stems
from problems and phenomena that are clearly marked in the scholarship of that tradition, and thus,
necessarily requires expansion, critique, and re-description through conversation with representatives
of other traditions. Even within the medieval European Christian tradition, each local instance of
exemplarity retains distinct characteristics, and changes profoundly over time. The canonization
process, for example, or the formal and legal process of saint-making in Christianity, only began to
develop among the highest levels of ecclesiastical authority in the eleventh century CE, with procedural
refinements that would continue through the sixteenth century when it was considered to be a
prerogative of the Pope alone.8 By the later Middle Ages, authorizing texts included canonization
8 On the development of the canonization process in the medieval Church see, most recently, (Prudlo 2015); see also
(Katajala-Peltomaa 2010; Vauchez 1989).
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inquests, but long before that period, lives, liturgical feasts, and miracle collections conferred an
exemplary figure with authority. Informal conferences of authority proliferated as well, in the form of
personal prayers, visions, devotional images, and accounts of pilgrimage to a local shrine.
These designations, “formal” and “informal,” overlap and inform one another,
building multi-medial hagiographic accretions, and thus point to the ways that the exemplary
figure represents both normative forms of a tradition as well as its local instantiations. Take the
example of a late medieval European Christian exemplar known as Christina Mirabilis (c. 1150–1224
CE). Christina, who oversaw herds at pasture in the village of Brustem (modern-day Belgium), was said
to have died and been bodily resurrected three times, to have thrown herself into icy waters, crawled
into burning ovens, and tortured herself on the rack.9 Although her devotional behavior struck her
contemporaries as positively aberrant—at one point she is described as climbing into treetops to
pray while rolling herself into a ball like a hedgehog (ericei)—Christina was clearly revered by her
contemporaries. But Christina garnered enough of a reputation for true holiness (in the medieval
Christian tradition, this reputation is often called fama) that people told stories about her capacity for
divine visions, her skill in prophecy, her miraculous body that endured pain on behalf of the sins of
others, and her ability to intercede for the dying. She took refuge in a Benedictine women’s abbey and
a local count considered her as his most soothing source of spiritual counsel. Christina even appears in
the Sefer Hasidim (“The Book of the Pious”), a thirteenth-century halakhic (legal), moral, and narrative
composition written by three German Jewish pietists (Hasidei Ashkenaz), where she informs her Jewish
neighbors about what she saw while dead, including those among them who were in the Garden of
Eden.10 Although she was never canonized, Christina’s bones were relocated to a place of veneration
after her third and final death in 1224 CE, and at least one miracle was recorded testifying to her
continuing presence among Christians in her region. Christina’s life story was recorded shortly after her
death by a cleric, the Dominican Thomas of Cantimpré (c. 1200–1265/70 CE). Originally composed in
Latin, her Life was later translated into vernacular languages and disseminated outside of the southern
Low Countries in which she lived. In short, this strange woman who bucked social convention—she
was neither a nun nor a wife—managed to emerge as a spiritually authoritative figure. How did the
hagiographical process work to render this enigmatic shepherd into a transregional “saint”?
This brief glimpse into the Life of Christina Mirabilis compels me to further refine some of the
terms posed above and to add others, destabilizing my understanding of the key aspects of exemplarity.
For example, the “extra-ordinary,” “embodiment,” and “performance” (perhaps even “intercession”)
are all simultaneous in the case of Christina, seemingly impervious to disentanglement for analytical
purposes. Her “extra-ordinary” qualities were mediated through embodied performance, that is,
her intense displays of public asceticism that, we are told, benefitted the inhabitants of her town.
Furthermore, the notion of “reputation,” I see now, might be included to gather a sense of the chatter
around an exemplary figure, which might differ from their official or authorized image. We might
also consider adding to this hagiographic index a term such as “discernment” that would capture
the community’s questioning of the motives and inspiration of an exemplary figure, to determine if
their extra-ordinary qualities stemmed from an ultimately healthful or harmful source, or if they were
altogether feigned. The case of Christina Mirabilis also raises questions about imitation or emulation.
Surely, this exemplary figure was not intended for imitation, as her hagiographer insisted. How then,
did she function and serve the community in which she was embedded and the devotees who told her
astonishing story? Christina’s status among the local Jewish population also suggests that we might
introduce a term, such as “itineracy” or “portability,” for reverence of the exemplary figure in multiple
traditions. Finally, her location—in treetops, the bedroom of a count, near mills and wells shared by
9 (Thomas of Cantimpré 2008). An edition of the Life of Christina Mirabilis can be found in the Acta sanctorum July vol. V
(1868), pp. 650–56.
10 (Baumgarten 2008). Baumgarten makes it clear that the woman described in the text is very much like Christina in the
circumstances of her death, resurrection, and post resurrection visions, if she was not actually Christina herself.
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the Jewish population, and in a monastery—compels me to render a term like “built environment” or
“frame” to imagine the setting through which the exemplar becomes visible as exemplary, as different.
4. Conclusions
By entering into dialogue and committing to listening and to refining our terms for analysis,
we can, and I believe, should engage comparative methods to re-center hagiography as a global
phenomenon. This effort will require collaboration to identify the key dynamics through which
communities selected and promoted their exemplary figures. The process of collaboration will also
point to the terms that simply do not apply to a particular tradition or context, suggesting further
refinement. Comparative efforts can find commonality and also preserve particularity when they are
undertaken with mutual dialogue and a genuine spirit of understanding.
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1. Introduction
A recent, popular text by David Epstein, titled Range, argues for the necessity of rethinking our
current models of specialization.1 In it Epstein explores numerous areas that have benefited from the
hand of a generalist, or at least someone who could see beyond their tightly-focused specialization.
It seems that the interest in breadth, as well as depth, is returning to favor in the popular and scholarly
contexts. Building on the work of Oliver Freiberger and his notion of the “illuminative” nature of
comparative work, this paper will explore some areas of growth that are available specifically to
the scholars willing to transcend their traditional boundaries. From there, it will apply Freiberger’s
methodology for comparative studies to a more specific framework of hagiography, in the context of
a 2018 conference panel.2 From my perspective, Hagiology, and indeed the study of Religion has
experienced stunted growth due to its own reliance on specialization. While exceptions are proliferating,
there are compelling reasons for this historically being the case.3 Few scholars who master Sanskrit
go on to add Syriac, or Armenian, or any other combination of fundamental languages to particular
traditions. How could one, whose expertise lies elsewhere, hope to speak definitively on a subject,
while relying on translations and their own dilettantish curiosities? It is my suspicion that our particular
scholarly communities, Religious Studies, and its partners in History and Literature, are ill-practiced at,
and perhaps ill-equipped for, crossing over traditions in the interest of interdisciplinary perspectives
and compelling theories that might expand our ways of knowing. Given that the fields of History and
Religion have historically relied on specializations in particular languages and time periods, any hope
of transcending discipline-oriented impediments renders collaborative work imperative. This paper
1 (Epstein 2019).
2 I agree with Massimo Rondolino’s view of hagiography as a metalinguistic category of analysis, useful for pursuing
“more sophisticated understanding of religious phenomena as human expressions within given historical and cultural
realities” (Rondolino 2017, p. 6). See also (Freiberger 2018, p. 5).
3 Some recent, and notable, comparative work includes: (Hawley 2018; Rondolino 2017; Cuffel et al. 2018).
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responds to this question of how a scholar might effectively traverse the high walls of one’s discipline,
especially in the realm of hagiology.
Hagiology is a particularly interesting locus of disciplinary interchange. Saintly figures and their
stories abound in many religious traditions. The stories often approximate each other with minor
changes in framing details or underlying theologies. It came as somewhat of a surprise to me after
graduate school to realize that my colleagues, who had specialized in different languages and traditions,
were working with saintly materials that could be considered strikingly similar to my own on a number
of levels. Why had we never discussed our texts? Was there really nothing we could hope to learn
from each other because the narratives were housed in different languages and cultures? Although,
the movement towards area studies departments offers one possibility, it can also create competing
loyalties and further artificial boundaries. I am not interested in making an argument that “religious”
behavior transcends cultural boundaries in some categorizable form, but certainly there is some value
in exploring the common ground and diversity that exist amidst these silos of particular religious
traditions, history, and literature.
I remember well a dialogue between two leading scholars at a premiere university, who happened
to study monasticism in their respective fields. Both had studied the other’s tradition at some point in
their scholarly journeys, and one scholar pointed out the numerous similarities between the traditions
in the way monastic practice was conducted. Nodding along, the other scholar made nice, and later
circled back to me to explain that there was almost nothing that could be considered similar about
monasticism in the two traditions.
This highlights the historical terrain of Religious Studies and the resulting paradigms that we
now seen in the academic study of comparative religions.4 The history of comparative study, and its
subsequent distrust, serves to preclude us from useful paradigms of study in, and outside, our fields
of interest.5 Returning to our initial question of how we push past the siloed nature of thinking in
academic disciplines, I propose comparative study as the most useful academic tool when skillfully
employed. A recent example from my own liberal arts college emerged when a working group,
focused on assessing undergraduate composition, attempted to compare best practices for writing
in various fields (Humanities, Sciences, Arts, Social-Sciences). Scholars were jarred by the variation
in requirements and what that indicated about the styles of scholarship. For instance, many were
surprised to realize that few Scientific articles would venture to quote a phrase from another scholar as
the study of Humanities regularly does. Others found remarkable the simple notion that the date of an
article is more prominent in APA style than it is in Chicago. These details tell us something about what
we value as scholars and ignite our curiosities about why we value it.
What, if any, are the values of a comparative theory or methodology in the study of the
saints across traditions? Does a category’s meaning develop when considered outside of their
regular or received context, i.e., panegyric, devotional material, compilation, theological treatise,
training manual? How do we push past the siloed nature of thinking in academic disciplines and fields
of study? For example, how might one’s reading of a text be affected by awareness of other modes of
4 For a concise history of this tension, see Sara Ritchey’s contribution to this special issue (Ritchey 2019).
5 There are exceptions, of course. One worth noting occurred between my field of late antique Christian studies and the fields
of anthropology and social theory. A seminal text in the study of Christian saints, Peter Brown’s 1971 article in the Journal of
Roman Studies, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,” cites in his first footnote Mary Douglas as an
inspiration toward his work. Brown’s later work on asceticism, The Body and Society, cites the influence of Michel Foucault in
his introduction. I raise these instances because I think Brown embodies the best version of collaboration with fields of study
and theories that may, at first, appear to have little impact on the late ancient world of Christianity. Peter Brown leads as a
generalist as much as a specialist; his seminars regularly included a wide variety of material that, at first glance, seemed
only tangentially related to the topic. In my graduate program, I was delighted to hear from a colleague of mine, studying
South Asian saints, that he found Brown’s work to be influential and enlightening in his own field of study. This detail is
useful for framing the style of comparative studies that may prove most generative. See (Brown 1971, 2008, p. xvii).
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writing/reading/reception/function?6 I argue that similar realizations occur when scholars of hagiography
explore the worlds of saintly material outside their traditions and time periods. Perhaps most difficult
in this enterprise is to allow oneself to go down the road of basic comparison, acknowledging that
initial results will sometimes appear simple and uninspiring—much like that aforementioned professor
anticipated. One worries, at times, that there will be scant results, barely surpassing the enthusiastic
claims of, “My tradition has a saint that sounds almost identical to that!” I want to propose, however,
that pushing the comparison a few different directions might yield more considerable outcomes.
In order to organize these questions into ways we might read texts in conversation and collaboration
with other scholars and traditions, I offer here a nascent attempt at best practices for comparative
hagiology in a conference setting.
2. Best Practices in Comparative Hagiology
Freiberger has insightfully argued that “Much of what is regarded as problematic about comparison
in the study of religion (decontextualization, essentialization, undue generalization) should be discussed,
in my view, not only in theoretical but also in methodological terms.”7 Working with his open-ended
and excellent methodology, this section explores how this might function in a conference panel setting,
oriented toward comparative hagiology. This model represents my reworking of the incisive ideas of
Sara Ritchey, Jon Keune, and Patton Burchett, who experimented in how to best organize a panel for a
joint session of the 2018 AAR sponsored by the Hinduism unit, and precipitated by the Hagiographical
Society’s working group.
2.1. Expand the Range of Meaning Beyond Genres
The first aspect of comparative work, that I want to consider, is the widening scope of interpretation
that is gaining momentum in some scholarly circles.8 Beginning with the notion of saints’ lives as
literature, it is interesting to consider how the concept of genre has worked, in the words of Sara Ritchey,
to “overdetermine interpretations of sacred biography.” Should all hagiography be read in the same
way? Was it received in its original contexts in the ways we conceive of it today? I find this framing
apparatus works in a number of western, Christian interpretive contexts. When we hear someone call
something, “gospel” or “scripture” or “panegyric” or “poetry” we gain a facility with these texts. At the
same time, we start to lose possibilities of interpretation and understanding. Similarly, the compilation,
to use one hagiographical style, is readily embraced as another attempt at encyclopedic knowledge.9
Reading compilations as attempts at universal knowledge is certainly enlightening, but it does not
encompass the possibilities that lie within these enigmatic collections. In order to start considering the
potential of reading beyond particular categories, it is useful to inquire as to whether the category exists
in other historical contexts. The simple act of exploring a category in a parallel world gets one thinking
6 Not limiting the saintly material to text is an important step in expanding the discussion beyond the written word, in order
to include varieties of material culture. Here see Jon Keune’s essay that favors the term “hagiology” over “hagiography”
(Keune 2019).
7 (Freiberger 2018, p. 11).
8 I would point out a forthcoming volume, Constructed Sainthood, in Vigiliae Christianae Supplements, edited by Christa Gray
(Univ. Reading) and James Corke-Webster (Kings College London), that is the outcome of a British Academy Leverhulme
project. In it a series of scholars explore the various ways hagiography has been utilized by its authors and readers, and in
what ways it can be investigated by contemporary scholars. My work in this volume begins with the question of whether,
and how, the compilatory framework—both the impetus to compile multiple saints’ lives and the subsequent reception
history—grew as a uniquely advantageous style in the hands of late antique authors.
9 Similar to what Hildegard of Bingen attempted in her Physica: Liber subtilitatum diversarum naturarum creaturarum and Causae
et Curae, or Hugh of Saint-Victor with his treatment of the arts in Didascalicon. Several excellent bibliographies relating to
encyclopaedism are readily available online. See the “Medieval Encylopedias, Bestiaries, Lapidaries, and Herbals” entry
from ARC Humanities Press; the online journal, Spicae, Cahiers de l’Atelier Vincent de Beauvais; and the Atelier Vincent de
Beauvais: “Bibliographie sur les encyclopédies médiévales. See also (Hildegard 2003, 2010; Hugues de Saint-Victor 1997).
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about the category itself, and how it might benefit from further definition or critical investigation.10
What drove the author to compile, and was it the same everywhere? Whether this question is answered
or not, the historian has already opened the possibility of interpretation beyond the normative methods
and theories of their field.
Beginning with this framework, it is fascinating to think about the ways that we might be reading
a text incongruously with its intended purpose—of course, this style of inquiry has always been the
privilege of the historian. Using a brief example from my own work, I would cite the collection of John
of Ephesus in the sixth-century, Byzantine context. John is championed as the Miaphysite bishop who
worked closely with the Emperor Justinian (Chalcedonian) and Empress Theodora (Miaphysite). I think
it is tempting to read John’s work as a piece of history or theology, without paying attention to the
enormously influential political terrain of his day.11 Individual lives can easily be plucked from John’s
work to render several different narratives of the saints in the Syrian context. Possibilities multiply as
the number of included saints grows. How does a story change when it is coupled with other stories?
Moreover, what might be the aims of someone engaging in the compiling process? Might a text be read
against itself, or in remembrance of a movement or doctrine that it openly denounces? In all of these
questions, we see the possibilities of reading texts in less constricted ways for wider fields of meaning.
Did all hagiographers intend their saintly literature to be read in the same ways? We must be
missing out on some social contexts, or jokes, or literary styles and traditions that would make as little
sense to us today as the choice to write a saint’s life in the first place. Indeed, the entire enterprise
of drafting saintly material can be foreign to the modern scholar and requires a rethinking of our
own position vis-à-vis the text. In conclusion of this point, the category of “hagiography”, as some
static repository, is in need of continual complication. Coming together initially with an interest in
expanding beyond the range of regular meanings is an ideal first step in allowing the comparative
process to excel. This leads to a second aspect: How to settle on common territory.
2.2. Begin with a Theme
This step is the most complicated, as it ponders the question of whether and how to let go of that
which got us here. I want to first cite Freiberger’s assertion that the selection of the comparands prior
to the act of the comparison “presupposes a prior act of comparison.”12 With this in mind, it becomes
important to consider the possibility that a theme, or tertium comparationis, over which the comparands
might be selected and brought into conversation, could be an important first step in holding open a
space that is less encumbered by predispositions and vectors of interest. This may not be possible
in every field, but within the context of hagiology, it appears not only feasible but advantageous.
Within the framework of hagiology, analogous themes abound, often unhindered by theologies or Sitz
im Leben.13
This raises the question of the definitional problems of hagiology that Rondolino, Keune,
and Ritchey explore in their papers for this volume.14 How would one know they are engaging
with the same “stuff” unless agreed upon signifiers can be placed? One option, which aligns with
Rondolino’s “heuristic” form is to delimit by choosing particular themes that are oriented toward saintly
behavior and its retelling, such as: Miraculous, holiness, otherworldliness, asceticism, and subsequent
10 See Rondolino’s piece in this volume that argues hagiography functions as a heuristic device, rather than a specific genre
(Rondolino 2019).
11 We might render this broader view a historically-conceived “thick description” of John’s work. See (Geertz 1973).
12 (Freiberger 2018, p. 8).
13 This notion is worthy of significant further study.
14 Rondolino argues for hagiography as a “heuristic device that serves a taxonomical function for: (1) the identification of a given
datum; (2) its classification within a group of similar and already known phenomena; and (3) its study and interpretation in
light of the web of relationships and characteristics proper to that group” (Rondolino 2019).
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subjectivities, or monastic—and their approximate counterparts in translation.15 Once scholars assent
to these signifiers, a range of topics emerge as possibilities for the tertium comparationis: Material
artifacts, comeuppance or retribution, forgiveness, healing, challenges to authority, political leaders,
reception, production, promulgation, devotion, city/country, compilation, literary aspects, economics
(both money and modes of exchange), social justice, death, community, politics, the author, plot,
asceticism, subjectivities, love, sexuality, violence, and the heretical.16 Focusing on a single theme
keeps the conversation centralized and increases the chances of attaining some depth.
The job of this first aspect is to arbitrarily narrow the field of interest to a manageable locus,
based on the personal interest of the involved scholars. Given the wide variety of saintly material
in any tradition, and multiplying that across disciplines, the creation of a third space, in which
comparative partners can play with ideas becomes necessary.17 I would cite the recent development in
the Hagiographical Society’s AAR working group that has attempted to partner scholars from varying
traditions in the exploration of particular themes.18 As an example: The theme for 2018 was the concept
of the “miraculous.” Scholars were allowed to choose a text or figure to explore from this viewpoint
and formulate their own theories on the topic in their traditions and areas of expertise. One important
outcome of this first step is that it limits the tendency to look for simple analogues across traditions and
then orient them toward a basic tertium comparationis. Beginning with a theme, and then exploring the
way that theme emerges in a context, yields richer and more complicated findings, e.g., not “My saint
also levitates,” but “How and why does the supernatural manifest in a given context?”
2.3. Choose Initial Frameworks for Reading the Theme from Various Traditions
Within the comparative group, scholars may choose different ways of thinking about the theme.
As in step one (above) this can feel somewhat arbitrary as it is based on the preference of the scholar.
In our 2018 panel, themes were proposed by the individual scholars: Transgressive actions reinterpreted;
objects, agency, and transmission; conflicts and competition in community and teaching; and retribution
and agency. Scholars identified these starting points based on their own interests and initial ways
of reading, which helped other participants to think with these notions as they explored their own
topics. In other words, beginning with a foreign framework, or hearing the kinds of questions different
scholars apply to their sources, allows the scholar to read their own texts in new light, before even
hearing others’ findings. This also increases the possibility of overlapping insights. Rather than each
scholar reading their material with their favorite lenses, this step gives a foreshadowing of what other
ways of reading might be applied to the project.
2.4. Share Unfinished Papers for Commentary
When scholars are asked to share their papers before they are complete—a truly daunting practice
for any scholar—the possibility of cohesion emerges. Rather than the stagnant conference paper,
or edited volume with a few retro-fitted citations from other chapters to make it look cohesive,
the scholar has a chance to really think about how their texts might change in the new light of
other research styles and traditions. Having attended national conferences for well over a decade,
I can attest to the strong tradition of failed attempts at drawing together panels with a moderator
or respondent, who reads the papers a few days before they are presented. This step leaves room
15 The problem of language in translation is significant. Does miracle mean the same in translation? This is another rich field
of possibility for exploration in the comparative framework. On Asceticism creating new subjectivities. See (Valantasis 2002,
p. 548).
16 This list is obviously not comprehensive, but gives a sense of the variety of topics that are widely available in
different traditions.
17 See Keune’s argument that focusing on the basic methodologies serves to foreground “playful, creative, and open-ended
conversations among the collaborators, rather than the disparities and differences that will inevitably arise when diverse
specialists come together” (Keune 2019).
18 Sara Ritchey has been particularly instrumental in facilitating these dialogues.
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for early communication, pivoting in ideas, and exploration of new styles of interpretation: all the
things we regularly tout as tantamount to the scholarly process, but rarely leave time for in our own
conference work.
2.5. Leave Room for Rounds of Communication
Comparison takes time. As scholars we are accustomed to acting as the authority on a subject
and what we find is often publishable and well-received as definitive. Building in the extra steps of
communicating what frameworks (step 3) the scholar sees as directly applicable to their own work,
as well as what new ideas were sparked by way of the initial sharing of papers is an essential step in
the comparative process. This cross-fertilization can obviously take many forms such as: Commentary
on each other’s papers, a colloquium (if funding permits), round-robin summarization of each other’s
papers, a word cloud approach at prominent themes, or a short comparative paper in which one uses
another scholar’s methodology on their topic, or looks for points of crossover and difference, with an
attempt to explain why these occur.
2.6. Generate a Core Body of Interest
As any scholar of hagiology will concur, one can find almost anything in the storehouse of saintly
material. In order to deepen the conversation on a given topic, the comparative group needs to focus
on a particular core of issues they want to further examine. A succinct way of doing this is having
each participant make a “top five list” of bullet points that they see as the most promising ways
forward. There will inevitably be consensus on some issues or ideas, which make for excellent nodes
of connection and serve to decrease the time scholars must invest to engage with each other’s ideas.
What is perhaps most intriguing in this step, however, is the reflection on what areas do not overlap
and why they do not. In this step, each participant should consider why certain ideas stand out as
valuable points of interest in their own work, but are absent in another tradition or historical setting.
2.7. Return to Your Work with New Perspectives
After these initial steps of collaboration, it is very intriguing to re-encounter your initial paper
with the breadth of ideas and interpretations of the theme that has been generated in the comparative
work. Far from looking for consensus, or simple comparisons, the scholar is able to re-invigorate their
initial ideas with the range of possibilities emerging from their collaborative partners.
2.8. Add the Voice of an Outside Respondent
As a final perspective, the collaborators might include the voice of an outside scholar, who could
take the overarching view and discuss themes and styles that might be useful to the participants.
The process of going deep in comparison on the ground will regularly benefit from a return to
the overarching perspective, that can bring themes together and reinvigorate dialogue in finely
tuned directions.
3. A Few Brief Personal Observations on the Process
Although I anticipated the final round of work to be most insightful, I was surprised to find
one of the most useful aspects of this process was the initial paper writing in conversation with the
others’ proposed frameworks. In knowing the concepts that the other scholars would pursue on our
theme, I found myself addressing the material in unique ways. Instead of quickly skimming over
the preliminary narrative of my saint, I was attuned to new ways of reading. For example, I began
to question whether my saint’s violent retribution, the death of children from uncooperative parents,
should be considered a miracle at all, and how it might have been interpreted in that community.
Moreover, I began to think about the narrative in light of the framework of “competition in community”
and realized my text needed far more contextual inquiry, since it only gives one side of a very
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contentious story. I could reconsider my own proclivities toward the theme of retribution in the saints
and put the text in conversation with my comparative group’s chosen frameworks: Concepts of agency,
and transmission; transgressive actions reinterpreted; conflicts and competition in community and
teaching. New insights in my own work emerged and old connections were highlighted in vivid relief.
This process awoke new, curious aspects of my own work, because I researched my saints knowing
that it would be read by scholars from different traditions. I am reasonably familiar with some of the
South Asian traditions and found the reading of my own texts and subsequent writing about them was
imbued with a new sense of possibility and range of understanding. As a quick example, the oblation
or eucharistic practice and the economy of divine power surrounding it, took on new meaning in
thinking about various Hindu rites. As I read, several new interpretations emerged. I was reminded
of the power of the eucharist for early Christians, who saw in it a type of direct exchange with the
divine. I had never considered this power dynamic in my particular story. A colleague’s exploration of
interpretation of transgressive action and how they were interpreted by the community, in which it
occurred, as well as later readers was particularly insightful for my own work on retribution, making
me aware of a layer I had missed in my work. The collaboration moved several of us to think more
deeply about what constitutes a “miracle” in our own context and beyond.
I recognize that we naturally read our texts with lenses that are most accessible and foundational
to our intellectual heritage—that which our Doktormütter and -väter trained us to examine. When I
pick up a text, I am immediately drawn to envisioning what it looked like on the ground, what the
theological problems were, and how these get worked out socially. Although a great model, it leaves a
significant swath of possible interpretive options untouched. In conversation with other traditions,
we think more deeply about the possibilities of writing and reading in our own context.
I am drawn to a method of comparative work that acknowledges one’s own position within the
tradition and seeks to disrupt these normative readings as much as possible. If one begins with a shared
theme, the inclination to look for simple similarities is quickly traversed, opening the way for sustained
contemplation on the ways of reading that do not come naturally. The outcome of these is then to read
alongside, and in conversation, with one’s own field for wider possibilities of interpretation.
Comparative work is not easy. In order to successfully achieve an outcome that rises above simple
similarities, numerous steps, additional time, and increased communication are required. There is a
naturally destabilizing effect that occurs when one subjects the well-worn paths of their intellectual
heritage and like-minded research communities to the scrutiny of outsiders. In effect, this project is akin
to comparison of, not only texts and themes, but also the comparison of academic enclaves. What are
the underlying proclivities of a field that we as scholars are reluctant to lay bare? What inherited styles
might we be unaware of in our scholarship? This internal scrutiny is the most significant outcome of
the comparative project.
In conclusion, the comparative paradigm serves not to find some common ground for a grand
narrative about the baseline of religions, nor for finding links that prove primacy or mimicry, but rather
a catalyst for seeing again one’s own field with clarity, drawing on the wealth of fresh perspectives and
awareness. If I may liken this to the claims of Martha Nussbaum in her early work on cosmopolitanism,
we might see that we can only accurately learn about ourselves in the context of others.19 Or, in this
case, we may better understand our own histories and traditions of inquiry if we can parse out our own
predilections and blind-spots. The comparative project is uniquely useful in helping one to achieve
this perspective. It leaves me wondering how those two scholars of monasticism might have benefited
from a more open and deliberate conversation about their shared intellectual spaces.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
19 (Nussbaum and Cohen 2002, pp. 11–12).
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Abstract: There is a basic tension within the idea of Comparative Hagiology, because the two terms
that constitute its name are incongruous. To formulate a comparative hagiological project, we must
choose at the outset which term will take priority. Prioritizing the comparative in comparative hagiology
orients us to focus more on the basic disciplinary approaches to gather compare-able data, leaving
hagiology as a placeholder whose content will be defined by the results of the comparison. Prioritizing
hagiology requires first defining hagio- and reckoning with the European and Christian baggage that it
brings to cross-cultural and inter-religious comparison. Holding that definition in mind, we then
locate examples to compare by whatever approach seems fruitful in that case. Different choices of
priorities lead to potentially different results. I argue that a path that prioritizes comparative is more
likely to inspire experimental and innovative groupings, unconventional definitions of hagiology,
and new perspectives in the cross-cultural study of religion. An approach that prioritizes hagiology
runs a greater risk of repeating the same provincial and conceptual biases that doomed much of
20th-century comparative religion scholarship.
Keywords: collaborative scholarship; comparative method; comparative religions; definition; disciplinary
innovation; hagiography; hagiology; religious studies; theory and method in religious studies
1. Introduction1
This paper grew out of participating in the two Comparative Hagiology Workshops that took
place in 2017 and 2018. In the first workshop, as we pondered what “comparative hagiology” could
be, group discussion gravitated toward what seemed like a primary problem that needed resolving
before anything else would be possible. How shall we define our key terms—saint, saintliness,
or even religion? How is meaningful comparison even possible without first clarifying the criteria
by which scholars selected items to be compared? These questions prompted concerns about using
traditionally Christian words from European contexts to mistranslate phenomena from non-Christian
and non-western worlds. Unsurprisingly, we reached no consensus on basic definitions, and some of us
left the workshop frustrated with that line of inquiry, if still optimistic about the possibilities. The next
year, Sara Ritchey and David DiValerio addressed this problem by proposing neutral, carefully selected
terms that we might deploy cross-culturally to move comparison forward. We see the excellent fruits
of their intellectual labor here, in their articles in this issue of Religions (Ritchey) and (DiValerio).
I pursue a quite different line of inquiry. I want to take a step back and reconsider whether it truly
is the case that we must clearly define our key terms before proceeding with comparison. As we envision
what comparative hagiology could be, I argue that a broader range of methodological possibilities
opens up if we resist emphasizing initial definitions. Essentially, I think the problem lies in the fact
1 I am especially grateful to Massimo Rondolino for gathering an inspiring set of diverse scholars in the Comparative
Hagiology workshops, and to Barbara Zimbalist for her insightful comments on a draft of this paper at the 2018 workshop.
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that the term “comparative hagiology” contains a vital cognitive tension. This tension would not
substantially change if we were to rearrange the terms and call it hagiological comparison. The two
words in the name are basically incongruous and do not play together nicely. Comparative hagiology
is not a single, unified thing but rather a dynamic conflict: comparative versus hagiology.
Now, I do agree with Thomas Tweed that it is a best practice for scholars to provide “stipulative
definitions” of key terms as a way of indicating the scope of their observation and analysis.2 However,
when it comes to overtly comparative projects, I think that Tweed’s point applies not so much at the
beginning of research (as Tweed assumes) but rather in the final stages, when one presents one’s
findings to an audience who is unfamiliar with the whole research journey. In this respect, a helpful
point of reference is the five-fold comparative process proposed by Oliver Freiberger (building on J.
Z. Smith): selection, description, juxtaposition, re-description, and rectification or theory formation.3
Freiberger points out that that these five operations are not necessarily sequential, and some projects
may omit one or more processes. My argument is that formulating too precise a definition (description,
in Freiberger’s list) at the outset confines the entire comparative process. At the earliest stage of
a project, during which one selects items to compare, declaring stipulative definitions is less urgent
and can even be a hindrance. A deeper understanding of the tension between comparative and hagiology
may be helpful for keeping in check the temptation to define key terms first.
At the risk of appearing to contradict myself, I want to clarify how I use the word hagiology as
opposed to hagiography. I understand hagiology in a very broad sense: the study of hagio-, however we
define that word (traditionally, saints or sanctity). To this end, hagiology may draw on a wide range of
source materials for its data. In the past century, when scholars have studied saints in an academic,
non-confessional way, they typically relied on sources that were in the form of written text—literally,
hagiography. Now, some scholars (including most of my colleagues in this special issue of Religions)
define hagiography much more expansively than I do, going well beyond written texts and even
encompassing what I call hagiology. For my argument, however, it is essential that we distinguish
among different media, their distinct modes of communication, and the disciplinary approaches that
developed for analyzing them. I think that the word hagiography cannot but prioritize textuality in
its restricted sense of written documents, even for those who intend to use it expansively. After all,
written documents have been the vast majority of source materials for studying saints in the 20th
century, and that continues to be true today. In any case, such difference in word usage is nothing new
or deficient. Over the past 1500 years, several terms that begin with hagio- have borne diverse and
inconsistent meanings.4
2. Comparative vs. Hagiology: A Provocative Oversimplification
How ought one begin conceiving a project in comparative hagiology? I suggest that two main
options exist, derived from the tension between comparative and hagiology. In effect, they present scholars
with a fork in the methodological road. Immediately but not necessarily consciously, the scholar must
choose a path that prioritizes one of the two terms over the other. For comparative and hagiology are
rooted in a different set of considerations and disciplinary lenses.
Prioritizing the “comparative” of comparative hagiology foregrounds the analytic and often creative
act of apprehending multiple items together. Of course, all theorization relies on comparison to some
degree, in order to reach a level of abstraction, but I focus here on examples that consciously aim
to be comparative. Oliver Freiberger has helpfully described comparison as a second-order method
that depends on other, first-order methods.5 Whatever and however one compares, some kind of
2 (Tweed 2006, p. 34).
3 (Freiberger 2018, pp. 8–11).
4 (Philippart 1994). I am grateful to Charles Talar for translating this article into English after the Comparative Hagiology
workshop in 2017.
5 (Freiberger 2018, p. 2).
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research and knowledge gathering must have occurred in order to apprehend the items (comparands)
that one is comparing at all. This basic research is carried out through disciplinary methods that
scholars mostly agree are able to yield reliable knowledge. Such first-order methods are grounded in
academic disciplines that have no necessary relation to religion: literary criticism, art history, sociology,
psychology, political science, and so on. These pre-comparative methods are crucial in apprehending
items as comparable. The methods are a core part of the tertium comparationis—the “third” thing,
with reference to which the items are compared. It is the method that positions each item logically in
relation to the tertium.
In essence, prioritizing the comparative in comparative hagiology grants importance to the
first-order method that the scholar used in their pre-comparative study. Most religious studies scholars
in the 20th century followed methodologies for interpreting texts, beliefs, and history, sometimes
seasoned by theoretical concerns from sociology, theology, psychology, discourse analysis, and the like.
Since that time, approaches that analyze bodies, space, ritual, and visual dimensions have become
more common. None of these approaches are religious, in and of themselves.
Prioritizing the comparative in comparative hagiology does not require one to define initially
what constitutes a hagio-, saint, or religion. Doing so may even hinder the comparative process,
as assumptions embedded within the definition unnecessarily narrow the field of possible candidates
for comparison. Creativity is involved in apprehending items as comparable, analogous, oppositional,
or held together in some way within the same scope of attention. Because of this, it suffices initially to
regard hagiology as a placeholder that gestures in the direction of something like religion, ideology,
venerated figures, or extraordinary people. After research is carried out and the project nears
completion, the scholar may wish to articulate a definition to clarify what is “hagiological” (or not)
about the project. This is especially important for the sake of communicating one’s findings to people.
Prioritizing hagiology at the start of a comparative hagiological project prompts the scholar to
articulate what constitutes hagio-, to stipulate what meaningfully compare-able items might look like
when the scholar starts searching for them. In English and most European languages, this would
usually involve carefully redefining the word “saint” so that it is not too Christian, or it involves
adopting a term (like Ritchey’s “exemplary figures” and Rondolino’s “perfected beings”) that avoids
the word “saint.”6 Yet, with all of these terms, the weight of semantic precedent and tradition makes
it difficult to define such terms without reference to “religion.” And if hagio- is hard to define in
a cross-culturally sensitive way, religion is even more notoriously difficult. Since a logic like that
of Parson Thwackum (“When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the
Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of
England”)7 cannot suffice for comparative scholars, they may choose to adopt or refine a definition
from the variety of famous options: Spiro’s “interaction with supernatural beings,” Tillich’s “ultimate
concern,” Tweed’s “confluences of cultural-organic flows,” and so on. Or one could follow Max Weber
and regard “saint” as an ideal type, as many scholars do in practice if not explicitly, when they view
saints cross-culturally as people who exemplify virtues or hold religious/charismatic authority. Yet this
“definition” involves resorting to a deeply sociological method. As an ideal type, “saint” effectively is
situated between a hard definition and a flexible method.
It seems to me that those scholars who are most comfortable prioritizing hagiology in comparative
hagiology are used to focusing on Christian and western traditions, since hagio- and its affiliates are
emic to their study and directly meaningful for them, even if they attempt to reflect critically on that
language. Scholars of non-western traditions who speak or teach in European languages constantly
reckon with more extreme linguistic and conceptual translation in their research and publications.
They may be more reluctant to concede yet again to defining a basic term in English, Latin, or Greek,
6 See (Ritchey; Rondolino 2019).
7 From Henry Fielding’s 1749 novel A History of Tom Jones, A Foundling, quoted in (Nye 2008, p. 9).
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for the sake of engaging in comparative hagiology with colleagues who are not demanded to make the
same concession. Although we may treat hagio-, for academic purposes, as merely a heuristic device,
there is no getting away from the fact that it will feel more familiar and comfortable to some people
than to others.
In his article in this special issue, Massimo Rondolino points out that a benefit of retaining hagio- is
that it allows us to trace the historical questions and debates over the term’s applicability.8 A neologism,
in contrast, would be no less informed by these debates but would render them invisible. In theory,
this is valuable for remembering how the field arose. But I fear that it may further strengthen the
gravity of European and Christian studies, making it even harder for scholars of other regions and
traditions to do anything except continue orbiting around that center. For many, this would be a very
unappealing prospect, and comparative hagiology would find fewer conversation partners among
those who work outside the West and Christianity.
An alternative route we could take when prioritizing hagiology at the outset would be to commit
to experiments that demonstrate a willingness to escape the Euro-Christian gravity well. A group
of collaborators could agree to exchange hagio- or saint with a term that originates somewhere else,
grounded in a very different world of thought and practice. Instead of focusing on saints, one could
make the central concept something like sādhu, guru, sant (an Indic false friend of saint), imām,
junzi, or shengren. If hagiology is to be a truly global and cross-cultural field of study and not just
an extension of a provincial and confessional paradigm, then such swapping out terms like this
should not be controversial. Scholars of Christianity could be challenged to wrap their minds around
studying someone like Thomas Aquinas through the lens of comparative junzi-ology or theorizing
hagiology through the conceptual categories of guru-śāstra (a neologism for the “systematic study of
gurus”). Of course, Thomas Aquinas does not fit comfortably in the boxes of junzi or guru, but those
terms would certainly shine a different light on him. Or, yet another alternative route would be
to regard “comparative hagiology” very explicitly as merely provisional—an English placeholder
concept that introduces non-specialists to what comparative hagiology scholars do, but one that
newcomers would be quickly forced to replace with something more relevant and meaningful to
specific comparative projects.
In summary, I think it is helpful to acknowledge that comparative and hagiology pull in two different
directions. The comparative operation depends on first-order disciplinary methods, which construe the
items of comparison (such as saints) as things that can be meaningfully understood within non-religious
disciplinary paradigms. Religion is not an essential component of these methods, and the analysis that
is performed through them may even have the effect of “secularizing” or disenchanting the items it
compares. So, prioritizing the comparative activity and the disciplinary methods that feed into it could
lead a scholar to select items for comparison that fit the methods well, but the results of the comparison
may greatly push the envelope of what constitutes hagio- and religion. Prioritizing hagiology would
steer away from those more experimental comparisons, unless scholars were to define hagio- very
expansively, well beyond the traditional meanings of hagio-, saint, saintliness, and religion. It seems
to me that prioritizing the hagiology of comparative hagiology at the start of a project cannot but
obligate a scholar to explain the relation of hagio- to religion generally (what differentiates a saint from
a non-saint?). And this would end up reinforcing and favoring, even if unintentionally, the default
Euro-Christian paradigm from which the comparative activity is trying to break free. In theory,
one could use the hagiology-prioritized approach and define hagiology initially in a way that pushes
intentionally against Christian terminology, by adopting non-Christian terms as the placeholders and
maybe even replacing the word hagiology with a Chinese or Sanskrit term that shifts the center of
attention away from Europe and Christianity. However, given the gravity and depth of hagiography
studies of medieval Europe, I think this practically quite unlikely.
8 (Rondolino 2019).
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3. Concluding Reflections
Throughout this article, I have kept referring to the initial stage of a project being the crucial point
at which one must choose to prioritize either comparative or hagiology. In the introduction, I demurred
from Thomas Tweed’s call for scholars to provide stipulative definitions at the beginning of their
work, on the grounds that, in an explicitly comparative project, defining terms is most productive at
the conclusion, when one communicates one’s results. Sequence is crucial. In terms of Freiberger’s
five-fold process of comparison (selection, description, juxtaposition, re-description, and rectification or
theory formation), I am interested mainly in selection and the role that definitions play in it. Freiberger
notes that the selection of items to compare is “extremely complex” and “the least transparent of the
five operations” because so many variables figure into what may—even unconsciously—capture one’s
attention.9 In arguing that we should prioritize the comparative of comparative hagiology, I am pointing
to the energy or inspiration that leads to selection. Whereas prioritizing comparative broadens our
horizon of possible selections, prioritizing hagiology narrows it down. Although Freiberger notes that
the five processes need not occur in the order that he presents them, I am arguing that for comparative
hagiology to be truly cross-cultural, selection ought to precede definition/description. Those who feel
the need to define hagio- before deciding on what to compare, effectively put definition/description
before selection. This may not necessarily be putting the cart before the horse, but it is at least hitching
the cart to a horse that is strongly inclined to stay on a familiar path.
Because the selection process is elusive and difficult to explain, Freiberger insists that “transparency
is paramount,” so that we may recognize what agendas may have guided our choices unconsciously.
I agree. But along with being lucid about the selection process, I argue that we should be ludic as well.
Not to make light of the colonial and hegemonic effects of past comparative projects, I nonetheless
think that creativity and even playfulness can be quite valuable in selecting items to compare, because
those are the qualities that lead to new ways of thinking and seeing the world. This would also bring
some levity to the endeavor, so that people are not intimidated or frightened of comparison. After all,
comparison inevitably requires us to move at least partially outside our comfort zones and areas of
expertise. Focusing on the basic methodologies that feed into comparative hagiology rather than
preparing to fight over the definition of hagio- opens up greater freedom for that vital creativity and
play. This would be especially helpful in collaborative research, to foreground playful, creative, and
open-ended conversations among the collaborators rather than the disparities and differences that will
inevitably arise when diverse specialists come together.
Let us consider an example. In Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Hagiographical Strategies, Massimo
Rondolino proposed a methodology that I think holds great potential for comparative hagiology.10
It also can help illustrate what I have been trying to argue in this article. Although he observes sets of
hagiographical sources in different traditions (Francis of Assisi and the Tibetan Buddhist yogin Milarepa),
his main concern is not the figures themselves but the “hagiographical process”—the literary patterns
and competing ideological forces that standardized the ways in which later generations remembered
them. Although Rondolino may have initially selected these two examples based on a fairly traditional
idea of sainthood, he approaches them by focusing on function, behavior, context, and change in the
discourse of these texts. He calls this the “hagiographical process,” but his method is a combination of
discourse analysis, historiography, and close readings of texts. In essence, his project emphasizes the
comparative rather than the hagiology of comparative hagiology. The word “hagiographical” derives
from the fact that he analyzes texts that people conventionally regard as hagiography, because they are
about individual people conventionally remembered as extraordinary religious figures.
To take this one ludic step further, this same approach that observed the “hagiographical process”
could be applied equally well to figures who are liminal to the broadly conceived category of “saint,”
9 (Freiberger 2018, pp. 8–9).
10 (Rondolino 2017).
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such as Confucius, Martin Luther, Charles VIII, Shivaji Bhosale, George Washington, Karl Marx, Elvis
Presley, or Kim Jong-il. Do the same concerns and forces that define the hagiographical process of
Francis and Milarepa also shape the cultural memory of these figures? If not, then what accounts
for the difference? If so, what might this suggest about the distinctiveness of the hagio- in hagiology?
By prioritizing the comparative in comparative hagiology and delaying the definition of hagiology,
creative and playful comparative projects like these could go in some very interesting directions.
They may even lead to developing new concepts that illuminate areas of research that were previously
inconceivable, such as Robert Bellah’s notion of civil religion.11 Ultimately, theories and definitions are
human attempts to reckon with a messy world; we should expect the world to frequently overspill the
boundaries that we imagine.
As we imagine what comparative hagiology could look like, I urge us to envision a field that is
as broad and inclusive as possible. Prioritizing the comparative process and the methods that feed
it hold the greatest potential for innovative and cross-culturally sensitive research. Of course, some
people will inevitably object, after witnessing some of the experimental comparisons that arise out of
this approach, “But that’s not religion, and those aren’t saints.” To this, I would respond that the real
problem is not that the scope for comparison is too broad, but that the definitions of religion and saints
are too small.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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11 Freiberger (following J. Z. Smith) calls this process of creating new categories “rectification”—the ultimate stage in the
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Abstract: In this response essay, I consider Jon Keune’s proposal to prioritize the act of comparison
over definitional agreement when beginning an exercise in comparative hagiology. Reflecting on
my own experience as the respondent for a panel at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American
Academy of Religion (AAR), which saw me comparing two very different “hagiographical texts,”
I argue in support of Keune’s approach by stressing its advantage in pushing conceptual creativity
and collaborative inclusivity. In the process, I accept Massimo Rondolino’s invitation to consider his
working re-definition of “hagiography”, which I take as a starting point for thinking through some
of the questions my panel’s unconventional primary texts raise and how they might recommend
revisiting our categories. In the end, I advocate for a capacious view of potential comparanda as one
of the best ways to foster a process of continuous self-reflection and scholarly development.
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1. Introduction
At the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR), I was asked to be the
respondent for a panel entitled “The Ethics of the Saints: Re-Reading and Re-Writing Hagiographical
Texts.” The two papers to which I responded were substantive and thought-provoking. They were
also wildly different. Besides the fact that, as the panel’s title suggests, one involved the scholarly
act of re-reading a text while the other analyzed the creative act of re-writing them, the authors’ use
(or non-use) of key terms, such as “ethics,” “saint,” or “hagiography” indicated little ready overlap.
What is more, the studies diverged in the periodization of their sources (medieval vs. modern), religion
of focus (Islam vs. Christianity), and academic discipline (religious studies vs. theology). Despite
the dialogical challenge posed by these layers of difference, I found the panel to be methodologically
helpful. In what follows, I will reflect on this “experiment” in comparative hagiology in conversation
with the core essays in this issue of Religions, especially those of Jon Keune and Massimo Rondolino,
whose complementary contributions serve as the backdrop for my own thinking. In brief, a lack of
common ground with respect to the hagio, the graphē, as well as the theories and methods employed
by the papers to which I responded spurred me to test out a version of Keune’s approach—that
is, to initially prioritize the comparative analysis over proposing hagiological definitions. Far from
undercutting the comparative utility of “hagiography” as “a heuristic device that serves a taxonomical
function” for like data (Rondolino 2019), I found this compare-first approach well suited for rethinking
“the hagiographical” in expansive and (I hope) productive ways.
Now, before I proceed any further, allow me a few preliminary remarks. First, I have introduced
several terms that require some fleshing out. These clarifications are especially important given their
varying usage by the other contributors in this special issue. Like Rondolino, Ritchey, and Hollander,
but unlike Keune, I assign “hagiography” a wide descriptive range, referring not only to texts but
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all sorts of things which are “read” in relation to the hagio, including artistic productions, practices,
and behaviors. In the course of my essay, it will become clear why I adopt such a broad understanding.
As for “the hagiographical,” a phrase that I seditiously deploy as a noun, this is a nod toward
Rondolino’s “hagiographical process” (Rondolino 2017, p. 2), specifically as it underlines the creative
and receptive dynamics of hagiography. And, with respect to the view that there is no hagio without
the graphē that defines him/her/it, I employ “hagiology” and “hagiological” to denote the study of
hagiographical media, study of the hagiographical process, or discourse about theories and methods in
the study of hagiographies. (Cf. Rondolino 2019; Ritchey 2019; Keune 2019; Hollander 2019; Zimbalist
2019).1 Second, like so many of the other essayists here, my thinking has been shaped by participation
in the on-going AAR-sponsored Comparative Hagiology Workshop, organized by Massimo Rondolino.
The lively theoretical and methodological discussions of this collaborative forum’s 2018 session, the fruit
of which can be found throughout this issue, have been particularly decisive in the following reflection.
2. Approach
Keune’s essay is given to exposing and interrogating a basic, if often unnoticed, tension in the
structure of “comparative hagiology.” In terms of how the scholar devises her study, it is a question of
prioritizing one over the other. Either one starts by describing the hagio2 and then moves on to her
comparison, or one proceeds directly to the comparative act (and the pre-comparative “first-order”
methods that enable it)3, and afterward (re)considers what may (or may not) be hagiographical (or
hagiological) about the comparanda based on the results. Keune advocates for the latter approach on
the grounds that, as it expands the field of possible comparanda far beyond what are conventionally
deemed in the Western academy as “hagiographies,” it is more likely to escape the gravitational pull
of the Euro-Christian paradigm and its attending colonial baggage. Indeed, one should expect this
compare-first approach to facilitate highly creative even playful experiments, in turn leading to new
and unexpected ways of thinking about our objects of study, including “religion” itself. All in all, I find
that Jon Keune makes a compelling case, not only with the accuracy and lucidity of how he describes
the task of comparative hagiology but also with his capacious vision of what that work could be. Yes,
to prioritize comparison is to take a risk—one may be judged provocative, reckless, or, worst of all,
wrong!—but the potential rewards are great.
Understandably, Keune assumes that the comparativist has complete freedom to decide which
approach to take up—compare-first vs. define-first4. In my case, however, I was constrained by the
respondent’s task, which is, as I understand it, to bring the research and results of other scholars
into conversation with one another on the agreed upon theme, or tertium comparationis. In retrospect,
this conventional limitation was a benefit. Having the compare-first approach set before me at the
outset helped to forestall overdetermining my analysis according to how I saw and used the operative
terms in my own field. Still, I admit to finding it easier to proceed with a sense of ambiguity when
it came to what we meant by “ethics” and “saints” than by “hagiography.” This impulse saw my
preliminary thinking vacillate between leaving “hagiography” as a placeholder (per Keune’s proposal)
and trying to arrive at agreement on a serviceable definition (per Rondolino’s proposal).5 Now, let me
be clear: I believe that the latter project (or something like it) is ultimately indispensable, especially
1 On the historical complexity of these and related terms, see (Philippart 1994).
2 Despite the fact that I accepted to gloss hagio as “saint” for my AAR panel, I prefer not to do so here. Being an Islamicist by
training, my hesitation comes not from the term’s Christian connotations but from its automatic association in my field with
Sufism. Thus, adopting “saint” in the context of Islamic hagiology risks excluding all kinds of other hagios, such as prophets,
caliphs, scholars, etc.
3 On comparison as a second-order method depending on prior first-order methods, see (Freiberger 2018; cf. Keune 2019).
4 “In arguing that we should prioritize the comparative of comparative hagiology, I am pointing to the energy or inspiration
that leads to selection” (Keune 2019).
5 Specifically, I played with a more restrictive variation of Rondolino’s definition (see Rondolino 2019).
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for those concerned with communicating and collaborating outside of their fields of specialization.6
However, for the participants in the context of this AAR panel—myself included—it quickly became
apparent that getting on with the comparison rather than negotiating hagiological terms was going to
be the more effective and practical approach. So, in order to get the dialogue off the ground, the panel
agreed that the texts under discussion were “hagiographies” and moved on.
3. Comparison
Setting aside “hagiography” as a placeholder to enable our conversation prompted me to attend
more carefully to the distinctive ways in which the panel contributors described their texts, methods,
and conclusions, as well as how these descriptions might connect to our joint theme. In the process,
I found their functionalist concerns to suggest new avenues of comparative inquiry that I would have
missed had I insisted upon a prior hagiological consensus. To elucidate what I mean, let me begin by
concisely describing the two scholarly papers. In the first, Stephanie Yep scrutinizes one of the most
beloved devotional biographies of Muhammad, al-Shifā’ of Qād. ı̄ ‘Iyād. (d. 1149). Using concepts and
methods from discourse analysis and emotion theory, she convincingly shows how the text educates
its reader on the proper “ethico-emotional comportment” one should have in relation to the Islamic
prophet7. The second paper, by Min-Ah Cho, adopts a feminist literary and theological approach to
explore Dictee, the avant-garde, quasi-autobiographical experiment of Korean-American author and
artist Theresa Hak Kyung Cha (1951–1982). Her analysis persuasively argues that Cha’s “re-writing”
and interweaving of the lives of three Catholic women (two saints; the other, anonymous and abused
by her husband) in the work’s fifth chapter, “ERATO/LOVE POETRY,” is not only an individual act of
resistance to a patriarchal church but one that, as it invites its reader to locate her own voice in the
narratives, seeks to recover women’s experiences and agency more broadly.8 Again, both are very
well-conceived and insightful papers. But what do they suggest by way of hagiological comparison
within the designated tertium comparationis of “ethics”?
It seemed to me then—as it still does now—that both studies revolve around the same locus
of analysis: it is not so much the text (the graphē) or the subject of the text (the hagio) but the reader
(or, in the case of the second paper, the writer as well as the reader). More specifically, Yep and Cho
are concerned with demonstrating how the texts they examine inform certain practices of “reading”
hagiography.9 These practices could be called “ethics”—in line with our theme—to the extent that
they seek to cultivate in their readers a particular relationality with the hagio. Of course, what this
relationality is to look like varies considerably between the texts in question. Thus, according to Yep,
al-Shifā’ demands a particular sort of “emotional work” with respect to the veneration of Muhammad,
whereas, in Cho’s analysis, the Dictee invites its women readers to develop a bond with the hagios by
adding their own voices to the “concentric circle” of stories. But while they are certainly different,
I would argue that it is precisely in the light of these differences that we can observe the texts’ basic
hagiographical link, namely, how they both prescribe reading practices meant to develop a personal,
affective, and participatory relationship between their readers and hagio-subjects. Although we cannot
say in this case that the reader’s relation with the hagio is circumscribed by an ethic of exemplarity (cf.
Ritchey 2019)10, there is an expectation that one is changed by the encounter.
6 For a thought-provoking reflection on why and how to challenge our siloed thinking, see (French 2019).
7 This paper is drawn from the author’s doctoral dissertation (Yep 2019). For the primary text, see (Ibn Mūsá 2014).
8 This paper is an excerpt from the author’s forthcoming book chapter, see (Cho 2019). For the primary text, see (Cha 1981).
9 Here I use “reading” broadly, to include reading of something as well as reading into something. It is in the latter sense that I
locate Cha’s act of “re-writing” within this rubric.
10 I should point out that Ritchey only glosses hagio as “exemplar” heuristically, “with the intention of clearing analytical space
for multiple participants,” especially for those who might be put off by the term “saint.” (Ritchey 2019). All the same, it is
difficult to imagine how that space might welcome non-exemplary hagios.
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4. Discussion
Following Keune’s approach, it is in the wake of such a comparative exercise—brief though it may
have been—that one is best positioned to proffer “stipulative definitions”11 of the placeholder terms.
Accordingly, here I would like to return to our central category of analysis, asking: If al-Shifā’ and Dictee
are “hagiographies,” do they signal alternative ways of thinking about the hagiographical? If so, how?
First, as I have noted above, the respective analyses of Yep and Cho cooperate to amplify reorienting our
attention from text to practice, from literary subject to transformative experience. This phenomenological
perspective strikes me as all too often “the road not taken” (or at least less taken) in hagiological
studies.12 Second, rethinking the hagiographical in terms of media that promotes a set of reading
practices (and here I do not mean “reading” in the strictly textual sense) which are meant to cultivate
an active relationality with the hagio, suggests the need to consider the fundamental role of reception
(individual and communal) in the definition of hagiography. In fact, one could argue that, irrespective
of authorial intent, a text or other production is not a “hagiography” until it is received hagiographically,
that is, received by its reader(s) as a medium of relating to the hagio.13
Now, if we accept that the hagiographical is, or at least can be, characterized by a dynamic of
active relationality between the reader and the hagio, how would this influence our interpretation of
“hagiography” as an analytical category for apprehending like data? In order to think this through,
I would like to accept Rondolino’s invitation to consider his working re-definition:
[Hagiography is] the complex web of behaviors, practices, beliefs and productions (literary,
visual, acoustic, etc.) in and by which a given community constructs the memory of
individuals who are recognized as the embodied perfection of the “religious” ideal promoted
by the community’s tradition and socio-cultural context (Rondolino 2019).
Here we have a remarkably well-developed proposal, which, on the basis of Rondolino’s
supporting examples, I find quite persuasive. But how well does it correspond with our data, with Qād. ı̄
‘Iyād. ’s vade mecum of Muh. ammadan devotion and Cha’s artistic weaving of the stories of Catholic
saints and non-saints? On the one hand, Rondolino’s generous construal of the graphē to include
behaviors and practices appears to welcome attention to the very sort of relational reading practices that
define the above works. On the other hand, there is the question of whether viewing hagiography only
through the lens of community memory might lead one to ignore considerations of the contemporary
readers’ experience of the hagio (through graphē) as a personal reality that impacts their present lives14.
But an even more significant question arises when we consider the latter part of the definition.
Drawing on his expertise in the study of Buddhism and medieval, Western Christianity, Rondolino
articulates the hagio as the “embodied perfection of the ‘religious’ ideal.” This is a carefully considered
phrasing that, it would seem to me, has broad transferability. But does it have currency in the present
case? In reference to Qād. ı̄ ‘Iyād. ’s depiction of Muh. ammad, it might, so long as the Prophet’s example
of perfection is perceived as an illustration of and not as a model for.15 (Sure, Muh. ammad is the Muslim
exemplar par excellence, but not in all aspects, and certainly not with respect to his prophetical status
and miracles, which are Qād. ı̄ ‘Iyād. ’s chief concerns.) Now, as for the idea of perfection in Cha’s work,
there is no need for such equivocation. Her “concentric circle” experiment is purposely built upon
the imperfect, the incomplete, a state of perpetual potentiality, welcoming more voices, more stories.
Lastly, we should ask something about that delightfully ambiguous modifier “religious.” Should one
11 Here I am referencing Keune’s redirection of Thomas Tweed (Keune 2019; cf. Tweed 2006, p. 34).
12 However, see Sara Ritchey’s list of questions under the heading “Intercession/Transformation” (Ritchey 2019).
13 I understand Hollander to be getting at something similar in his discussion of “hagiographical consumption” see (Hollander
2019).
14 For a study that attends to the latter specifically, see Hollander’s psychosocial analysis of hagiography as acts of mediation
that inscribe understandings and experiences of the hagio in the context of modern Cyprus (Hollander 2018).
15 For this distinction of the hagiographical “example,” see (Hawley 1987, p. xiii).
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take it to indicate that the hagiographical ideal has been sanctioned by the community’s “religious”
authorities, or that it reflects their “religious” beliefs and practices, or that it takes up their “religious”
subjects, or . . . ? Whatever the case may be, the unorthodox Dictee would again seem to challenge
this stricture.
5. Conclusions
Given how Qād. ı̄ ‘Iyād. ’s al-Shifā’ and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee might challenge our notion
of “hagiography,” perhaps the simplest solution would be to just write them off as “non-hagiographical.”
I imagine that some of my readers have already arrived at this conclusion, especially with regard to the
latter work. But that is not the more curious or courageous response, nor the one I see advocated by
my colleagues in this special issue. Each and every one of them, in his or her own way, suggests the
possibility, if not the outright necessity, of critically revisiting and (when appropriate) revising our
conceptual categories in the course of the comparative process16. In the end, undertaking sustained,
interdisciplinary comparative projects in a collaborative way17 will necessitate finding some common
ground—perhaps in a heuristic definition (Rondolino 2019), “controlled vocabulary” (DiValerio 2019),
or “descriptive index” (Ritchey 2019)—and I am immensely grateful to my colleagues who have begun
thinking in this direction. If my modest reflections have contributed something to those conversations,
it is simply, in echo of Jon Keune, to encourage prioritizing the comparative exercise with boldness
and creativity, continuously making space for the “other” as a way of productively destabilizing our
conceptual models—especially when that “other” is at first perceived as unusual, liminal, and perhaps
even non-religious.18 If, as Todd French avers, the comparative paradigm is ultimately “a catalyst for
seeing again one’s own field with clarity, drawing on the wealth of fresh perspectives and awareness”
(French 2019), I can think of few better ways to push forward this critical self-reflection and enhance
our scholarly contributions than by expanding the range of comparanda in dialogue with diverse and,
most importantly, generous interlocutors.19
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Abstract: Although the academic study of hagiography continues to flourish, the role of comparative
methods within the study of sanctity and the saints remains underutilized. Similarly, while much
valuable work on saints and sanctity relies on materialist methodologies, issues of critical bibliography
particular to the study of hagiography have not received the theoretical attention they deserve.
This essay takes up these two underattended approaches to argue for a comparative materialist
approach to hagiography. Through a short case study of the Latin Vita of Lutgard of Aywières
(1182–1246) written by the Dominican friar Thomas of Cantimpré (c. 1200–1270), I suggest that
comparative material research into the textual history of hagiographic literature can provide us with
a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of the production of any specific holy figure, as well
as the evolving discourses of sanctity and holiness in general. While this suggestion emerges from
my own work on medieval hagiography from the Christian Latin West, it resonates with recent
arguments by Sara Ritchey and David DiValerio to call for a materially comparative approach to
narratives of holy lives in any religious tradition in any time period. Furthermore, I suggest that
medieval studies, and in particular medieval manuscript studies, may have much to offer to scholars
of sanctity working in later periods and other settings. Offering a view of material textual scholarship
as intrinsically comparative, we may expand our theoretical definitions of the comparative and its
possibilities within the study of sanctity.
Keywords: comparative literature; comparative method; comparative religions; critical bibliography;
hagiography; hagiology; manuscript studies; medieval Christianity; religious studies; sainthood
In the century between Canon MacCulloch’s proposal of “comparative hagiology” as a discrete
field of study and Massimo Rondolino’s call for its serious reconsideration, the study of hagiography
has developed into an academic discipline on its own terms.1 Countless serious and theoretically
ambitious studies now provide more scholarly bibliography than any single graduate seminar could
include.2 Book series from American and European publishers encourage new theoretical approaches
to hagiography while calling for expanded attention to global traditions of sanctity.3 Yet the role and
force of the comparative within the study of hagiography remains—with a few exceptions—curiously
undertheorized, despite the flourishing fields of comparative religions, comparative literatures,
and their attendant professional organizations.4 Many possible reasons for this particular lacuna exist,
1 See (MacCulloch 1908; Rondolino 2017).
2 See, for example, (Brown 1981; Vauchez 1981; Heffernan 1988; Head 1990; Kleinberg 1992, 2008; Bartlett 2013).
3 For new book series, see Amsterdam University Press’ Hagiography beyond Tradition and Routledge’s Sanctity in Global
Perspective.
4 For comparative studies in religion see, for example, (Clooney 2010; Clooney and Stosch 2018; Freiberger 2018, 2019;
Freidenreich 2004); and in general the “Comparative Religion” series from Oxford University Press; see as well the
Comparative Studies in Religion Unit of the American Academy of Religion. For studies in literature, see the rise in
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from the place of hagiographic scholarship within studies in religion and literature, more broadly
to the difficulties inherent in academic approaches to the sacred. Yet, as Todd French notes in this
issue, while the disciplinary restrictions inherent to academic specialization create a difficult terrain for
comparative approaches to religious topics, they nevertheless “render collaborative work imperative.”5
In what follows, I want to focus on a specialized but nevertheless crucial facet of hagiography: the unique
challenges inherent within the critical bibliography of hagiographic literature.6 I am mindful as well,
here, of the historical, conceptual, and disciplinary issues raised by the term “hagiography”, long used
as a generic classification with colonialist, patriarchal, and Christo-centric associations.7 I have chosen
to use the term “hagiography” in the discussion that follows—with some caution—because I focus
specifically on a methodology for approaching the literature of sanctity: the textual record of the life
stories of holy men and women.8 In this relatively narrow terminological usage I depart from Sara
Ritchey’s and Massimo Rondolino’s use of the term, explained elsewhere in this issue, to describe a
much wider range of medial and conceptual records of the sacred imaginary, which variously combine
in the production of holy identity and reputation. I agree with my co-contributors that hagiography in
and of itself exceeds the textual, and I am mindful in particular of Jon Keune’s caution here, that we
give careful nuance to the various media expressing sanctity, since “the word hagiography cannot but
prioritize textuality in its very restricted sense of written documents.”9 However, for the purposes of
this essay focused on materialist approaches to the literature of sanctity, I have chosen to use the older
term hagiography for this very reason, because, in Ritchey’s formulation, “the graphia or text-production
of the hagiographical process concentrates the hagio of the exemplary figure”. The material history of
hagiographic texts—the various texts that lie behind the official or canonical versions of any saint’s
life story in any tradition—demand rigorous and context-specific approaches to the oral and written
narratives of their sanctity because it is those narratives that preserve and even—through the multiple
configurations charted here by David DiValerio—create sanctity itself.10 A materialist approach to
those narratives thus necessitates the technical methodology of manuscript studies and book history.
While the study of any particular saint, hagiography, or hagiographic tradition may at first
glance appear singular, monolingual, or culturally isolated, in actual fact, the differences in cultural
context between literary and spiritual traditions demands nuanced scholarly engagement with the
complex balances of religious, political, and social forces that generate the cultural milieux of holiness.11
Indeed, as Massimo Rondolino argues elsewhere in this issue, the term “hagiography” itself signifies
“an analytical category for the taxonomy of sources that contribute to construct and promote the
recognition of a given individual as a perfected being in the context of a particular religious theory of
truth.”12 The textual history of any single hagiographic text often encompasses a long and complicated
history of narrative negotiation among speakers, languages, and versions of a life story, more often
than not resulting in the type of generic diversity of sources discussed here by DiValerio, and able
comparative literature departments in American universities since the 1990s, journals such as Comparative Literature (Duke
University Press), book series such as Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature (Harvard University Press), and the
ongoing work of the American Comparative Literature Association.
5 French explains, “our particular scholarly communities . . . are ill-practiced at—and perhaps ill-equipped for—crossing over
traditions in the interest of interdisciplinary perspectives and compelling theories that might expand our ways of knowing.”
(French 2019).
6 For foundational theoretical discussion of critical bibliography see (Chartier 1994; Febvre and Martin 1976; among others);
for introduction to medieval manuscript studies see (Clemens and Graham 2007; Johnston and Dussen 2015); for examples of
influential materialist readings of texts in manuscript that offer new views of a particular subject, author, corpus, or reading
culture, see (Dagenais 1994; Bahr 2013; Lifshitz 2014).
7 See in particular the essays by Keune, Ritchey, DiValerio, and Rondolino in this issue.
8 (Ritchey 2019; Rondolino 2019).
9 (Keune 2019).
10 For excellent studies of hagiographic manuscript culture see (Kuefler 2014; Bcheiry 2018).
11 For sanctity and holiness as communally constructed, see the essential work of (Brown 1981; Delooz 1962; Heffernan 1988;
Kleinberg 1992); see also Rondolino in this issue.
12 (Rondolino 2019).
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to reveal a holy imaginary along more indexical axes, as Ritchey suggests, than we might expect.13
I suggest further that attention to the material history of the literature of sanctity—to the religious
literature that Western scholarship has long termed hagiography—allows us to ask questions that
reveal a comparative approach to hagiography from the inside out. What is the role of material history,
manuscript studies, and print history in comparative studies in religious literature, and in particular
in studies of hagiography? Can questions of critical bibliography be comparative? Or, to ask in
another way, can such questions be anything but comparative? Self-reflective interrogation of the
material history of hagiographic literature may be closer to Keune’s “comparative-prioritized” method
than we realize, able to “disrupt normative readings” as French recommends, precisely because our
narratives of the textual, material history of hagiographic literature remain largely unexamined—and
unquestioned.14 Only through a comparative approach to the material record can we begin to ask such
questions and work toward a more nuanced understanding of the literature of sanctity.
In what follows, I offer one set of perspectives on these issues by way of reflections on a brief
case study. The text I will discuss—the Vita of Lutgard of Aywières (1182–1246 CE), written in the
mid-thirteenth century by the Dominican friar Thomas of Cantimpré (1200–1270 CE)—appears to
exemplify the authoritative textual singularity attributed to high-medieval Latin hagiography in the
Western Christian tradition.5 This singularity, often imagined as textual, linguistic, and authorial,
receives reinforcement through inclusion within the official canon of the Bollandist Acta Sanctorum,
which offers a definitive, authoritative text of a saint’s life. As David DiValerio and Jon Keune observe
in their essays here, comparative methodology appears to cohere uneasily with the apparently singular
normativity of the textual, materialist orientation of hagiographic literature: the holy life story of a
saintly person, assumed to be written by an authoritative, male, clerical author, most likely in service
of canonization efforts.16 The textual history of Lutgard’s Vita, however, tells an entirely different story
of narrative collaboration, textual variants, differing translations, and ongoing editorial intervention.
It reveals this apparently singular Vita to be the product of multiple, sometimes competing forces,
and demonstrates that only a comprehensive, comparative view of this diverse plurality can begin to
show us the history of Lutgard, her sanctity, and her Vita. In its particulars, Lutgard’s Vita demonstrates
one of the main reasons that comparative methodologies have had such small purchase in what
otherwise remains the flourishing scholarly field of hagiography. Simply put, the official, printed
version of Lutgard’s Vita in the Acta Sanctorum canonizes the text at the same time that it obscures its
own varied and diverse material history.17 Through a comparative approach to the narratives and
manuscripts of Lutgard’s Vita, however, we might not only recover some of that history and gain new
perspective on the diverse influences that collude in the production of sanctity, but we can also trace
the contours of a materialist methodology that argues for a more internally comparative approach
to hagiography.18 Although comparative scholarship remains most frequently conceptualized as
comparative across or between traditions, languages, and cultures, comparison within any apparently
singular tradition of religious literature—comparison of the various literary, conceptual, and ideological
forces that collude in the production of sanctity—offers valuable new insight both into the production
of the hagiographic text as well as the production of sanctity itself.19 While approaches such as
Ritchey’s analytical index or DiValerio’s formal vocabulary reveal narrative plurality within perceived
13 (DiValerio 2019; Ritchey 2019).
14 (Keune 2019; French 2019).
5 Lutgard’s Vita has been edited and published in Latin by the Bollandists (Bolland 1897) and in English translation as part of
Thomas of Cantimpré’s oeuvre (Newman 2008).
16 On hagiographic scholarship as essentially comparative, see (Rondolino 2017, 2019). In Rondolino’s estimation hagiography
not only essentially functions comparatively but also invites—even necessitates—reflection on that methodological quality.
17 On this point, see DiValerio’s discussion of how the reworking of hagiographic materials renders earlier sources invisible
(DiValerio 2019).
18 See note 14.
19 See note 11.
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textual singularity, comparison of the different actors (human and/or object) within the material
history of a single text further reveal the multiplicity inherent within apparently singular traditions.
The act of comparison, when considered as a fundamental aspect of a materialist approach to holy
lives, thus invites theoretical reflection on the comparative possibilities inherent within studies of
hagiography writ large: as method, concept, and discipline.
As I explain above, my choice to discuss Lutgard’s Vita stems from the vast differences between
the canonical version of her Vita as recorded in the Acta Sanctorum and the material record of that text
before its “official” Bollandist printing. I am inspired in this textual focus by Sara Ritchey’s work on
late-medieval hagiographic manuscripts, particularly her observation that “the fundamental mobility
of medieval texts . . . signified in ever-changing ways during the process of transmission.”20 Precisely
because of its material variety and variance, that is, medieval hagiography often offers a particularly
rich opportunity for a comparative material approach.21 A Cistercian prioress and mystic, Lutgard
remains somewhat well known within circles of Catholic devotion as the patroness of the blind and
disabled, a founding figure of the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and an unofficial patron
saint of Flanders. Her Vita is thought to have been composed within two years after her death by her
spiritual friend and confessor Thomas of Cantimpré, a Dominican friar who had previously written
vitae of Marie d’Oignies, Christina Mirabilis, and Margaret d’Ypres.22 While the Vita was very likely
intended to promote Lutgard’s canonization, she was never formally canonized; she remained popular
locally, however, and a cult in her honor flourished for centuries after her death. While now little
studied, Lutgard’s Vita was much admired, often translated, and frequently recopied by medieval
copyists and compilers, who saw her as one of the mulieres religiosae of high medieval Liège whose
spirituality offered new modes of devotion and piety to high medieval women.23
Lutgard’s Latin Vita circulated in ten manuscripts, one of them (Brussel, Koninglijke Bibliotheek
7919) significantly shorter than the other nine. Dutch scholars have long debated the relationship
between different manuscript versions of the Latin Vita. Guido Hendrix has termed the shorter version
of the Vita the “primitive vita” or Vita Antiqua.24 He argued that the Bollandists who had first edited
the text had erroneously rejected the shorter version for invalid reasons—which included, in his view,
a mistaken view of the shorter Vita as an abridgment rather than an original or early draft of the Vita.
His comparative reading raised serious questions about the Vita’s authorship and reception. If the
shorter version was indeed a true Vita Antiqua, he argued, than Thomas of Cantimpré must either
have composed the Vita in parts over time; or the longer version of the Vita represented a collection
of material written by a later author. This may not seem like a dramatic claim; yet when considered
through the lens of generic scholarship, the argument takes on more urgent force. Lutgard’s Vita has
long been regarded as Thomas of Cantimpré’s masterpiece. To accept Hendrix’s argument would
mean accepting the possibility that Thomas’ final and greatest work might not have been either of
those things; and more profoundly, it would mean accepting a view of hagiographic authorship as
collaborative and communal. As many scholars have long argued, sanctity is essentially a communal
construct, yet extending this communal impulse to the act of authorship remains a less enthusiastically
embraced approach to the material history of hagiography.25 A comparative reading of a single vita’s
versions, however, suggests a communal mode of authorship more accurately reflecting the ways in
which hagiography constructs its subject over time.
Since Hendrix’s argument, however, scholarship continued to treat the Vita as the product of a
single author; finally, in 1996 Jean-Baptiste Le Fèbvre published a rebuttal of Hendrix, claiming that
20 (Ritchey 2017, p. 1103).
21 I share Ritchey’s view of medieval textual transmission grounded in Paul Zumthor’s concept of mouvance and Bernard
Cerquiglini’s concept of variance (Zumthor 1989; Cerquiglini 1999).
22 For Thomas’ complete oeuvre, see (Newman 2008); for recent analysis of his work as a whole see (Smith 2019).
23 For discussion of Lutgard’s piety see (Bynum 1987; Smith 2019).
24 (Hendrix 1978).
25 (Kleinberg 1992; Vauchez 1981; Heffernan 1988).
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the Vita Antiqua was not in fact an early draft but rather a later abridgment—as the Bollandists had
long ago supposed.26 Hendrix’s challenge to the Bollandists’ editorial practices was clearly unpopular,
and Dutch scholarship has uniformly accepted the Acta Sanctorum version of the text and referenced
Lefebvre as the authority on the manuscripts (not Hendrix). As a result, the canonical force of the
Acta Sanctorum’s editorial apparatus resists attempts at reexamination of the material history behind it.
While on some level canonical persistence fuels the most fundamental goals of the Bollandist project in
that it perpetuates a “stable” sanctity, that stability comes at the cost of a more nuanced understanding
of the manuscript tradition of the vitae, of a clear view of the communal nature of that sanctity, and of
precisely what Vitae such as Lutgard’s continue to represent in academic settings. When we place
the material history of the Latin Vita alongside a comparative reading of its vernacular translations,
moreover, new possibilities for understanding the text and its authorship emerge.
Lutgard’s Vita also circulated in manuscript in Dutch poetry, Dutch prose, and French prose.
Each of these versions differs not only linguistically but formally from the canonical Latin Vita.
The Dutch verse translation, the Leven Van Lutgart, preserved in Copenhagen Royal Library G.K.S. 168,
consists of over 20,000 lines of poetry divided into stanzas of varying length, and an in-text dedication
dates its composition before 1274. For centuries, scholars attributed this translation to William van
Affligem, though within the last fifty years this authorial attribution has become more contested.27
The thirteenth century manuscript translates only the second and third sections of the Latin Vita.
Based on later references within the text to a lost first part, there is general consensus within Dutch
scholarship that part one exited in verse translation at some point, though now lost, which makes the
Copenhagen manuscript necessarily a copy of an earlier translated version of the Vita. The relatively
early date suggests that translation of Lutgard’s Vita was taken up almost immediately after her Latin
Vita began to circulate, which has intriguing ramifications for the relationship of the two different Latin
versions to each other. The two different prose translations support this view of temporal contiguity
and complex Latin textual evolution.
The prose Dutch translation, preserved in a late fifteenth century manuscript at the Brussels
Library of the Bollandists, consists only of the first fifteen chapters of the Latin Vita. In these details,
the prose Dutch translation is most similar to the shorter version of the Latin Vita—the version Hendrix
argued for as the Vita Antiqua. In a series of articles in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Hendrix claimed
that the existence of the prose translation confirmed his suspicions that the shorter version of the
Vita preceded the longer version, and thus that Thomas of Cantimpré composed Lutgard’s life over a
much longer period of time than generally accepted. The existence of this prose Dutch translation thus
raises the possibility of an extended Latin translation informed by intermediate vernacular translation.
This intriguing suggestion has yet to be taken up as a serious subject of study; furthermore, no earlier
manuscript containing the prose translation is known to exist, which makes definitive knowledge
of the relationship between the Latin Vita and the prose translation impossible. The same cannot
be said, however, for the French prose translation, which represents a very early translation effort
internally dated before 1248.28 Like the prose Dutch translation, it does not include the full Vita; like the
verse Dutch translation, however, it does include material from the long Vita. Hendrix and Josef
Van Mierlo suggested that it may represent a lost, intermediate Latin version of the Vita by Thomas,
and thus provide evidence of a longer process of hagiographic authorship that may have incorporated
originally vernacular material.29 This view of the vernacular translations, as potential contributors
to the canonical Latin version of Lutgard’s Vita, specifically challenges long-held views of Lutgard’s
26 (Le Fèbvre 1996).
27 Currently, the dbnl considers the question of authorship “zeer onzeker”, despite Erwin Mantingh’s attempts to definitively
prove William’s authorship (Manitngh 2000).
28 The manuscript is preserved in a sixteenth century manuscript in the Leuven library of the faculty of Divinity; the prologue
dedicates the text to Abbess Hadewijch of Aywières, who died in 1248.
29 (Hendrix 1978; Van Mierlo 1936).
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Vita as Thomas’ magnum opus, and demonstrates the scholarly benefits of a comparative approach to
material textual history.
I hope that the previous paragraphs have demonstrated in small part the revelatory power of
a comparative approach to material history, by making visible how pervasive assumptions about
Latin’s anteriority and textual singularity might be usefully interrogated through a comparative,
materialist approach. By accepting that vernacular translation may have played some role in the
ongoing composition of Lutgard’s canonical Latin Vita, we might take a new look at authorship as
a communal venture that incorporated many more authorial participants than current scholarship
allows. This type of materialist comparison, further, might combine productively with the analytical
methods outlined here by DiValerio and Ritchey. Intersecting methodologies—and, often by extension,
collaborative work, such as the work that inspired the essays in this issue—thus emerges as a valuable
approach to the study of sanctity, despite its relative paucity in the critical record. In attempting to
understand the pressures of canon and the workings of genre, we must always look to the material
histories that sometimes obscure, sometimes reveal, but always shape those larger ideologies through
which we encounter a text—ideologies which, as Rondolino and Keune point out, inform not just our
approach to hagiographic subject but our very conception of hagiology, hagiography, and sanctity
itself. Though I have focused here on a fairly conventional example of Western medieval Christian
hagiography, I hope that these observations may inspire further reflection on any sanctity tradition,
and on the academic discipline of hagiographic studies more broadly. Comparative investigation of
the material history of hagiography—along with the collaborative, intersectional methodologies such
investigation might inspire—can only augment our ideas about sanctity, authorship, and textuality,
and allow us to chart new paths forward in our understanding of these discourses.
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Abstract: This paper argues that a virtue-informed methodology is foundational to best practice in
scholarly, collaborative, and comparative hagiological work. Following a discussion of how this
resonates with Todd French’s work in this volume, I then draw from my experience as an educator to
outline how a virtue-based approach might play out in pedagogy. Finally, I offer two metaphors for
an “other-person centered” collaborative–comparativist mindset. Both of these are taken from my
lived, and conversational “apprenticeship” in comparative hagiology on the Argentine–Brazilian
border. Reflection on these metaphors, as well as their generative experiences, demonstrates the need
for holistic self-reflection in the comparative study of religions, and of “hagiography” in particular.
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1. The Pressing Issue
One of the most pressing issues in comparative hagiology is how to carry it out when we often do
so in a highly charged context, whether this is in the arenas of academic collaboration, pedagogical
settings, or lived religion. The potential for misunderstanding each other’s assumptions, biases,
intentions, and conclusions means that, unfortunately, the spectre of unintentionally causing offence
hovers over the entire enterprise. This may have the effect of eroding and discouraging productive
relationships and projects. This concern is further heightened by our recognition that it is not possible
to be an expert in a number of scholarly fields, which in practice means that very often we will carry out
our comparative work as non-experts looking “over the fence” into someone else’s scholarly domain,
which is often heavily guarded. Such guardedness about our work and scholarly expertise needs to be
acknowledged, because it is a reality that stems from complex processes that are entrenched within
individuals and academic groups.1 These include, but are not limited to: the desire to be respected as a
significant researcher, insecurities about our competence, the psychology of merit associated with the
risk-taking inherent to higher education, professional silos of expertise, and fear of public shaming.
These interdependent issues contribute to the scholarly and relational maze through which we must
find our way if we are going to work well together. In what follows, I argue that virtues such as justice
and wisdom help mitigate a number of the hazards that accompany comparative hagiology. I trust
that this essay will generate a conversation about the need for group self-reflection for the benefit of
collaborative scholarship and comparative hagiology.
2. Virtues as the Moral Basis of Collaborative and Comparative Hagiology
If we begin our discussion from the perspective that persons and flourishing relationships are
valuable fundamental realities, then we can claim that collaborative and comparative hagiological
1 Todd French deals with this issue in his essay in this special issue. He promotes the importance of the work of scholarly
“generalists” who may shed light on a range of academic disciplines and their methodological cultures (French 2019, pp. 1–2).
Religions 2019, 10, 660; doi:10.3390/rel10120660 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions57
Religions 2019, 10, 660
work requires respect and justice for one another including for different religious traditions and methodologies.
Respect and justice may work to the end of generating candid interpersonal interest and openness in comparative
hagiographical work.2 This emphasis on collaboration applies to all comparative work, because we
are necessarily dealing with other people’s past work and often collaborating with live people in the
process of comparison, too. Respect means treating each other with justice. In practice, justice means
relating to each other in such a way as to uphold the demands for fair treatment that intrinsically
belong to each human being and their work.3 A concern for justice is accompanied by the other
virtues of wisdom, restraint and courage. Justice, restraint, wisdom, and courage are explicitly and
implicitly built into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the American Academy of
Religion code of conduct.4 A secular Western society and the AAR are our primary working contexts,
so they can be reasonably taken as an informative common basis for our work in hagiology, because a
human rights approach to our work assumes and expects justice with respect to all areas of a person’s
life, including their religious views and the practices related to them.5 In addition to these reasons,
there are personal experiential motivations for this claim, which I discuss at the end of this essay in
recognition that our scholarly work stems holistically from whom we have become and are becoming
in culture, relationships, and time. The interconnected scholarly and personal dimensions of what
I discuss result in the belief that those involved in comparative hagiology will act and think justly
with respect to all religiosities, and in return, the work of comparative scholars will be treated with
justice too.6 This moral aspect of the comparative study of religions has been recently pointed out by
Kathryn McClymond, who argues that it is necessary in view of the correctives that have been offered
to comparative studies. “Looking forward”, McClymond states, “I believe comparative work has to
be more cognizant of its moral component.”7 McClymond’s moral stance is especially necessary to
comparative work across religious studies.
In what follows I firstly discuss how Todd French’s essay resonates with the idea of a virtue-based
culture as the necessary foundation for comparative and collaborative hagiography.8 I demonstrate
2 Here I align my views with others in this special issue. For example, DiValerio’s proposal of a controlled vocabulary for
our shared enterprise is an instrument that allows for shared values and language in order to facilitate best academic
practice (DiValerio 2019). Rondolino’s social–scientific proposal is another example of setting the rules in order to allow
for clear communication within an agreed framework that, at the same time, includes some aspirations and not others
(Rondolino 2019). Sara Ritchey also addresses these issues (Ritchey 2019).
3 (MacDonald 2018, p. 13); and (Twiss 2013, p. 2456).
4 https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. For AAR see https://www.aarweb.org/aar-annual-meeting-
policies. For illustrative purposes, it is worth noting that their Professional Conduct Statement (2017 draft) includes the
following on respect, which is a foundational value to my own work. “As a scholarly and professional value, respect manifests
itself in mutual accountability—of AAR members to one another and to the organization’s stated commitments. Respect
as a scholarly and professional value requires that AAR members recognize the inherent worth of each member of the
organization.” (American Academy of Religion Professional Conduct Task Force 2017, p. 2). “Transparency” is another
key value in the AAR policy, and is related to my use of justice and respect for collaborative work. It reads: “As a key
value of our learned society, transparency promotes a culture of openness, accountability, reflexivity, integrity, and honesty.”
(American Academy of Religion Professional Conduct Task Force 2017, p. 3). An expanded version of this work could
deal more fully with the rationale for normatively (not merely informatively) drawing from these documents, with some
examples of how to implement the virtues they promote in comparative hagiology with both past and living interlocutors.
5 This is a coherent worldview argument made within the documents themselves (Bradley 2013, p. 2770). A related
philosophical argument for why we cannot compartmentalize our lives, especially our mindset and perspectives, is made by
Rondolino (Rondolino 2019). I would add fundamental psychological and social reasons for this.
6 (Twiss 2013, p. 2456). The AAR states the following on its value of “diversity”: “Within a context of free inquiry and critical
examination, the AAR welcomes all disciplined reflection on religion. This outlook includes two different components:
one has to do with the methodological variety of our inquiries, and the other with the diversity of the persons who undertake
these inquiries. At many points in our history we have underscored the importance of diversity in teaching, research,
and service. Equally important is the diversity of scholars who represent different cultures, social locations, perspectives,
professional standings, and experiences. These enrich and enlarge our understanding of ourselves and our community.”
(American Academy of Religion Professional Conduct Task Force 2017, p. 2)
7 (McKlymond 2018, p. 4).
8 I focus on French’s work because I was part of the discussion group that focused on his paper during the 2018 workshop.
I am not arguing that he alone pursues this avenue of thought, rather in this paper I am also trying to convey the way
in which collaboration occurs shapes our perspectives. My views would have been slightly different, and with different
emphases as well as concerns, had I been a participant in another group.
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this approach with examples from my lecture room practices. A discussion of two metaphors that
drive my practices—“deliberate border crossing” and “modulating our accents”—shows that we carry
out our work based on experiences as much as anything else. Therefore, we need to be cognizant of
the need for holistic self-reflection, because we will be clearer and more open with others when we
appreciate who we are, whom we are becoming, and how this shapes our approach to other scholars
and sources for our work.
2.1. Formal Scholarly Collaboration: Some Thoughts on Best Practice
There is a shared sentiment across the contributors to this special issue that collaboration in
cross-disciplinary and cross-tradition hagiological efforts is the way forward for this task. The benefits
of this will be academic as well as ecumenical.9 The academic benefits revolve around bringing to
light unrecognized dimensions in both the original sources for study and also in the comparanda.10
Ecumenical outcomes include a deeper understanding of our conversation partners across traditions,
as well as real-world improved relationships and harmony.11 This may have tremendous social and
personal benefits in local and global community relationships that are often fractured by religious
misunderstandings. We cannot argue for scholarly “social engagement” and “outreach” whilst ignoring
the benefits of well-intended and well-informed scholarly engagement with real issues from a range
of perspectives.
The challenge moving forward is that we need to create a scholarly language and culture in
which comparative and collaborative hagiological work can breathe anew and in fresh ways. If this
pioneering work is successful, then it may contribute as a template for other comparative projects.
Examples of this include Rondolino and DiValerio, who are leading the way in terms of developing a
new vocabulary for the enterprise.12
The first step for the new directions in comparative hagiology is the pursuit of a productive
intellectual ethos, or culture (where ethos refers to ethical values and culture refers to their implemented
practices in situ), within which anything that carries meaning can be explored comparatively. Such a
culture is dependent upon a scholarly, permission-giving framework for an open-minded as well
as rigorous scholarly methodological process. A quest for a new hagiological culture is implicit in
the work of a number of contributors to this volume. For example, French calls for, “the creation
of a third space in which comparative partners can play with ideas . . . ”13 A new space, or culture,
for comparative hagiology, enlarges the possibilities for the discipline by avoiding the common problem
of allowing shallow comparative work to precede the selection of the theme, or tertium comparationis.
Methodologically, scholars must deliberately create comparative cultures within which the entire
sequence of our procedure is based upon a conceptually narrow, early, and preliminary point of
comparison. Freedom to bring a number of approaches to bear on a tertium comparationis will surely
allow for more productive and surprising comparative hagiological insights.
A crippling destabilization of hagiological questions can be restrained when appropriate attention
is paid to the documentary pre-history within its native context, while simultaneously being controlled
by present day scholarly interests and their leading interpreters. On the other hand, locating
9 (Hollander 2019).
10 French wonders: “How do we push past the siloed nature of thinking in academic disciplines and fields of study?
e.g., how might one’s reading of a text be affected by awareness of other modes of writing/reading/reception/function?”
(French 2019, pp. 2–3).
11 We can hope for “substantial and empathetic immersion in a tradition other than one’s own, followed by patient comparison
of how some matter of importance is engaged in in this other and in one’s own tradition, for the sake of collaborative
articulation of some new understanding and ultimately more productive relations between communities” (Hollander 2019).
12 “I wish to initiate a conversation to establish a shared vocabulary for the comparative study of hagiographical sources,
whether inter- or cross-cultural” (Rondolino 2019, p. 2). See also (DiValerio 2019). On collaboration see (O’Rourke et al. 2013).
13 (French 2019, p. 5).
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“hagiography” in both the past as well as in the present enables hagiologists to overcome the biases
that pertain to both the hagio- and the comparative dimensions of comparative hagiology.14
A “culture of life” for hagiological studies always keeps its moorings securely grounded in the
empirical world: if we allow both the historical past and the scholarly present to breathe their insights
into a new hagiological culture, then we have a framework that allows for creativity within reasonable
bounds. This is precisely what French suggests is the first step in the comparative method: “interest in
expanding beyond the range of regular meanings.”15 This naturally cascades onto finding and agreeing
upon “common territory” for discussion. We therefore have a sequence that looks like moving from
a permission-giving culture, to an interest in new meaning, and subsequently to common territory.
The upshot of this is the “playful third space” that contemporary and productive hagiological study
requires. Once in place, and if it is structured well, such a culture would continue to be an exciting,
yet grounded framework for handling the insights that will follow on from its use.
A “third space” ethos could potentially allow Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu sources to
be brought into new conversations with one another. It is important to note that these conversations
would trade on collaborative consultation with scholars from other traditions, in order to make sure
that we work in a scientific and scholarly manner when we “look over the (hagiological) fence.”
Collaboration of this kind would allow us to re-examine or rectify our hermeneutics from “a foreign
framework,” offering up new results from seeing our “own texts in a new light, before even hearing
others’ findings.” At this point, the importance of virtues became glaringly obvious. To cite one example
alone, justice and wisdom require that when we are working with another scholar’s hermeneutical
lenses, we do so in constant consultation, in order to make sure we are being fair to their scholarship as
well as informed about our sources. In practice, French’s suggestion that we share unfinished work
amongst scholars gives each other permission to actively ensure the justice of each other’s work and
results. By means of ongoing conversation and cross-checking, we could become a community that
habitually encourages the organic development of virtues in ourselves and others. Justice therefore
grounds the scholarship that functions as a communal form of quality control on comparative work.16
Indeed, this special issue is the result of a collaborative and cross-checking process, which has deepened
my understanding and reception of key ideas from the past two years’ worth of workshops.
It is worth noting that this collaborative methodology is consistent with the DNA that Rondolino
has tried to build into the network of scholars studying “hagiography” who participate in his workshops.
Conversational and open scholarship needs to be cultivated. This means naming assumed group values
in scholarship. These are often assumed and enjoyed without being explicitly stated. For example,
one reason for the ease with which a collaborative approach appears to be viable in the minds of this
journal’s contributors has to do with scholarly trust and friendship, as much as other factors. A number
of us know and respect each other from past work in “hagiography” and from events such as the 2017
AAR hagiology pre-conference workshop in Boston. In practice, this meant that some of our group
members (myself included) were very comfortable with one another due to a pre-existing baseline level
of trust and non-defensiveness. In other words, we appear to have been biased towards a hermeneutic
of trust rather than suspicion. This is an important point to make, for in the same way that at times
superficial, curiosity-driven comparison precedes the selection of the theme, trust and friendship seem
to precede the positive uptake and implementation of methodological ideas. Virtues such as justice
ensure the initial possibility, and ongoing potential, of a fair and respectful collaborative culture.17
14 “How ought one begin conceiving a project in comparative hagiology? I suggest that two main options exist, derived from
the tension between comparative and hagiology. They present scholars with a fork in the methodological road. Immediately but
not necessarily consciously, the scholar must choose a path that prioritizes one of the two terms over the other. For comparative
and hagiology each is rooted in a different set of considerations and disciplinary lenses” (Keune 2019, p. 2).
15 (French 2019, p. 4).
16 (Freiberger 2019, pp. 99–110).
17 In this Section, I draw from the experience at AAR 2018 to develop French’s argument and propose some initial thoughts on
the ethics of an aspirational “code of best practice.”
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Following French, I believe that concrete examples of ongoing sharing and collaboration should
be taken deliberately in order to demonstrate the plausibility of a “playful third space”, and to
provide the structures that it requires.18 Collaborative outputs from these cross-fertilizing efforts are
also important to this process; examples of these could include special journal issues and dedicated
podcasts. The collaborative nature of these could be disruptive of some of the vices of academia, such as
individualistic pride and greed. In addition, a new approach, such as multi-authored papers, which is
common in the sciences, could enable longer-term conversations without professional penalties.
Perhaps one of the most helpful aspects of French’s work is his emphasis on the ongoing value
of working in groups. This pushes us to consider virtues at a corporate level rather than merely on
the register of the individual. French’s work presumes a vital community in which select issues are
deliberately pursued in a group context over the medium term. If comparative hagiologists as a group
are known for working in wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage, then we will be more likely to
resist the reflex to make simplistic and safe comparisons, whilst avoiding substantive areas of difference.
In fact, because our self-understanding is deepened in conversation with others, it seems that best
practice in life as well as hagiology would entail embracing the virtue-based ethos described above.19
Assuming that we flourish together when we act ethically and consistently across all aspects of our
existence, there will be powerful connections between our scholarship and pedagogy, as I note below.
2.2. Pedagogy: The University Classroom
The pedagogical implications of renewing the culture of comparative hagiology have not been
explored at length in scholarship.20 In the classroom I promote insights into justice, modes of expression,
and conversation with the hope that my students will deploy these in order to serve our societal good
in a multicultural context. My experience is that I have been able to generate classroom cultures
that support collaborative comparative hagiological work. I begin with the assumption that I am
“apprenticing” students into the discipline of comparative hagiology as part of the larger formal study
of religion.21 At my college, we carry out comparative work in a number of classes, including history
and ethics. Texts with hagiographic features from Roman, Maccabean, Christian, Islamic, Buddhist,
and Hindu sources may be considered.
Because I know we are going to engage with these texts and traditions, I prepare the students in a
number of ways. In particular, I provide a foundation on the classical Roman virtues during the first
three hour class:22 the accent on justice promotes responsibility, the emphasis on wisdom asks us to
consider which is the best way forward, temperance restrains rash judgment, and courage locates our
task at the mean between academic cowardice and recklessness. I also add the virtues of hope, trust,
and care.23 The benefits of these three are critical. By carrying out our work in hope we may avoid
cynicism as we aim for the best outcomes despite the tension in the task at hand. In fact, hope has
been an important sustaining element as I experienced the AAR workshops, which at times have felt
like a “two steps forward and one step backwards” experience.24 Trust in those who collaborate with
us, and our own trustworthiness, is the basis for collaboration. I promote trust in the classroom by
18 (French 2019, p. 5).
19 In French’s words, “we can only accurately learn about ourselves in the context of others” (French 2019, p. 7). French draws
from (Nussbaum and Cohen 2002, pp. 11–12)
20 It is worth noting that Hollander is attentive to this issue in his essay (Hollander 2019).
21 This echoes McClymond’s notion of comparison as a craft (McKlymond 2018).
22 The cultural make-up of the class is diverse, however, the historical context for most of my classroom sources is Ancient
Rome and Late Antiquity, therefore, I use Rebecca Langlands’s 2018 Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome.
23 This is an academic rephrasing of the virtues of hope, faith, and love, which are heavily used in first and second century CE
Mediterranean Christian ethics.
24 Aaron Hollander writes: “Recognizing the need for such metatheoretical reflection has led the comparative hagiology
workshops into a kind of two-steps-forward-one-step-back rhythm, as every apparent agreement has been accompanied by
the recognition that the agreement obscures differences in our working definitions of core problems and holds a tenuous
common ground between different frameworks of scholarly sense-making” (Hollander 2019, pp. 3–4).
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gradually sharing experiences (beginning with short spontaneous personal reflections on The Passion of
Perpetua and Felicity). This “scaffolds” the experience of collaboration by starting small yet building
to larger collaborative and open presentations during the semester. Finally, care, defined as active
work towards the other’s flourishing, locates collaborative comparative hagiology within relationships,
in which the task serves the good of those with whom we work. The seven virtues I mention have a
norming, an authoritative, shaping influence over our work together. Consequently, they promote
scholarly and relational habits that I hope will shape the future of academic research in religious
studies, including comparative and hagiological studies. I operate as somewhat of a referee in the early
stages of the semester, “throwing flags” or “showing yellow cards”, for those who are not just, wise,
temperate, courageous, hopeful, trusting and trustworthy, or caring. I try to do this in a fair manner
and explain my actions when I do show a yellow card. I encourage the work and attitudes of those
who learn and enact these virtues.
Naturally, the virtues relate to content. I circulate Smith’s, Freiberger’s, and Rondolino’s work
on comparison for student reading in preparation for a subsequent classroom discussion on method,
followed by carefully phrasing and parsing out our interaction with the “lives” that we read. I also
discuss Rondolino’s work in reading groups or individual meetings with students who are particularly
interested in comparative hagiology, with a view to them carrying out their final research projects
in this area. The procedure outlined above may go some way to resolving the tensions between the
hagiological (to do with saintliness and the holy) as well as the comparative tasks at hand, which are
outlined in this volume by Jon Keune.25
3. Models of Practice from Informal Comparative Conversations and Lived Religion
I would like to close this essay with two “models of practice” that I believe help shape a virtuous
and collaborative mindset for our purposes.26
3.1. Deliberate Border Crossing
The first is the idea of “deliberate border crossing”. The context in which I learnt to justly and
respectfully engage with multiple religious expressions was Argentina. I grew up in Argentina and
also worked there as an adult. Crossing the border to Brazil was a semi-regular occurrence that strongly
generated my interest in comparative studies. As we drove over the bridge from one country to another,
we moved into another religious imagination and way of life. Animistic and Roman Catholic Argentina
gradually gave way to Brazil’s Umbanda and Candomblé, as well as their influences on Roman
Catholicism. Even as a child I understood that “crossing the border” was a literal border crossing
into Brazil, but it also functioned as a metaphor for moving into a slightly different, yet somewhat
familiar religious worldview. There was overlap in belief between Argentina and Brazil in terms
of shared heroes of faith, including Gauchito Gil (a Robin Hood-like figure) and his red coloured
shrines. Yet, there are strong differences in song, dress, and focus with respect to the majority of other
shrines dedicated to divine, spiritual, and living dead beings. If we are cognizant of deliberate border
crossings in the task of comparative hagiology, we are less likely to make mistakes “looking over
the fence”, because we are already over the fence. A border crossing makes more likely the empathetic
comparative work that Hollander and Clooney advocate.27 As Kathryn McClymond understands
it, comparative hagiology is a descriptive conversational craft.28 It is also a craft into which we are
25 (Keune 2019).
26 This article is intended to raise some of the neglected ethical dimensions that comparativists and hagiographers often face.
Due to essay length constraints, I cannot propose an ethically sound and constructive model that responds to the challenges
I have outlined. However, my hope is to work with other scholars on a collaborative volume that explicitly outlines an
ethical model framework for comparative hagiography.
27 (Clooney 2018, pp. 206–7; Hollander 2019).
28 (McKlymond 2018).
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apprenticed by social groups and individuals.29 This apprenticeship requires an openness to being
shaped by those we meet over the border: those we meet “looking over the fence”. Comparative
hagiology is a conversation in which the only way to understand the stories of importance and their
meaning for any given sub-culture, is via engagement on the other’s home turf.30
3.2. Modulating Our Accent
The craft of communicating respect across the Argentina–Brazil border required time and hard
work to develop, and I think could serve here as a good illustration of how comparativists may have
to overcome unforeseen and unintended behaviours within their own mindset and method. I can
illustrate this from my own experience. When, in Brazil, I engaged with local lived religions and the
stories of people’s “great ones”, my only points for comparison were Argentine religions. In practice
this meant that I was restricted to asking curious comparative questions from an Argentine point of
view. As a child I assumed the Argentine perspectives were correct and the Brazilian ones were odd.
However, as I matured, I became aware that the comparative questions I had asked as a child needed
far more nuance. After an awkward conversation at a saint’s shrine, to my shame, I realized that the
manner and mode of comparison mattered at least as much as how our interactions are interpreted by
conversation partners. It was not primarily a question of knowledge, it struck me that how I asked the
question also determined how I came across when I asked it, and hence how the conversation developed
(or stalled!). I had to learn that the degree to which people were willing to share with me and then
engage in comparative conversations was driven by whether or not they perceived that I would treat
them with respect and justice. In a way that parallels the dangers of contemporary comparison across
historically conflicted religious groups, it is important to note that, given my cultural location, this was
particularly awkward and had inbuilt challenges.
Let me explain. I grew up in Buenos Aires, Argentina’s capital. Her native residents are known
throughout Latin America as Porteños. This means that our Spanish has a very particular accent with
its own series of inflections, a lot of unique slang, and the inclusion of a number of Italian words.
It is also spoken in what non-Porteños oftentimes take to be an arrogant or harsh tone; questions
sound like interrogations for the sake of information only. Consequently, Porteños are not often liked
very much outside of Buenos Aires. The significance of this for comparative religious conversations
began to dawn on me as a teenager. I began to realise that conversations about a local spiritual
figure across the geographical and religious border would go better if I modified my accent. That is,
if I spoke in a more generally Argentine (so not Porteño) manner, and in a more classically formal
manner, then people behaved more warmly to me, and this included cross-religious dialogues. In other
words, if I communicated as a respectful Argentine rather than “a certain kind” of Argentine, then a
constructive religious conversation was more likely, whether it be at a bus stop at a shrine or a candle
shop. This softening of my accent, and using a more formal manner with others, required a significant
change to my Spanish. I even had to reorder words, for example. So, how questions were asked
changed: they were asked in a gentler manner, in a more open-minded tone, and addressed the other
person more politely. My questions hopefully did not come across as rude Porteño demands, which is
how Porteño “questioning” can often come across. My modification in how the question was asked,
hopefully shaped how the question came across, and how I came across.
In a way that is suggestive for the academic task of comparison, I learnt that awareness of tone
shifted the prospects for the whole enterprise. It applies to our basic disposition to other scholars,
29 “Ours is an apprenticeship profession [ . . . ] If we are lucky, we get to train with master craftsmen and craftswomen,
watching over their shoulders [ . . . ] to see how they select the material they will work with, how they play with it, and how
they bring the tools they have been trained to use to bear upon the “stuff” of religion. There is no single, correct method,
although certain practices are common” (McKlymond 2018, p. 5).
30 I understand that when we are dealing with many cultures in the distant past our conversations will be indirect,
mediated through material culture, literary products, and interpreters of these traditions, including scholars.
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our willingness to shift from one perceptive framework to another, to listen for new tones over and
above familiar ones, and to place ourselves in a posture of collaboration rather than competition.
4. Conclusions: Recognizing Virtues as Intrinsic to Successful Comparative Relationships
A new culture for comparative and collaborative hagiology is under development, and it will
greatly benefit from a holistic view of its practitioners. To accomplish this, we need to grapple with
who we are as scholars and as an emerging guild of specialists who comparatively and collaboratively
work on hagiographical materials. We must be mindful of the fact that our lived experience will be
expressed in our ongoing work towards developing “models” of best practice. Therefore, the best
we can be and can do for each other at this early turn of a fresh movement in comparative studies is
to encourage self-reflection on how our experiences shape and inform our work as researchers and
educators. In so doing, we need to deliberately consider also how, vice versa, our work as researchers
and educators shapes who we are becoming as whole persons. I hope we will be more able to skilfully
and deliberately “move across borders”, as well as “shift our accents” in order to promote productive,
collaborative, and comparative hagiographical work.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
List of Contributions: DiValerio, David. 2019. A Preliminary Controlled Vocabulary for the Description of
Hagiographic Texts. Religions 10: 585. doi:10.3390/rel10100585.French, Todd. 2019. Saints across traditions
and time periods: Methods for increasing range and reading in comparative frameworks. Religions 10: 577.
doi:10.3390/rel10100577.Hollander, Aaron. 2019. Comparison as Collaboration: Notes on the Contemporary Craft
of Hagiology. Submit to Religions.Keune, Jon. 2019. Comparative vs. Hagiology: Two Variant Approaches to the
Field. Religions 10: 575. doi:10.3390/rel10100575.Ritchey, Sara. 2019. Dialogue and Destabilization: An Index for
Comparative Global Exemplarity, Religions 10: 569. doi:10.3390/rel10100569.Rondolino, Massimo. 2019. Some
Foundational Considerations on Taxonomy: A Case for Hagiography. Religions 10: 538. doi:10.3390/rel10100538.
References
American Academy of Religion Professional Conduct Task Force. 2017. Draft Professional Conduct
Statement. November 8. Available online: https://www.aarweb.org/aar-annual-meeting-policies (accessed
on 4 August 2019).
Bradley, Ben. 2013. Intrinsic Value. In The International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Vol. V. Edited by Hugh LaFollette.
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 2770–79.
Clooney, Francis. 2018. Difficult Reminders: Seeking Comparative Theology’s Really Difficult Other. In How to do
Comparative Theology. Edited by Francis Clooney and Klaus von Stosch. New York: Fordham University
Press, pp. 206–28.
Freiberger, Oliver. 2019. Considering Comparison. A Method for Religious Studies. New York: Oxford University
Press.
MacDonald, Paul. 2018. Grounding Human Dignity and Rights: A Thomistic Reply to Wolterstorff. The Thomist
82: 1–37. [CrossRef]
McKlymond, Kathryn. 2018. Comparison as Conversation and Craft. Religions 9: 39. [CrossRef]
Nussbaum, Martha Craven, and Joshua Cohen. 2002. For Love of Country? Boston: Beacon Press.
O’Rourke, Michael, Stephen Crowley, Sanford D. Eigenbrode, and J. D. Wulfhorst, eds. 2013. Enhancing
Communication and Collaboration in Interdisciplinary Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Twiss, Sumner. 2013. Human Rights and Religion. In The International Encyclopaedia of Ethics. Vol. IV. Edited by
Hugh LaFollette. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 2455–65.
64
Religions 2019, 10, 660
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution





Comparison as a Provisional Activity
Nikolas O. Hoel
Department of History, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL 60625, USA; n-hoel@neiu.edu
Received: 17 December 2019; Accepted: 3 January 2020; Published: 8 January 2020
Abstract: The careers of many scholars in various disciplines have been focused on the study of
hagiography, including that of the author. Yet, as those scholars have uncovered new knowledge
and employed new interpretations of the materials at hand, the very notions of “hagiography”
and “hagiology” have become deeply problematized. The issues become more complex as multiple
religious traditions are examined. The scholarly work that forms the basis of the essays in this
volume has explored the effects of taking a comparative and collaborative approach to “hagiography”.
This piece responds to the core essays by showing first how personal the study of such sources and
act of comparison can be, and then exploring how knowledge changes through the processes of
comparison and collaboration. In the end, this response argues that comparison is by its very nature
a provisional activity in that the knowledge it creates constantly changes as comparative methods
and theories are re-applied again and again over time. This process is only aided by collaborative
efforts which make the act of comparison even more effective and productive.
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hagiology; religious studies; sacred biography; sainthood; theory and method in religious studies
No man ever steps in the same river twice,
for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.
—Heraclites
Heraclites may be a strange place to start the discussion of comparison, and we will get back to
him in a little while. Seemingly more germane, I think, is the fact that many scholars come to the idea
and methods of comparison from strange places. For me, comparison started with a Gibbon-esque
moment. Edward Gibbon claimed that he conceived of writing The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire as he sat in Rome, writing that the idea came to him almost as a revelation. I had a similar
experience, as a young graduate student pursuing my MA at the University of Colorado-Boulder,
I stumbled across a Buddhist text which seemed very similar to the Latin saints’ lives I had been
studying. The book, which was entitled The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions, contained
the story of the eminent monk Xuanzang’s pilgrimage to India from China in the seventh century
(Li 1996). The wheels began to turn as I began to think that what I thought of as “hagiographic” texts
might exist in multiple traditions and during many time periods. As I looked at the mountains that
surrounded the campus, I came up with the idea that would become my dissertation. I compared Latin,
Byzantine Greek, and Tang Chinese Buddhist vitae or their equivalent from the seventh through ninth
century. My thinking about the topic was in its formative state and I have since become very aware
of the problematic nature of calling the texts written about venerated individuals in non-Christian
contexts “hagiography”.
At the time, I thought I was the only one doing this work, and there were very few of us that were.
Thankfully that number has been increasing over the last decade or so, which lead the pre-conference
workshops on comparative hagiology that have taken place at the American Academy of Religion
Annual Meeting the last few years. Many scholars seem to acknowledge the importance of comparison
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in the fields of history and religious studies. Chris Wickham has even gone so far as to call it essential
(Wickham 2009). For Wickham, although there are challenges to employing comparison, by using it
we can avoid solipsism, which prevents a single culture or tradition from becoming seen as normative.
Yet the challenges to doing comparative work make the enterprise of comparing “hagiographies”
across cultures daunting, if for no other reason than there is a lack of a universal vocabulary across
cultures (Keune 2019) and the risk of decontextualization, essentialization and generalization clearly
exists (Freiberger 2018).
The papers in this special issue are part of an effort to explore what “comparison” and “hagiology”
are. They also serve to conceptualize what “comparative hagiology” is. At the AAR workshop in
2018, where the five core papers were originally discussed, I had the fortune to be a part of the group
that discussed the one written by Jon Keune. The foundations he set for the discussion were beyond
solid and we were off and running almost immediately. Most of that discussion, which centered on
the issue of key terms, is reflected in Keune’s paper in this volume. We talked about translation and
metalinguistics. The group tried to grapple with the difference between “hagiology” and “hagiography”.
Then, a thought came to me and I wrote down in my notes a simple phrase: “any comparison is
provisional”.
Just as Wickham believes that comparison is essential, he also claims that it is hard (Wickham 2009).
This, I believe, is where method comes into play, because, as Freiberger has argued, one must discuss
what is problematic about comparison in both theoretical and methodological terms (Freiberger 2018).
The method I used in my dissertation is that of Jonathan Z. Smith. In many ways reading Smith
introduced me to the excitement of comparison and to its potential as a tool for furthering scholarly
knowledge. He remarked that “comparison provides the means by which we ‘re-vision’ phenomena
as our data in order to solve our theoretical problems” (Smith 1990, p. 52). I was attracted to the
concept that to Smith comparison is an active, playful exercise, one that deconstructs and reconstitutes
(Smith 1990). The thought that a method could be “playful” appealed to me, who had gone to graduate
school with the excitement of being able to play with ideas in the company of others who cared about
them. The ideas were all well and good, but by what method was I to play with them? Smith provided
that answer as well. I was introduced to his method in an essay entitled “The Bible and Religion,”
which I found in Relating Religion (Smith 2004). The essay was originally published in 2000. Smith’s
method consisted of four parts: description, comparison, re-description and rectification. Although
Smith’s method has been expounded upon by scholars such as Burton Mack (Mack 1996) and Oliver
Freiberger (Freiberger 2018), the idea behind it has proven very useful. I employed this method, and an
example of how I used it may be useful in understanding its potential. I looked at asceticism in multiple
traditions. I described the rejection of certain foods and sex as a model for behavior in “hagiographies”
produced in the Latin West, Greek Byzantium, and Tang Buddhist China in the seventh through ninth
century. When I compared the behaviors of venerated persons in those traditions, they seemed to be
doing very similar things. Yet, I looked deeper and re-described the actions of Buddhists, in particular
those individuals who participated in self-immolation. In the sources that I considered, there are no
examples of Christians who set themselves on fire. When I rectified this difference, I argued that
Buddhists could set themselves on fire and Christians could not because of different theologies of the
body: to Buddhists, the body did not exist, whereas to Christians the body was the image of God
and thus ought not be destroyed by the human. In some ways, this conclusion was an example of
essentializing the traditions, and I have come to realize in the time since writing the dissertation the
problematic nature of this generalization.
For my dissertation, the method worked. Yet, in and of itself, it lends itself to adaptation.
The knowledge the method produces is provisional, in that the knowledge changes as more studies are
done. The more re-description one does, the finer the tuning of the ideas becomes. As more sources
are considered, and hence the more data collected, the more rectification is needed. The results of
comparison are thus provisional because further comparison may well lead to differing interpretations
of the past and of different traditions. Even the methods of comparison can be changed. For example,
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in this special issue, Todd French describes the method of comparison used by the members of a session
at the 2018 American Academic of Religion conference, which adapted previously established methods
to create a better understanding of the phenomena the panelists wished to discuss (French 2019).
In essence, French is describing one possible set of best practices in comparative studies of religion,
yet he describes it as a “nascent attempt at best practices” (French 2019). These methods will most
likely be supplanted as new ways of comparing texts and phenomena are determined to work better.
Further as methods change, knowledge too will be refined.
The issue of language plays into the provisionality of comparison as well. Every paper in
this special issue, in one way or another, deals with the issue of language and each author hints
at the discomfort with the idea that the terms which described phenomena in one tradition could
or should be used to describe those in another. In other words, at a fundamental level, does the
word “saint” as conceived in the Christian tradition, reflect any lived experience in Hinduism,
Buddhism, Islam, or any other tradition? The issue of language is Jon Keune’s main focus here. He
states that he agrees with Thomas Tweed that stipulative definitions are important but thinks that
they should be applied at the end of the research process and not at the beginning (Keune 2019).
He works to better define the difference between “hagiography” and “hagiology”. David DiValerio
notes the concern in the core essays with arriving at a precise definition of “hagiography” and
argues that the lack of a shared vocabulary to describe the formal features of hagiographic texts is
hindering our ability to study them (DiValerio 2019). Barbara Zimbalist, in her response here, notes
that the authors of the core essays do not in all cases even agree on what constitutes the genre of
“hagiography” or if it is a “genre” at all (Zimbalist 2019). The issue is complicated by Kevin Guilfoy
who examines whether any of the terms we use and the concepts they represent can be translated from
tradition to tradition or across time and space (Guilfoy forthcoming). As an outsider to the study of
“comparative hagiology,” he worries whether the enterprise is even possible because the concepts we
are examining are socially constructed and historically situated, hence possibly within an epistemic
tradition (Guilfoy forthcoming). We should certainly heed this warning, consider its implications, but
not necessarily be dissuaded by it. Understanding how we use the terminology of our own fields
and then working to collaborate to see how our colleagues understand their words will facilitate
comparison and understanding in the end; a point Guilfoy seems to see as possible by the end of his
essay. Thus, as a result of the work of all the authors here, language becomes problematized, yet at the
same time remains critical to the enterprise of comparison.
I believe that however terms end up being defined, language itself is a critical piece of the
provisional nature of comparison. Language is in constant flux; it changes regularly and irregularly at
the same time. Language is in and of itself provisional and since it is used to describe phenomena, the
descriptions are provisional as well. For example, in his essay in this volume, Massimo Rondolino
proposes a new working definition of “hagiography” (Rondolino 2019). Three things are worth noting.
First, his definition is the result of years of study and thought, and reflects a change, even if subtle, from
the way he thought about “hagiography” while he was writing his book on the comparative study of
hagiographical sources (Rondolino 2017). Second, he describes it as a working definition, implying the
he thinks it is not static and needs redefining. Finally, his definition is already being considered by other
authors in this volume (DiValerio 2019; Guilfoy forthcoming; Keune 2019). These three factors point to
the reality that definitions are a work in progress, subject to change, and by nature provisional. As the
language used to define categories of analysis change, so too does the understanding of them. This is
particularly true in the case of comparison, which Freiberger has posited is a second-order method,
which relies on first-order methods such as language analysis (Freiberger 2018). Thus, the effect of
language on comparison is that as scholars further define terms and explore the intricacies of words
and how they are used, comparison will be further clarified, and knowledge will be advanced. Keune’s
concluding sentence in this volume may well reinforce my thinking here as he suggests that “the real
problem is not that the scope of comparison is too broad, but that the definitions of religion and saints
are too small” (Keune 2019). When we continue to develop our understanding of what a “saint” is
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or is not, our comparisons have the potential to be deeper and more meaningful. Guilfoy, of course,
problematizes this idea as he rightly points out that the term “saint” carries much cultural created
value for Christians (Guilfoy forthcoming). Yet, even if the terms, like “saint,” are not translatable
across traditions, phenomena and discourses can be compared to create a more appropriate vocabulary
and as a result further knowledge. Thus, as language changes, the fruits of comparison will change as
further evidence that comparison is indeed provisional.
What then is the role of collaboration in the effort of comparison? If “comparative hagiology”
is worthwhile, what is the best way to do it? The answer, for me, is that we continue to collaborate.
While most of us will continue to produce single-author studies, we should also continue to work
together. Collaboration in its purest form is the activity of bringing together many people with many
ideas. Coming together as scholars has the potential to have value on a greater level. Scott Harrower
remarks in the volume that comparison helps with our own individual self-reflection, it may also
be a virtue-based approach, which introduces an element of social justice to what we are doing in
this collaborative project (Harrower 2019). Harrower’s suggestions surrounding the possible greater
meaning of our work is certainly worth further exploration. In the immediate, although perhaps
related, when new ideas are presented and considered, phenomena can be viewed in different ways.
In essence, re-description occurs. Collaboration facilitates re-description. Re-description leads to new
ways of reconciling diverse information and leads to new understanding of religious behavior, models,
and belief. The mere act of working together increases the chances that new understandings will be
achieved. In the end, we, as scholars, attempt to increase collective knowledge and memory. Further, by
collaborating we can play with ideas that are otherwise unavailable, we walk along the path that would
have been otherwise unavailable but is lined with, at least for me, excitement, intellectual questioning,
and joy. It can be fun. The path may well be endless because it, like the fruits of comparison, are
provisional. Knowledge and understanding will change as we work together.
What I argue here is that comparison is truly provisional. Through comparison, Massimo Rondolino
has furthered the understanding of St. Francis and Milarepa (Rondolino 2017). In this volume, Sara
Ritchey has argued that “’comparative hagiology’ offers a method of productively destabilizing the
assumptions and expectations that we, scholars working within specific intellectual, geographic, or
confessional traditions, bring to our sources. This destabilization has the potential to make meaning
across differences and, in the process, to generate new insights and understandings in our own areas
of specialization” (Ritchey 2019). Through comparison, Jon Keune envision a broader and more
inclusive field than exists today (Keune 2019). In the end, what we know about “hagiography” or
“hagiology” today has the potential to be vastly different from what we will know in the future
because of comparison. That comparison will be facilitated through collaborative efforts because
more information will be available as each individual brings their knowledge to the collective table.
Knowledge and understanding will change, and that is what I mean by provisional; comparison is
only what it is at a specific moment: this one. At this point, I will come full circle, or perhaps more
appropriately, down the river. Like Heraclites’ river, knowledge is never the same as it is always
moving. Comparison, then, as the current to the river’s water, is that force that keeps knowledge in
constant flux.
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Abstract: A workshop on “comparative hagiology” over the course of three years at the American
Academy of Religion has yielded not only a series of articles but an experimental methodology by
which scholars hailing from different disciplines and working in different fields might collaborate
in threshing out commonalities and entanglements in their respective treatments of holy figures.
This article’s response to the workshop identifies three pillars of general consensus among the
participants that serve as promising footholds for aligned innovation in our respective fields:
That hagiography (1) is constituted not only in verbal texts but in a wide array of media, both material
and ephemeral; (2) is best interpreted by attending substantially to the “processes” of thought, life,
and society in which it is rendered; and (3) opens possibilities of cross-cultural and interdisciplinary
comparison by way of the many family resemblances in how saints (or more broadly, religious and
even para-religious exemplars) are rendered in transmittable media and mobilized for a particular
group’s benefit. The article concludes by suggesting vectors for further development on these grounds,
indicating how the category of “hagiography” affords a resource for interpreting unauthorized and
apparently irreligious phenomena akin to sanctification, and calling for a professional and pedagogical
ethic of collaboration that extends beyond any particular scholarly fruits of hagiological comparison.
Keywords: collaborative scholarship; comparative method; comparative religions; disciplinary
innovation; hagiography; hagiology; sainthood; theory and method in religious studies
1. Comparison and Collaboration
A roundtable on “comparative hagiology,” at which questions of theory and method in the study
of holy figures (broadly construed and continually contested) are in the foreground, is an outstanding
opportunity not only to compare the materials and methods with which a group of scholars spends its
time but also to consider more generally what role comparison plays in one’s larger scholarly objectives.
What are the prerequisites of productive comparison, and for what is it a condition of possibility?
For my part, I would locate comparison as bound up with (both fueled by and allowing for) two other
modes of scholarly activity. Before comparison is possible there must be a degree of comprehension:
considerable enough expertise in the subjects under consideration to be able to assess not only their
differences but also the significance of those differences.1 In addition, while comparison can stand
as a proximate end in itself (as in a publication providing edifying conclusions as to the nature or
1 Oliver Freiberger therefore recommends describing comparison as a “second-order method,” on the grounds that “comparing
two or more items can be productive only if those items are being seriously studied” (Freiberger 2018, p. 2). However,
it must also be said that the deliberate engagement with difference implied by comparison is indispensable to adequate
comprehension of a phenomenon in the first place, so we are dealing with a positive feedback process rather than a neat
succession of analytical stages. J. Z. Smith describes this as a continual interplay between “description” and “redescription,”
where comparison “rectifies” the initial understanding of that which is being compared and which was (only partially)
comprehended beforehand—see (Smith 2000, p. 239; Ritchey 2019, p. 3). On difference being the ground and fuel of
productive comparison, see (Smith 1987, pp. 13–14; McClymond 2018, p. 2).
Religions 2020, 11, 31; doi:10.3390/rel11010031 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions73
Religions 2020, 11, 31
significance of some difference), I would commend the craft of comparison as a means of facilitating the
wider and more open-ended tasks of collaboration: public scholarly itineraries determined not primarily
by the individual interests of those walking them but by mutually articulated needs in the academy
and/or society.2 Such an interplay of comprehension, comparison, and collaboration is certainly of
meaningful utility in the two primary fields in which I locate myself and to the flourishing of which I
dedicate my hagiological research—interreligious studies and ecumenical theology.3
It is in light of this general sense of the function of comparison in my own work that I can examine
and evaluate the AAR workshop on comparative hagiology that has led to this collection of essays.
At the outset I would note that in none of the phases of this project—the original papers circulated
by five participants, the interlocking conversations on site at the AAR in Denver (in 2018), and the
subsequent production and exchange of response essays by the workshop’s other participants—has
the sense of “comparative hagiology” been limited (or even primarily dedicated) to comparing the
varied hagiographical media on which we work. Rather, we have embraced the opportunity to bring
into the foreground a comparison of our methodologies and orientations, contextualized as these are
by different disciplines, fields, and institutions. Accordingly, I would like to reflect, first, on my sense
of some shared hagiological commitments that seem to have emerged in the core papers and our
conversations around them, so as, second, to highlight what I take to be some lingering tensions and
promising directions for future deliberation.
It seems appropriate at this point to pause and make explicit, as other contributors have done,
what I take as my working distinction between “hagiology” and “hagiography”—terms which I
use frequently and together, but not interchangeably. I describe the materials on which I work
as “hagiographical media,” that is, media that inscribe and transmit human understandings and
experiences of holiness (and that include but are not limited to verbal inscriptions such as texts and
prayers), and the discursive work of interpreting them as “hagiology,” that is, the study of how holiness
(or its analogues) is construed and of the media in which it is purported to be manifest. In this
framework, hagiography and hagiology are not mutually exclusive: Hagiological discourse, scholarly
or otherwise, might well itself become a means of hagiographical mediation, depending on its context
and participants.4 However, I am in no way eager to insist that this working distinction is valid for
everybody. (Philippart 1994) established the wide historical variability of both terms’ use in European
scholarship and ecclesiastical use more broadly, and, in my own context of study (Greek Orthodox
Christianity), it is important to recognize that the two terms have an emic utility of distinguishing
between verbal and visual representations of holiness (with agiographia referring today mainly to icons
and freschi—images of saints—and agiologia mainly to texts such as Lives, passion accounts, hymns,
etc.—words about saints). Both terms, then, are worth retaining in scholarly analysis—in this position I
2 I am not at all suggesting that the worth of scholarship is directly proportional to the number of scholars that it animates.
Rather, this collaborative pursuit is only one of multiple valuable ways of scholarship, one which foregrounds public
significance and attempts to build a bridge between the efforts of individual scholars and the multidisciplinary mutualism
of groups of such scholars willing to be challenged, reoriented, and strengthened by one another’s work.
3 The burgeoning scholarship on interreligious studies has insisted on thorough comprehension of the traditions and
phenomena that are entangled (a rather more robust sense of connectivity than is typical for comparative work) at any
interreligious interface, which in turn necessitates scholarly collaboration between experts in different traditions in order
adequately to account for the multiple horizons and deep roots of a given interreligious texture. So too, the older framework
of ecumenical theology has benefitted from a similar (indeed more linear) methodological integrity of comprehension,
comparison, and collaboration: substantial and empathetic immersion in a tradition other than one’s own, followed by
patient comparison of how some matter of importance is engaged in this other and in one’s own tradition, for the sake of
collaborative articulation of some new understanding and ultimately more productive relations between communities.
4 For instance, it is no challenge to recognize the hagiographical force of Kallistos Ware’s or G.K. Chesterton’s literary/theological
interpretations of the lives of the saints—or indeed, as I will discuss below, if we recognize the hagiographical productivity
of the varied and unpredictable uses of media depicting the saints, there is no reason that a scholarly article intended as
nonreligious analysis could not be appropriated as hagiographically edifying by a devotee of the saintly figure in question.
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differ from most, but not all, of the core essays of this special issue, which tend to prioritize (explicitly
or implicitly) one term as more adequate than the other for the task at hand.5
Our emphasis on comparing methods for scholarship pertaining to holiness, saints, and their
representation (and on comparing the possible definitions and taxonomies of such key terminology)6
has meant that a kind of fruitful frustration has prevailed in our conversations. As Jon Keune poses
the question: “How is meaningful comparison even possible without first clarifying the criteria
by which scholars selected items to be compared?” (Keune 2019, p. 1). Recognizing the need
for such metatheoretical reflection has led the comparative hagiology workshops into a kind of
two-steps-forward-one-step-back rhythm, as every apparent agreement has been accompanied by the
recognition that the agreement obscures differences in our working definitions of core problems and
holds a tenuous common ground between different frameworks of scholarly sense-making. However,
it is my sense that these delaying detours, sending us back through the weeds of suppositions we had
not yet worked to explicate, can be counted as features rather than as liabilities of comparison. We are
all the better off for having reckoned with approaches that we do not share and the challenges leveled
by those approaches’ differences, whether or not we come (or even want to come) to consensus on
particular elements of them.
That said, it is heartening to see the degree of agreement around some key, yet more or less novel,
parameters of hagiological scholarship. I would identify three of these matters in which participants
(myself included) were generally convinced, and which seem to me to be representative of what can be
identified as a contemporary approach to hagiographical sources. These areas of alignment provide
initial frames for collaborative sense-making even in the absence of shared material or scholarly goals.
2. Common Grounds
Hagiography, whether understood as “a text about the life of a figure regarded as holy by
some subset of a population” (DiValerio 2019, p. 1), “texts about exemplars, when texts include
objects, non-verbal images, and ritual actions (procession, votive offering, pilgrimage)” (Ritchey 2019,
pp. 2–3), or, most capaciously, “the complex web of behaviors, practices, beliefs, and productions
5 DiValerio does not draw an explicit distinction—he uses “hagiology” in his abstract and does not examine the term further
(DiValerio 2019, p. 1). French does not explore the distinction in his own analysis but makes note of other contributors’
preference of one rather than the other (French 2019, note 6). Ritchey prefers hagiography and notes that “hagiology” “shifts
attention from writing about sanctity to its logos”—more appropriate for the philosophy of religion than for material-cultural
analysis of the sort that she deems most fruitful in her work (Ritchey 2019, note 1). Keune prefers hagiology and provides an
explicit justification for his use of the term rather than hagiography on the (debatable) grounds that hagiography implies a
fixation on “written documents” (Keune 2019, p. 2). Only Rondolino seems to maintain both terms side by side, designating
hagiography as “an analytical category for the taxonomy of sources that contribute to construct and promote the recognition
of a given individual as a perfected being” and hagiology as “an academic, scientific approach to the study of particular
religious phenomena” (Rondolino 2019, p. 2; see also his Introduction to this special issue)—our approaches are aligned
insofar as hagiology designates the academic project and hagiography designates the web of products and processes
analyzed by it, although the partial mutual inclusivity between these two goes unnoted in Rondolino’s piece (as it is barely
noted here—it is a topic owed more substantial consideration elsewhere).
6 It is noteworthy that not only the choice of “hagiology” or “hagiography” but also the content and most appropriate English
designation of the “hagio-” itself were unresolved questions in our workshop and scholarly exchange. Keune explains this
with particular sensitivity: “Prioritizing hagiology at the start of a comparative hagiological project prompts the scholar
to articulate what constitutes hagio-, to stipulate what meaningfully compare-able items might look like when the scholar
starts searching for them. In English and most European languages, this would usually involve carefully redefining the
word ‘saint’ so that it is not too Christian, or it involves adopting a term (like Ritchey’s ‘exemplary figures’ and Rondolino’s
‘perfected beings’) that resolutely avoids the word ‘saint.’ Yet, with all of these terms, the weight of semantic precedent and
tradition would make it difficult to define such terms without reference to ‘religion.’ And if hagio- is hard to define in a
cross-culturally sensitive way, religion is even more notoriously difficult” (Keune 2019, p. 3). Although my work does focus
on Christian saints (Greek saints, hagioi, no less) and so I have not been especially obligated to worry about the applicability
of the Greek-Christian vocabulary, I would suggest for the sake of the comparative project that we can never completely
sanitize our vocabulary of associations and debts to particular traditions—the best we can do is cultivate hermeneutical
rigor and reflexivity toward these entanglements. With this expectation, I am comfortable with any of the proposed terms of
the roundtable—“holy figures,” “exemplary figures,” “perfected beings,” and indeed “saints” (given the etymological root
in the process of human beings’ sanctifying or setting-apart a person, object, place, or the like, for veneration or emulation—a
Roman term which, after all, does not originate in or belong to Christianity). I address this issue further below.
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(literary, visual, acoustic, etc.) in and by which a given community constructs the memory of an
individual who is recognized as the embodied perfection of the ‘religious’ ideal promoted by the
community’s tradition and socio-cultural context” (Rondolino 2019, p. 5, presupposing the longer
discussion in Rondolino (2017, pp. 35–40)), is an analytical category more capacious than the literary
productions that have typically exhausted it. Already in 1994, Felice Lifshitz demonstrated how
the notion of hagiography as a distinct “genre” of religious literature is problematic in light of this
definition’s reliance on obsolete historiographical suppositions about the opposition of history and
fiction.7 However, much of the hagiographical scholarship in the years since has remained invested in
construing hagiography as essentially literary or verbal: for instance, as “a variety of literary forms” in
which special individuals are glorified (Rapp 1999, pp. 64–65), or as “a set of discursive strategies for
presenting sainthood” (Miller 2009, p. 118). By contrast, the papers under consideration at the recent
comparative hagiology workshop, and the contributions of the other participants in conversation,
have for the most part embraced the subsequent move of classifying as hagiographical non-verbal or
trans-verbal “texts” (such as images, objects, apparitions, buildings, processions, festivals, etc.).8 While
this move should not be made merely for convenience and should be robustly theorized (a project in
which I am engaged as well), I take it as promising that “hagiography” is recognized to be a heuristic
tool rather than a stable and single set of data. This allows for the interpretation of family resemblances
and integrated functions between a vast array of media that, as enough of us have found, work together
and amplify one another’s interventions in the life-worlds of their consumers.9
So too, there seems to be an encouraging level of (at least provisional) agreement with Rondolino’s
proposal that hagiography be considered not only in terms of the “productions” in which the sanctity
of some person is constructed but also in terms of the “behaviors, practices, beliefs,” and other
ways of life of which those material productions are but one manifestation (Rondolino 2019, p. 5).
Rondolino describes this overall theoretical thrust as being concerned with “hagiographical process”
(Rondolino 2017, 2019, throughout)—a formulation that sparked excitement and recognition among
other participants, myself included. My doctoral dissertation, to take the example with which I am most
familiar, interpreted the relationship between the (multiple and interlocking) material textures and the
(public and private) political functions of the hagiography of St. George in modern Cyprus. In that
work, I developed a framework for interpreting hagiography as “the multimediation of holiness,” that
is, as designating not solely the media themselves but also and more fundamentally the psychosocial
processes that generate and mobilize these constructions of holiness for a wide array of purposes in
the world. I was delighted to find that this framework was at home in the comparative hagiology
workshop, and it was evident that the other primary contributions besides Rondolino’s were resonant
with the “hagiographical process” approach as well.10
7 (Lifshitz 1994; Rondolino 2019; French 2019) further explore the dysfunction of genre-based definitions of hagiography and
suggest promising alternatives—as do I in forthcoming work.
8 Keune’s dissent on this point is significant, but not disruptive of the shared orientation. He argues that the term hagiography
“cannot but prioritize textuality in its very restricted sense of written documents” (Keune 2019, p. 2) which worries him
precisely because the hagio-(however this ends up being construed in a given tradition or context) is not inscribed solely in
such written documents—exactly the case that I and others make in favor of an expanded definition of hagiography, inclusive
of the many forms of “inscription” (graphē) besides verbal texts. Here, the (reasonable, though I do not think determinative)
disagreement is over the scholarly lexicon rather than with the object of analysis. Likewise, although Zimbalist concentrates
her methodological attention on “the literature of sanctity,” she acknowledges that “hagiography in and of itself exceeds the
textual” (Zimbalist 2019, p. 2).
9 Such a recognition of “hagiographical” qualities and functions beyond written texts does not, of course, dispel the reasonable
concerns with the implications of extending the tools of textual hermeneutics beyond the verbal realm. Such a hegemony of
the text has been capably critiqued, for instance, in (Sullivan 1990; Asad 1993; Gell 1998; Malafouris 2013). Negotiating the
merits versus the liabilities of a hermeneutical approach to non-verbal “texts” remains part of the ongoing task of theoretical
and methodological reflexivity.
10 See (Hollander 2018, pp. 21–45; cf. Ritchey 2019; Keune 2019; DiValerio 2019). Siebeking also offers the resonant notion of
“the hagiographical” (Siebeking 2019, pp. 1–2) along the lines of Mark L. Taylor’s “the theological” and “the political,” as an
emphasis on the “creative and receptive dynamics of hagiography” unbound by institutional or historical norms.
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Finally, although there was not as much consensus (indeed there was some heated dispute)
as to whether “hagiology” and “hagiography” could be useful categories of analysis in the context
of religious traditions that either do not use the terms (or analogous terms) or that do not frame
phenomena as “saints” or “holiness,” etc.,11 there was a sense that all of our many approaches to
dealing with many incommensurable materials have something to do with one another, even if the act of
intellection around our commonalities (particularly where we are using terms derived from Greek or
Latin and regularly associated with Christianity) sounds all the usual alarm bells. After all, there we
all were, taking the time and effort to participate in a shared workshop, able to build upon one
another’s contributions and conceive of a collaborative future even when we could not agree on the
definition or specific utility of the terms we were working with. It may be my ecumenical disposition
speaking, but I take this to be enormously promising: The comparative hagiology project is constrained,
unsurprisingly, by all the challenges of comparative work in religious studies more generally, but it is
also fueled by the recognition that hospitality to one another’s contributions across our wide range of
hagiological construals and analytic suppositions is worthwhile even without the ability to translate
perfectly and without a lockstep commitment to the same intellectual goals. This is, of course, the norm
of human communication more broadly—we can never understand other people (or other languages,
or other traditions, or other disciplines) exactly as they understand themselves, yet communication,
translation, and multilingualism are not only possible, they are overwhelmingly the norm. As Keune
points out, we may not need conclusively (or even preemptively) come to consensus on our terms
before we begin the collaborative work of comparative hagiology.12 Thinking together, including about
these differences and disagreements, is transformative—we will not see our own material and our own
methods the same way when we can accompany others gleaning insights from their own.13
I will conclude these reflections with an indication of where my own approach, while wholly
aligned with the above areas of general agreement, would try to massage through some lingering
knots in our enterprise of comparative hagiological interpretation.
3. Where Next?
First, insofar as we are asking about the processes of thought and life that give rise to hagiographical
media (by which, in Rondolino’s terms, “the embodied perfection of the ‘religious’ ideal” (Rondolino
2019, p. 5) is constructed in publicly-available forms), we ought to consider within the field of view not
only those processes of hagiographical production but also those of what I would call hagiographical
consumption. The many authorized and unauthorized uses to which hagiographical media are put in
people’s lives are indispensable to the continued construction and circulation of the ideals of which
these media are representative. Indeed, an object that plays a hagiographical role in the life of a
community need not even be deliberately “produced” to be hagiologically significant. To take an
example from my own material: Across the island of Cyprus there are shrines that have developed
around stones bearing the hoofprints (ta pathkia) of St. George’s horse; such shrines may eventually
be formalized through recognition by the institutional church, but well before this point they have
coalesced as sites of holy significance and power through the procedures by which people interact with
them. Whether at such informal sites as this or in the established churches, practices of veneration
may be ephemeral but still constitute part of the status and indeed the very form of the holiness that
is there represented. Hagiographical consumers become part of the mediating field for one another,
their devotions being publicly perceptible, and the offerings that are frequently left behind (wax or
11 See, for instance, the various discussions of these thorny issues in Keune (2019) and Rondolino (2019) (drawing on
Monge 2016); and see again note 6 in this article.
12 See (Keune 2019, pp. 1–2). It is, moreover, worth remembering that using the same term—for instance the mere presence of
a concept of “saints” in multiple traditions—is by no means a guarantee that the ideas and images communicated by these
terms are aligned or even commensurable.
13 French suggests much the same and expands on the merits of this approach (French 2019, pp. 2–3, 6–7).
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tin votives, photos of loved ones, candles, coins, crutches, etc.) remain as a cumulative precipitation
from acts of consumption that amplifies the content and power of the media in question. In Michel
de Certeau’s formulation, such consumption is itself a co-production, not only of a site’s significance
but even of that which is available to signify in the first place. It is important not to let an allergy to
over-broadening our categories foreclose on including such phenomena in our hagiological analyses.14
Second, while I am in agreement that the analytical use of “hagiography” as a category is broader
than those religious traditions in which the term has emic significance, I would also suggest that this
breadth extends past religious studies as a discipline, or perhaps better, offers a point at which religious
studies may contribute to broader questions in cultural and political studies. The study of saints has
already made room for this recognition (for instance in Lawrence Jasud’s short but significant piece,
“St. Elvis,” (Jasud 2011)), yet the opportunity exists for more thoroughgoing theoretical attention to how
such transreligious hagiographical phenomena are related to those that are more familiar to scholars
of religion.15 Such an applicability at the margins of religious studies was, unsurprisingly, a point
of tension in our conversation (around the reasonable but, I think, ultimately untenable worry that
once everything is hagiography, nothing will be), yet I would suggest that Rondolino’s definition of
hagiography may in fact remain rather too narrow. As Keune puts it “But that’s not religion, and those
aren’t saints” (Keune 2019, p. 6) is a gatekeeping move that, though well-intentioned to keep a firm
grip on the reins of interpretation, will impede some of the most interesting analyses that comparative
hagiology may engender—for instance around sanctifying representations (verbal and otherwise) of
politicians, soldiers, celebrities, or animals.16
Third, I would like to encourage those of us committed to pursuing comparative hagiology not to
view the insights available in this comparative key as self-sufficient. I mean this not only in the sense
that sound comparative work can and should open the door to collaborative scholarship that mobilizes
diverse strengths in shared projects, but also in the sense that comparative methods risk giving a pass
to obsolete parameters for examining religious traditions, practices, or texts “individually,” as it were,
as if such phenomena were discrete entities that could be set next to one another as non-overlapping
spheres.17 Where hagiographical production and consumption are concerned, however, a community’s
dealings with holy figures are often if not usually preconditioned by a history of interreligious interaction,
in which the community’s own understandings and behaviors are oriented in no small part by what
they have witnessed on the part of religious others, whose presence and activity have contributed to
their repertoire of self-understanding. In this respect, I would offer the methodological resources of
interreligious studies—in its early days as a formal academic apparatus but earning ample recognition
and enthusiasm from practitioners across a range of disciplines—as valuable assets for the project of
14 See (de Certeau 1984, pp. xi–xxi); cf. (Siebeking 2019) on hagiographical “reception”.
15 I have tried to deliver on this suggestion in my forthcoming article, “The Heromartyrs of Cyprus” (Hollander 2020), in which
I interpret a museum dedicated to the memory of the Greek Cypriot “national struggle” against British colonial rule,
suggesting that the museum functions as an apparatus of hagiographical mediation insofar as it renders for local and
international publics an aura of sanctity around the dead anticolonial fighters.
16 It is on these grounds that Keune proposes his methodology of “prioritizing the comparative” (Keune 2019, p. 6) in
comparative hagiology, whereby the specific taxonomical boundaries of holiness, saints, religion, etc., are allowed to remain
fluid until the comparanda in question are posed to one another with a maximum of openness to possible resonances
and resemblances. Brian Siebeking helpfully tests this approach, in his contribution to this special issue, finding that the
avoidance of early definitional overdetermination not only allows for more interesting comparative insights in which the
rewards are potentially greater than the risks, but also for more effective and dexterous collaborative support for one another’s
projects (Siebeking 2019).
17 As Laurie Patton puts it, drawing on David Eckel, “modernist myths are broken [in contemporary comparative methods],
but they do not go away . . . they coexist instead with the rediscovery of traditional patterns of life and thought that were
considered long since out of date” (Patton 2000, pp. 193–94). Moreover, as McClymond observes (McClymond 2018, p. 3),
the scholarly work of comparison is itself creating (or at least intervening in) relationships between the phenomena to which
it attends, relationships bound up with power dynamics between the human representatives, agents, or addressees of
these phenomena.
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comparative hagiology, useful as they are for illuminating and accounting for the entanglement of
even apparently distinct religious phenomena.18
Where we go from here is as wide open as the breadth of imagination on the part of participants
in this series of workshops and of those in our own networks and beyond who are inspired by the
work. The collaborative commitment on the part of those involved is encouraging indeed, in light
of an academic profession that will not easily survive (or at least, will not easily flourish again) in
the absence of such collaboration. In a way, the fact of how such a contemporary hagiology is being
pursued—a circulation of drafts, an in-person negotiation of parallels and divergences, a collaborative
editing process, and a shared publication in a setting that amplifies each scholar’s contribution in light
of its resonance with the others—is as significant as the content of any of its scholarly accomplishments.
This experiment, whatever its quantifiable products, has moral implications not only for our responsibility
to steward the profession sustainably for the next generation, but also for our pedagogy as teachers of
students who will need to navigate a world of religious difference and will do so for better or worse.
The collaborative comparison in which we are engaged is—if we apply it thus—of substantial value in
the classroom, as we work to equip our students to think differently, and more precisely to think with
others, decoupling their commitments and horizons from a sense of self-evidence and offering these
destabilizing comparisons as opportunities to practice intellectual empathy and hospitality.19 If the
collaborative enterprise that has led to this collection can help cultivate the recognition that individual
excellence is not a sufficient end toward which to dedicate our scholarship, then our students, our
professional networks, and our interlocking publics will be much better for it.
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Abstract: Fully realized ethical and metaphysical concepts have intension and extension only within
an historically situated epistemic tradition. Only people who live the epistemic tradition fully
understand the concept and can accurately identify items that satisfy the concept. Such concepts
are only fully understood by those whose lives are shaped from within the epistemic tradition.
This makes comparison of ethical and metaphysical concepts across epistemic traditions difficult if not
impossible. Comparative hagiology employs theological concepts that may function differently from
ethical and metaphysical concepts. The articles in this volume seem to suggest that some theological
concepts may function as formal concepts. A formal concept is defined by rules or form, rather than
by its intensional or extensional content. Thus, formal concepts may be translatable across epistemic
traditions. Because the rules do not fully determine intension or extension, a formal concept can apply
to otherwise diverse individuals. Theological concepts may be formal concepts that could provide
the basis for comparison of the untranslatable concepts that give meaning and value to the lived
experience of people in epistemic traditions. The articles in this volume suggest several candidates
for such formal concepts.
Keywords: comparative method; comparative religions; formal concepts; hagiography; hagiology;
sainthood; theory and method in religious studies; translation
I have read the articles in this volume as an outsider. I am not a member of any religious tradition
or community, nor am I steeped in the scholarly community of comparative hagiology. While this
makes me reticent to offer commentary, Todd French argues that the inclusion of outside scholarly
perspectives can aid the discussion (French 2019). My recent work has been on the translation of
ethical concepts between traditions, not the comparison of concepts across traditions. Translation in the
context in which I work means taking the concept epistemic tradition and claiming that there is a fully
synonymous concept in another. In my work, I have argued that ethical and metaphysical concepts
are historically situated, socially constructed, and are only meaningful within an epistemic tradition
(Guilfoy 2018). The concept of “saint” cannot be carried over into a non-Christian tradition or applied
in a non-Christian tradition. The concept of saint only has meaning and content as culturally and
historically situated within the Christian epistemic tradition. Such a tradition defines the world and
what exists in it, sets the standards for epistemic practice, and provides a framework of meaning and
value for people’s lived experience. There literally cannot be a saint outside the tradition in which the
concept is defined, because the epistemic tradition defines the concept for that tradition from within
that tradition. This is not a conclusion I am happy with. One scholar has argued that as a result, there
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can be no meaningful cross-cultural conversations.1 Translation between traditions may be impossible.
The articles in this volume and the conference workshop have given me hope that comparison is not.
An example from my own college experience illustrates both what I mean by translation and the
difference I see between translation and comparison. My experience in comparative religion ended in
the 1980s when a professor asserted that the Great Spirit was like the Judeo-Christian God, just less
fully developed and understood by Native Americans. This seemed absurd and more than a little
racist. Thus, this college freshman never took another religious studies class.
My professor attempted translation not comparison. She attempted to apply, without modification,
the ethical, theological and metaphysical concepts of one tradition into another. My professor looked at
a different tradition to find an analogue for a key concept in her own. Finding something similar enough,
she declared the differences to be the result of their inadequate understanding of her concept. At best,
translation creates a shallow and trivial grasp of cultures and traditions.2 At worst, it is imperialistic.
The discomfort authors in this Special Issue have with cross-cultural application of the concept “saint”
shows that it is an historically situated and culturally defined concept that cannot be translated into
non-Christian traditions.3 I worry that I am doing the same thing in this comment. In what follows,
I suggest that the underlying problem can be understood as a philosophical problem—a problem of
conceptual translation. With all the arrogance of a philosopher, I suggest that the philosophical concept
of a formal concept might help religious studies scholars to better understand their own project.
The argument that translation is impossible is simple enough to outline. The versions I’m most
familiar with were developed from the logic and philosophy of science in the last century.4 Quine
argued that kind terms naming physical objects are not translatable between cultures. When a German
points at an object and says “katze,” there is no guarantee that the German’s ontology includes cats as I
understand cats. In the strongest form of Quine’s argument, even concepts that apply by ostension
to items we can experience via the senses cannot be translated between epistemic communities
(Quine 1969). The German’s ontology can be radically different from my own but phenomenologically
indistinguishable. She may literally be pointing at a different object from the one I see. Ontology
is relative to epistemic tradition. Ethical, theological, and metaphysical concepts are not reducible
to shared sensory experience. Their meanings are socially constructed and historically situated.
The conceptual frame form for identifying an object that satisfies an ethical or metaphysical concept is
more complex and, because it is evaluative, cannot be reduced to sensory experience. “Saint” is such a
concept. It is not merely an evaluative ethical concept, it is a concept that also includes a vast amount
of culturally created value and meaning that shapes the lived experience of those in the Christian
tradition. Saints literally do not exist in other epistemic traditions.
1 Rowe (2016), develops and defends this concept of translation. See especially chapter 7 and 8. I doubt I apply the concept
with the same intension as he does. Like all excellent philosophical arguments, Rowe leads one through a series of reasonable
and well-argued steps to a counter intuitive and controversial conclusion: it is not possible to have meaningful ethical
discussions across traditions. Translation by analogy, or connotation, or vagueness, may be possible, but this is beyond the
scope of this reply. Rowe cites Alastair Macintyre as providing a potential model for one tradition to compare and learn from
another (MacIntyre 1990). Comparison is possible when an individual in one culture learns another as a “second Language.”
However, comparison, as Rowe describes it, is the evaluative, even judgmental comparison that is ethically problematic
(Rowe 2016).
2 There are advantages to trivial understanding (see Stout 1988). Ineffable metaphysical issue spawn irresolvable disputes.
Many have died over an iota of difference. Acknowledging superficial similarities and ignoring unanswerable disputes
about metaphysics can encourage tolerance. On the other hand, it is precisely those ineffable metaphysical issues that give
meaning and value to people’s lives.
3 Many in this volume have responded favorably to Keune’s use of “hagio-” rather than “saint-” “Hagio-” is a likely candidate
as a formal concept, one that can allow for cross cultural comparison (Keune 2019). I believe this is why Keune’s suggestion
has been favorably received. In order to focus on the problems using untranslatable concepts, I will continue to use “saint”
and its variants.
4 There are other versions that developed in political theory (Hayek 2011; Gaus 2016) and in the post-modern tradition.
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I find something comparable to this line of thought in all the articles in this volume. Of course,
as an outsider, I cannot be sure that any of the authors understand the project as I do.5 Each of the
authors attempts to avoid the pitfalls of translation. French describes a method of collaborative checks
to insure that one is not translating concepts between cultures (French 2019). This collaborative model
could produce an understanding of how ethical, theological, and metaphysical concepts function in
different cultures. If we are careful, perhaps, we can compare the forms and function of patronage
and veneration exhibited by particular individuals in different epistemic traditions and thus, better
understand the many forms of patronage and veneration. There are limits. We cannot know the
meaning and value of what we label veneration and patronage in the lived experience of the people
engaged in the practices we compare. There is also the risk that a group of scholars actively engaged to
insure that ethical, metaphysical, and evaluative terms are not misapplied from one culture to another,
find themselves with literally nothing to talk about.
The other contributions to this volume point towards a reliance on formal concepts as a way
to ground meaningful cross-cultural comparison. A formal concept is a concept defined by rules
or form, rather than by its intensional or extensional content. Formal concepts are not uncommon.
“Good” may seem like an untranslatable ethical concept. What is identified as “good” varies radically
across epistemic traditions. The precise intensional and extensional content of one tradition’s concept
of “good” cannot be translated into a different cultural and epistemic context. Nonetheless, we are
quite comfortable treating “good” as a formal concept. X is understood as good in one tradition.
Y is understood to be good in another. We can delineate a set of observable “behaviors, practices,
beliefs and productions” that allow us to identify different conceptions of the good in other epistemic
traditions (Rondolino 2019). We can observe and compare the way a fully realized concept “good”
functions in different traditions.
To explain my point, I am going to focus on Rondolino’s contribution. Yet, the other contributors
are equally suggestive. Keune questions the value of fully stipulative definitions and suggests that we
“step back and reconsider whether it truly is the case that we must clearly define our key terms before
proceeding with comparison” (Keune 2019). Ritchey’s list of concepts contains several that could be
formal concepts (Ritchey 2019). There is a way of constructing taxonomies with formal concepts in
the subaltern categories. DeValerio’s taxonomy could be developed as a nominalist tree of porphyry
(DiValerio 2019). That is, with rules that determine several distinct sets of individuals that satisfy
the formal concept “perfected.” There would be compassionate, sacrificial, and spiritual, species of
“perfected” but not simply perfected beings.6
In Rondolino’s argument hagiography could easily be a formal concept. (Rondolino 2019). Rondolino
suggests we jettison the concept “saint” as too culturally specific, and adopt a definition of hagiography
that rests on an embedded concept of “perfection.”7 In the spirit of DiValerio’s argument, I suggest
that he could build a formal taxonomy of perfection. There are multiple fully realized concepts of who
is perfected in different traditions. Each tradition will have its own metaphysical beliefs about what a
person is, flaws or shortcomings, the path to fixing those flaws, and ultimately, what a person would
look like flawless. Each fully realized concept of perfection is only meaningful within a tradition.
A saint is a person who has achieved perfection as understood in the Christian tradition. The perfected
Hindu would not have the qualities, actions, etc., that define value and provide meaning to a person
5 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for demonstrating that translation itself is an untranslatable concept between
various academic disciplines. I hope I have presented my discipline’s version of the concept clearly. The word “translation”
is the same across disciplines. However, the concept signified by the word is quite different. Thus, the items identified as
satisfying that concept within one discipline may not be identified as satisfying the concept within another. At best, there
are confusing usages of the word “translate” to indicate analogous concepts.
6 In a nominalist tree of Porphyry, only the lowest level of the taxonomy specifies individuals. There are foxes, rats, and
ants, but strictly speaking, no animals. A fox satisfies the rules for being called an animal, but is only fully realized as a fox.
To paraphrase Peter Abelard, only discreet individuals exist, but there are rules governing where they fall into categories.
7 One of the rules governing the application of the formal concept hagiography is that the individual who satisfies the concept
be “perfected.”
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in the Christian tradition. A person perfected in the Hindu tradition would not satisfy the concept
“saint.” By clarifying the rules that allow us to identify individuals recognized as perfected, we can do
comparative hagiology. However, is “perfection” a formal concept that would allow comparison?
“Perfection” is clearly central to Rondolino’s re-definition of hagiography: “The complex web of
behaviors, practices, beliefs and productions (literary, visual, acoustic, etc.) in and by which a given
community constructs the memory of individuals who are recognized as the embodied perfection of the
“religious” ideal promoted by the community’s tradition and socio-cultural context” (Rondolino 2019).
Rondolino’s perfection is questionable. Does the concept of “perfection” have rules and a form
sufficient to be satisfied in radically different, perhaps mutually exclusive ways in different traditions?
Is there a cross-culturally identifiable form, function, or structure of “perfection” that can identify
(most of) the radically different individuals identified in different traditions as perfect?
The first clause of Rondolino’s definition describes observable behavior, (provided we take reports
of beliefs as behavior.) The problem is in identifying any set of behaviors as constructing the memory
of individuals recognized as embodied perfection. “Good” works as a formal concept because the
behaviors indicative that something has satisfied the rules for applying the concept are fairly clear
and universal.8 The concept of “Perfection” and the behaviors that would indicate a response to
perfection seem more complex and irreducibly culturally situated. Only those living an epistemic and
ethical culture can truly understand what perfection is, why it is perfection, what is being perfected,
etc. The behavioral responses to “perfection” can only arise in a tradition that has a well-developed
concept of the perfect. The observable behaviors people engage in to construct the memory of the
perfected individual are themselves socially constructed. The meaning of the behaviors is established
within the lived experience of those whose lives are shaped by the tradition. I doubt there is a way to
identify a culture’s behavioral responses to perfection without translating our concept perfection into
that culture. “Perfection” may be an untranslatable concept.
Ritchey’s example of Christina makes me think these are more than just academic worries.
“Although her (Christina’s) devotional behavior struck her contemporaries as positively aberrant—at
one point, she is described as climbing into treetops to pray while rolling herself into a ball like a
hedgehog (ericei)—Christina was clearly revered by her contemporaries” (Ritchey 2019). Christina
may have been revered, but she was also viewed as “aberrant” and “not to be imitated.” I do not see a
set of rules governing a formal concept of “perfection” that would be satisfied by Christina and Francis.
It seems that any observable behavior can be identified as a culturally created response to a perfected
individual. We have not left medieval Europe yet.
Ritchey’s suggestion of “extra-ordinary” is promising for two reasons. “Extra-ordinary” does
not have potentially untranslatable concepts embedded in its definition. Each epistemic tradition will
have different understanding of what is ordinary and what is extra-ordinary. This binary is much more
fundamental to basic issues of ethics and metaphysics than “perfection.” It should be easier to identify
what an epistemic tradition deems ordinary and extra-ordinary than it would be to identify what it
deems perfect.9
“Extra-ordinary” may be too genic for the discipline of comparative hagiology. Rondolino’s
definition of hagiography also includes the embedded concept of “religion.” This seems perfectly
reasonable in the context. But untranslatable. There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy.
Is Buddhism philosophy or religion?10 As I see it, the question involves a category mistake. The concepts
“philosophy” and “religion” are historically situated concepts that provided meaning in a certain
8 I noted above that we are comfortable treating “good” as a formal concept. Largely, this is because we can track fairly basic
human behaviors, attraction and aversion, etc. Attraction and aversion responses are indicative of what a person will judge
to be good and bad. This does not give us a very deep understanding of different conceptions of the good, only a way to
identify them. This analysis starts with Hobbes, but is also the basis of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt 2012).
9 I must admit I am imagining a sort of universal look of confusion as the primary indication of the “extra-ordinary.”
10 The battle is usually joined between departments that don’t want responsibility for teaching material outside their cultural
comfort zone.
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epistemic tradition. The question translates the concepts into a tradition where they cannot possibly
apply. “Extra-ordinary” as a formal concept avoids this issue. This makes “extra-ordinary” much more
useful as a formal concept, but runs the risk remove the intellectual core of comparative hagiology.
I am worried that, at best, this brief comment has simply illustrated the problems of applying the
conceptual scheme and epistemic process from one discipline to another. I have suggested that the
concept of a formal concept may be translatable across epistemic traditions. Such formal concepts
could provide the basis for comparison of the richer, more fully developed, and untranslatable concepts
that give meaning and value to the lived experience of people in epistemic traditions. I am also keenly
aware that I may have just repeated the error of my only religious studies professor and demonstrated
all the complexities inherent in comparative and interdisciplinary work. I have employed my limited
understanding of your project. You seem to be engaged in a form of analysis I can understand from
within my own discipline. With all the arrogance of a philosopher, I have suggested a way you can
meet the standards of my field. This makes me deeply uncomfortable. There are many fields where the
response to such an incursion would be unprintable. This discomfort may be necessary. The authors
in this volume have suggested several procedures and guidelines for ethical comparative hagiology.
Regardless of how good the procedures and guidelines are, success depends on humility, openness,
respect, and above all good will among the contributors to the discussion.
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